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CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
IN HUNGARY: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
LÁSZLÓ PÉTER 
School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, London, 
England 
The need for an historical perspective 
The past offers perspectives on what is permanent and what has changed. 
If political analysis confines itself to the present it will breed a myopic view of 
society and its prospects. In the history of modern Hungary the past and the 
present are brought together by the endeavour to create a west European type 
of civil society. Nineteenth-century Hungarian politicians and intellectuals 
strived to attain that social order and a century later their successors are still 
groping for it. 
The reform of church-state relations in the nineteenth century was just as 
important a part of the endeavour to create a civil society as it is now after 
the collapse of Communism. It would be wrong to assume that the Communist 
system of church-state relations was entirely the product of the post-war 
regime. The system had a good deal less to do with the Communist form of 
government and ideology and a good deal more affinity with the legal and 
political traditions of eastern Europe than is generally assumed. Before the 
Second World War most of the Churches in Hungary had enjoyed privileges, 
legal rights and internal autonomy on a far wider scale than that to which they 
were reduced after 1948. The ideological conflict between nineteenth-century 
liberalism and religion was trifling compared with that between Marxism-Le-
ninism and religion. Living under the barrage of fierce anti-religious propa-
ganda, the Churches were subject to the sternest restrictions even after the 1956 
revolution when the regime had become more tolerant towards its ideological 
enemies. Differences in the treatment of the Churches before and after the 
Communist takeover, though fundamental, should not obscure the fact that 
important principles on which church-state relations rested after 1948 were 
similar to those on which they had rested in the past. 
The turning point came with the collapse of the Communist system. In 
1989-1990 church-state relations were not restored to what they had been 
before 1949. The significance of Law IV of 1990 "On the Freedom of 
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Conscience and Religion and On the Churches" can be established only by 
looking at how church-state relations have evolved to become what they are 
today. We need not move back further than the nineteenth century, the age in 
which liberal politicians regulated the position of the Churches. It provides a 
most instructive historical perspective. 
A historical perspective sheds light on the similarities between the aspir-
ations of nineteenth-century Hungarian liberals and the country's recent liberal 
transformation. Politicians today, as in the last century, aspire to create a west 
European type of civil society in which the individuals, endowed with the same 
rights and duties, are equal and are subject to a single system of statute laws. 
Politicians today insist, as they did in the nineteenth century, that the law 
should treat all religions equally. Today the chances of accomplishing equality 
in church-state relations are better than they were a century ago. For, as we 
shall presently see, there were great differences in the position of the Churches 
and religions towards the state in Hungary as there were elsewhere. Until quite 
recently differences between the eastern and the western half of the Continent 
in this, as in many other respects, were considerable.1 
In west European civil society relationships between the state authorities 
and organised social groups were largely governed by statute laws and other 
legal norms, which applied equally to all. In Hungary and other east European 
countries customary laws predominated. Here the motley of government 
ordinances, instructions, prohibitions, licences as well as agreements and ad 
hoc arrangements - the product of bargaining between the civil authorities and 
individual Churches - generated a diversity of administrative practices and 
insecurely held privileges. These permitted each Church to function within its 
own circumscribed area of religious life. In order to explain church-state 
relations, first a general feature of the legal system, the autocratic principle of 
the law should be examined. 
The autocratic principle of the law 
The right of the government to issue decrees on its own authority {motu et 
potestate proprio), which I call the autocratic principle, informed the relation-
ship between the subject (later citizen), on the one hand, and the political 
authorities in Germany and the Habsburg Monarchy, on the other, before and 
during the nineteenth century. As we shall presently see, the autocratic 
principle, which rested on a presumption of the law, obstructed the freedom 
of the subject. Liberals in central Europe, however, found an effective remedy 
to counteract the consequences of the autocratic principle. A convenient way 
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to examine the autocratic principle is to contrast the presumption of the law 
as regards the citizen's rights in western Europe with the presumption of the 
law on the eastern side of the Rhine. 
In the law of evidence, the rebuttable presumption of law (presumptio juris) 
is either on the side of the citizen (and the group of citizens) or on that of the 
state authority. In the liberal states of western Europe, where the enforcement 
of civil rights was concerned, the presumption was on the side of the citizen. 
In conflicts between state officials, on the one hand, and the citizen and the 
group, on the other, the onus rested on the official to demonstrate that his 
action was authorised by statute law.2 In the Habsburg Monarchy, in Imperial 
Germany and elsewhere, the presumption of the law was on the side of the 
state authorities: in case of conflict, the burden of proof did not rest with the 
official but with the opposite side. The citizen (or the group), seeking legal 
redress against an alleged wrong done by the state official, had to produce 
evidence that the law expressly protected his interests on the point at issue. 
This difference in the presumption of the law between the two parts of Europe 
had momentous consequences. 
In western Europe, where the law was silent, the citizen was said to be free. 
In the legal systems beyond the Rhine, the opposite prevailed: where the law 
was silent, the individual and the social group were not expressly protected by 
laws, it was the state authorities who were 'free'.3 We have now reached the 
heart of the matter. The state authorities in central and eastern Europe could 
lawfully issue decrees and act at their own discretion in matters which 
interfered with the individual and the group. Enacted statute law restricted the 
area in which the authorities could lawfully act. And beyond the restrictions 
which statute law imposed on the official lay the sphere in which the 
authorities were either free from any legal restrictions in their dealings with the 
citizen {freie Verwaltung) or the government reduced the discretionary powers 
of the subordinate official by issuing a decree or order, an action to which it 
had a prima facie right.* 
This right, the autocratic principle of the law, recognised by jurists before 
as well as after 1848,5 was an accepted part of the Hungarian legal system. In 
Art. XII of 1790 the monarch promised to issue edicts only when the law was 
otherwise unaffected6 and to exercise 'executive power' in sensu legum. Law III 
of 1848 enacted that the executive power was to be exercised by the monarch 
through an 'independent Hungarian ministry in the sense of the law'.7 The 
wording allowed the survival of the autocratic principle. Para. 19 Law IV of 
1869 ordained that judges had to proceed on the basis of statute law, rendelet 
(government decree), 'based on statute law',8 and lawful custom. The debate in 
the House over the paragraph was instructive in that it clearly revealed that 
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the phrase 'based on statute law' merely required that the decree should not 
contravene statute law.9 The judge, before application, had to establish 
whether or not the rendelet was lawful and he invariably applied government 
rendelet whenever in his view it did not conflict with consvetudo,10 the 
enactments of decreta, or statute law. Under this legal system, based on the 
autocratic principle, individual rights were in essence 'concessions' from the 
state made either through independent executive action or by legislation. Thus 
the old question of sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes acquired special signifi-
cance. 
The German and Austrian liberals' remedy against the consequences of the 
autocratic principle was the Rechtsstaat, the State based on the rule of law. 
Liberals demanded formal declarations and entrenched civil rights as constitu-
tional guarantees. They also insisted on detailed and comprehensive statutory 
provisions that covered every conceivable situation in order to establish 
freedom for the individual. Local self-government, participation in the admin-
istration of the commune, was another guarantee, and liberals were especially 
eager to institute administrative courts - effective instruments of redress for 
the individual and the group against state interference. These were the liberal 
remedies in central Europe whose realisation in the late nineteenth century 
mitigated the dangers to liberal freedom inherent in the autocratic presump-
tion of the law. 
Hungarian constitutionalists applied some of the liberal remedies to 
counterbalance the effects of the autocratic principle. They introduced equality 
before the law. Also, they passed a few short laws which protected the right 
to private property, freedom of movement, work and contract, and other 
personal freedoms. Their record on civil rights, however, turned out to be 
patchy. Above all, they failed to create a statutory framework and provide 
sufficient institutional guarantees to protect civil rights in order to mitigate the 
effects both of the autocratic presumption of the law and of the overwhelming 
social power of the landowners over the rest of the population. 
The legal position of the Churches 
The autocratic principle obtained a powerful, although by no means 
exclusive, influence on the legal position of the Churches. The liberal objective 
was the creation of a legal order which safeguarded liberty of conscience and 
equality of religions. Yet liberal efforts led to unexpected results. As regards 
religion the customary rights of society interacted with the customary laws of 
the state: the enforced ministerial and local rendelets. In addition, statute laws 
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protected religious rights as they had done for centuries under the ancient 
constitution. The interaction of these three legal sources after 1867, paradoxi-
cally in the liberal age, did not create equality but a hierarchy of religious 
classes. 
In multidenominational11 and polyglot Hungary religion, nationality and 
social class sometimes coincided. The coincidence reinforced cultural differen-
ces and created in parts of the country what J. S. Furnivall described as 'plural 
society'.12 The coexistence of religions was regulated by the crown and by 
statute law. The monarch's powers in religious matters were wide, were partly 
outside parliament's control and, being largely customary, were undefined. 
The Roman Catholic Church was firmly tied to the crown through the ius 
patronatus, the monarch's claim to make church appointments.13 The Church 
enjoyed the full protection of the monarch at the expense of its independence 
which was eroded in the late eighteenth century through the Erastian, 
Josephist, as they were called, policies of the civil government. The Protestant 
Churches, though in the past hemmed in by restrictions, were self-governing 
communities, whose pastors and elders were elected by the congregations. The 
Calvinist Church was as closely associated with the national cause as the 
Roman Catholic Church was held to be a promoter of Habsburg interests.14 
The degree of autonomy the various Churches attained differed widely, 
although their ultimate control by the crown and their supervision by the civil 
authorities invariably set limits to their self-government. For the monarch had, 
since the eighteenth century, claimed ius supremae inspections and for a much 
longer time, iura circa sacra which, like the ius supremae patronatus, exercised 
over the Roman Catholic Church, amounted to a collection of autocratic 
practices.15 Most of the Church synods and congresses deliberated in the 
presence of a royal commissar or an inspector and their more important 
decisions were implemented only after they had been approved by the monarch 
or his minister. The crown approved the appointments of the prelates in the 
Orthodox Church16 and 'confirmed' the appointment of Transylvania's Cal-
vinist bishop.17 No Church was ever separated from the state. The Churches 
themselves did not want separation. They wished to be legally recognised, to 
be endowed with church statutes, to be entitled to legal and administrative 
protection by the state, including the right to seek help from the civil 
authorities to enforce their own regulations and to maintain internal disci-
pline.18 Above all, Churches expected subsidies from the government to pay 
their clergy and support their schools. The system, which liberals were set to 
reform, with its highly fragmented and ad hoc arrangements, was the product 
of the Churches' evolving customary rights combined with direct ministerial 
intervention based on the autocratic principle. 
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Equality of religion in legislation 
Liberty of conscience and the protection of free worship by statute law were 
indispensable parts of the liberal agenda. Furthermore, a distinguishing mark 
of Hungarian constitutionalism was the belief in the legal equality of religions. 
In contrast to nationality, this principle included the granting of autonomy by 
law equally to all the established Churches of multidenominational Hungary. 
Two attitudes, anticlericalism and the equality of Jews, were most closely 
associated with what liberals stood for. Anticlericals - particularly of the 
Protestant liberal opposition - demanded after 1867 that the Roman Catholic 
Church be stripped of its privileges, that its property be secularized or, at least, 
the Roman Catholic funds19 be absorbed into state revenues and be shared out 
equally among the other Churches. But there were Roman Catholic liberals -
mostly on the government side - who, instead of antagonising their Church, 
hoped to reform it from the inside. Their aim was Church autonomy: the 
introduction of lay participation in the Catholic Church which would then 
administer Church funds. Jewish equality in 1867 had a more general appeal 
to the literate public and to parliament than anticlericalism. It concerned first 
the demand that Jews' civil and political disabilities be removed and in these 
respects Jews were emancipated in 1867 by Law XVII. The two short 
paragraphs declared that the Jews 'in respect of civil and political rights are 
equal' to Christians and that 'all contrary law, custom and rendelet are thereby 
abolished'.20 Hungarian liberals also understood by the equality of the Jews 
that their religion should be recognised by law and that antisemitism in politics 
should be resisted. 
These attitudes came naturally to politicians in Hungary where Protestants 
had demanded freedom for their religion for well over two centuries before the 
liberal age. The Diet of 1790 reaffirmed the Protestants' 'liberties'; it also 
established the civil and political rights of the Orthodox Christians and 
recognised the privileges of their Church.21 These and other measures had been 
antecedents to the introduction of the liberal principle of religious freedom 
which was proclaimed (if, for the moment, one disregards the small print) by 
Law XX of 1848: 
Complete equality and reciprocity without any discrimination are hereby declared 
among all the lawfully received religious denominations of the fatherland (para. 2). 
Nineteen years later the minister in charge of religion (the so-called kultusz) 
and public education was, as he had been in 1848, József Eötvös. The minister 
and parliament were as committed to religious freedom and equality after 1867 
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as they had been in 1848. As we find from the Journal, the slogan which 
invariably won 'general approval' in the House - perhaps because it was hardly 
ever used in any specific sense - was 'free church in a free state'.22 The House 
on all sides expected the government to act 'in the spirit of 1848' and Eötvös 
needed no urging. He had been a champion of the liberty of conscience and of 
the equality of all religions for decades, insisting that these principles should 
be realised through generally applicable enacted statute law.23 In June 1868 
Eötvös, speaking in the House for the Cabinet, gave a commitment to bring 
in legislation to implement what Law XX of 1848 had already promulgated. 
But the reform of the Roman Catholic Church had to come first, comprehen-
sive legislation should come only afterwards. Meanwhile temporary measures 
would be introduced.24 The Preamble of Eötvös's bill (Law LIII of 1868) On 
Reciprocity Between the Lawfully Received Christian Religions declared that: 
Until the equal rights of religions25 are regulated in general, as regards the reciprocity 
between the Christian religions, by virtue of Law XX of 1848, the following are enacted. 
The Law provided a few regulations dealing with the conversions normally 
attending mixed marriages between Christians.26 The measure was small beer 
after the bold principles pronounced in 1848 and the House accepted the 
Central Committee's plea to instruct the ministry to bring in legislation during 
the following parliament in order to 'establish the equal rights of religious 
denominations in general' and to 'remove all the [legal] obstacles' to the 
realisation of the principle.27 The Andrássy Cabinet and its successors, 
however, dodged this obligation28 partly because the attempt to reform the 
Catholic Church ran into the sand.29 After a long interval Law XXXI of 1894, 
then, established civil marriage and Law XLIII of 1895, On the Free Exercise of 
Religion, enacted general principles and tacitly allowed the citizen to adhere to 
no religious denomination. The first paragraph clearly proclaimed the liberty of 
conscience with great aplomb: everyone was free to profess and follow any 
creed or religion, and practise it within the limits of the law and of public 
morality: no one was to be obstructed in practising his religion as long as it did 
not contravene the law, or public morality. And no one was to be compelled to 
perform religious acts against his beliefs. The rest of the law, however, as we 
shall presently see, did not establish the statutory framework of church-state 
relations. Instead it whittled away at the very principles the first paragraph had 
been at pains to establish: it systematised the hierarchy of religions - the motley 
of privileges based on customary law, royal decree and ministerial ordinance. 
Thus the law after 1867 was, in some respects, moving towards the ideal of 
confessional egyenjogúság (equality of rights). But Hungarian liberals at no 
10 LÁSZLÓ PÉTER 
time established either liberty of conscience or the equality of religions. 
Moreover, unwittingly, for it was not quite understood at the time, liberals 
created a discriminatory class system for religion which was an affront to the 
very principles they professed. A striking fact which characterised the system 
was the limited role that legislation played in shaping church-state relations 
except in the mid-1890s. Instead, the customary rights of the Church and of 
the civil authorities appear to be the decisive factors. The growing importance 
of ministerial rendelete - the customary law of the ministry - was a significant 
part of this pattern.30 By the end of the century, the Roman Catholic Church 
was more dependent on the government than it had been in the 1860s;31 its 
dependence grew through episcopal appointments.32 Church funds were han-
dled by the officials of the kultusz ministry, a tutelage which diminished the 
Church's ability to resist the government's intervention in its affairs. 
Eötvös and his successors, as the crown's kultusz ministers, were more 
successful with the Protestant and the Eastern Orthodox Churches in setting 
them on the course towards internal self-government. The powers were there 
in 1867 for Eötvös to turn to liberal purposes: they were vested in the crown 
by custom and exercised through the kultusz minister who either countersigned 
the royal enactments or acted with the monarch's prior approval.33 Only 
exceptionally did Eötvös turn to parliament in order to enact measures. 
Parliament never saw most of the enactments and even the Cabinet did not 
discuss many of them. Some measures had been countersigned by the minister 
after consultations with the Churches and promulgated by the monarch as 
royal decrees. A royal decree - a kind of contract between the crown and a 
Church as distinct from statute law or ministerial rendelet - guaranteed 
security to the Church. Other measures appeared as ministerial ordinances or 
rescripts, with express reference to the monarch's authorisation in the Pre-
amble. But frequently the kultusz minister introduced measures through 
ministerial ordinance after consultation with religious leaders and normally 
with the king's prior approval. 
The three classes of religion 
With one hand, the law began to remove the legal disabilities of the 
Lutheran, the Calvinist and the Orthodox Christian Churches in 1790 and 
later, of the Unitarians in 1848, and of the Jews in 1867, and again in 1895. 
This was a process of equalisation: it did not establish equality and reciprocity 
among the Churches; it did, however, point in that direction. With the other 
hand, however, the law introduced a graduated system of privileges. Inequal-
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ities in the civil and political rights of Churches were created by kultusz 
ministry rendelets and statute laws as well as by royal rescripts and by social 
custom - which remained a potent source of law. 
The state offered the Churches protection, recognised their old rights, 
conferred new rights on them, including that of self-government, and brought 
them under control by extending the scope of ministerial tutelage. Liberals 
justified ministerial tutelage over the Churches on the grounds that they 
received subsidies in order to carry out 'state tasks'. Churches kept the birth, 
death and marriage registers after 1867, some of the Churches administered 
marriage law in their own courts and Churches ran most of the elementary and 
grammar schools in the country. Yet church-state relations were not brought 
within a common statutory framework after 1867 except in a sense so broad 
as to be meaningless. In fact, the Churches fell, perforce, into a hierarchy of 
three legal classes as a consequence of the evolution of customary law and of 
independent executive action - the customary law of the state. Subsequently, 
this process was, in part, recognised by statute law. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, under the auspices of the Liberal governments, an extra-
ordinary system had come into existence which was founded on rigid legal 
classes of 'received', 'recognised' and 'tolerated' religions.34 Statues nowhere 
defined these classes but merely recognised them as products of customary law. 
Received religions 
The class of received religions was generated by nineteenth-century custom-
ary law; statute law took cognizance of it, and used it for its own purposes. 
Article XXVI of 1790 referred to the Lutheran and the Calvinist Churches as 
in sensu pacificationum receptis.35 'Received religion' was, then, used by the 
legislator in the nineteenth century. Law IV of 1844 declared that non-nobles 
of 'any of the lawfully received religions' could possess 'noble property' (i.e. 
land) and Law V established the principle that non-nobles of 'any of the 
lawfully received religions' were capable of holding public office. Significantly, 
the law did not say which religions belonged to the class of received religions.30 
Para. 2, Law V of 1848 established parliamentary franchise for (male) persons 
of 'the lawfully received religions without restriction', yet again, the law did 
not say which Churches. 
The above cases speak loudly of the prominent place that received religion, 
as a legal class, acquired in the Hungarian social order. Yet a search through 
the Corpus Juris Hungarici would fail to disclose either the meaning of the 
term, or the rights that belonging to a received religion conferred on a person, 
or provide a list of the Churches to which the class applied. There were only 
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two cases in which statute law 'received1 a particular religion: the Unitarians 
were received by Law XX of 1848, and the Jewish religion by Law XLII of 
1895. The Orthodox Church was habitually accorded the status of received 
religion in the nineteenth century on the strength of the autonomous rights 
recognised by statute law in 1790 and 1792,3-7 without ever being declared by 
statute law to be 'received'. Again, Law XX of 1848 declared 'complete 
equality' among the 'lawfully received religious denominations' without any 
explanation as to which religions were to be included.38 Nor did Eötvös feel 
any need to enlighten the House in this regard when in the autumn of 1868 he 
submitted the bill which became Law LIII of 1868 'On Reciprocity Between 
the Lawfully Received Christian Religions'. It was common knowledge that at 
the time the Catholics of all rites, Orthodox Christians, the two large 
Protestant Churches, and the Unitarians qualified; it was not quite (or not yet) 
communis opinio. For the Catholic Church never expressly abandoned its claim 
to be the avita and haereditaria religio rather than just one of the received 
religions.39 Communis opinio, court rulings, and the kultusz ministry together, 
as makers of customary law, shaped the views on received religion. In a 
long-forgotten yet illuminating ministerial rendelet to the town of Pest as 
regards the status of the Nazarenes, Eötvös pointed out that the Nazarenes 
had not been lawfully received, and that 'our laws concede [engednek] rights 
only to received religions and only with them can the government communi-
cate officially'.40 Eötvös's successor, Trefort, in 1887, insisting that the Roman 
Catholic Church was a received religion, explained that 
The term 'received religion' in public law means that the religion is placed under the 
protection of the law:41 it receives legal protection and guarantee of its rights; 
furthermore it means that those professing that religion are endowed with certain 
religious and political rights.42 
This definition was too loose and it had to be; any other stipulative 
definition would have run into difficulties. A typical product of customay law, 
the position of each of the received religions differed from the rest.*3 We might 
well say that a religion was 'received' if the public and the authorities regarded 
it as such - something that the minister obviously would not state. 
For constitutional lawyers and historians, the discrepancies - so far as they 
noticed them at all - appeared as anomalies which were sooner or later 
rectified. But far from being the anomalies of a statutory system, they were the 
haphazard arrangements which one would expect to see in a partly customary 
legal order in which the effects of the autocratic presumption of the law were 
not mitigated by general yet detailed statutory provisions. 
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Tolerated religions 
Religions which customary law in 1867 did not treat as being received were 
merely tolerated by the authorities, largely at their discretion. This was the 
obverse of the Hungarian liberal record, which Eötvös' ordinance on the 
Nazarenes exposed. This course followed from the autocratic principle of the 
law towards which the liberals' attitude was ambivalent. Eötvös and Deák 
sometimes clearly asserted the liberal principle that an executive order was 
lawful only if it was expressly authorised by statute law;44 at other times, at 
least implicitly, they endorsed the autocratic principle. In office, the liberals 
were flexible: they tried to circumvent the autocratic principle by conferring 
'recognition' on non-received religions as a 'concession' by the State. 
But the class of recognised religion did not yet exist in 1867. Nor did any 
general statutory enactment, like fundamental laws, secure personal freedom 
in Hungary. There was not even a law of association that might have been 
applied to Churches. The local authorities and the kultusz ministry issued, 
without statutory authorisation on the basis of established administrative 
practice, the so-called úzus, rendelets which regulated and controlled associ-
ations, including religious groups. A different treatment was meted out to each 
of the various confessions. When the Nazarenes approached the town of Pest 
in 1868 to ask for their own registers, Eötvös issued the rendelet already 
quoted:45 as 'our laws concede rights only to received religions' of which the 
Nazarene was not one, wrote Eötvös, the government could not recognise their 
actions as authoritative;*6 and they could not, therefore, keep their own 
registers 'as yet'. The government did not wish, however, to compel anybody 
to register with one of the received religions against his conviction. Eötvös 
instructed the Nazarenes to report births and deaths to the civil authorities 
who would arrange registration on their behalf with the office of the received 
religion 'to which the Nazarene had formerly belonged'. Furthermore, until 
legislation was introduced, 'the government and the authorities would be 
compelled' to treat children born into Nazarene marriages as illegitimate, with 
all the consequences of such treatment for the inheritance of property. 
Legislation was not, however, forthcoming from the government. Instead, 
the úzus towards the Nazarenes and other 'sects' was developed further by the 
authorities. Minister Trefort drew the anti-liberal conclusions implicit in 
Eötvös' 1868 order: there was a need, the minister declared in a rendelet issued 
in 1875,47 to extend 'police supervision' to confessions 'which are not regularly 
organised'. The Nazarenes, 'and other similar sects not lawfully received, 
whatever they called themselves' were to fulfil their legal obligations towards 
the received religons. Trefoil's ordinance took the 'concessionary' view of 
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religious rights to extreme lengths in order to argue that members of the 
Nazarene Church and other sects were in law still members of the lawfully 
received religion from which they (or their parents) had defected. They were 
to pay all the church taxes due to the received religion that they had left. 
Recognised religions 
Because the presumption of the law was on the side of state authority, 
conferring privileges on particular Churches could, arguably, secure freedom 
of worship more effectively than statutory declarations of general principles 
(unless, of course, the declaration was supported by detailed provisions). The 
monarch's approval was also easier to obtain for conferring particular privi-
leges than for blanket legislation of freedom of worship. But in 1867, the 
government could not arrange the legislative 'reception' of particular religions 
without opening the door to sectarian strife. It possessed, however, the 
customary right to 'recognise' particular Churches by rendelet. Just as the class 
of received religion was a product of society's customary law, the class of 
recognised religion was generated by the kultusz ministry after 1867 to fill the 
gap between the received churches and the tolerated sects. 
There was growing political support in parliament for some form, of 
recognition for the Jewish religion, which in law was still 'merely tolerated'.48 
From the early nineteenth century immigration from Galicia was swelling the 
country's Jewish population. Jews fought in Kossuth's army in 1848^49, were 
rapidly 'Magyarising' and accepted the gentry's leadership of society, as well 
as the programme of building a Hungarian civil society, more easily than did 
the intelligentsia of the nationalities.49 A growing proportion of the profes-
sions had become Jewish, especially in the capital. Eötvös held discussions with 
Jewish leaders and a congress convened by royal rescript drafted statutes 
which the monarch approved in June 1869. The Statutes of the 'orthodox' 
Jewish congregations were issued as a kultusz ministry rendelet by Eötvös's 
successor in 1871.50 
The position of the Jewish religion still differed from that of the received 
Christian confessions: there was no reciprocity in matters of marriage and 
conversions, for instance. But Jewish registration of births, deaths and mar-
riages was recognised by civil law, while such recognition was denied 'the 
sects', and the Jewish religion acquired security and limited protection by the 
authorities.51 Statute law soon took cognisance of this change. Whenever a 
statutory provision was meant to apply to the Jewish as well as to the received 
religions, the term 'recognised religion' was used.52 Two other religions 
attained recognition during the Dualist era: the Baptist Church was recognised 
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by ministerial rendelet in 190553 and the Muslim religion was, unconvention-
ally, recognised by statute law in 1916.5* 
Recognition of religions by ministerial rendelet was standardised by Law 
XLIII of 1895 On the Free Exercise of Religion. This law should have been 
the crowning achievement of liberal legislation. Instead, in its second chapter 
it established the standard rules 'On Religious Denominations To Be Lawfully 
Recognised in the Future'. Applicants wishing to form a recognised religion 
were to submit all the regulations of their proposed Church to the kultusz 
minister for approval.55 The minister would have to refuse approval if the 
applicants represented 'anti-state or anti-national tendencies', if the doctrines 
submitted contravened either civil laws or public morality, if the applicants 
had seceded from a 'lawfully received or recognised religion' only because they 
wished to use a different language, and also if the name of the proposed 
Church was either 'racial or national'56 in character, or 'damaged a religion 
which has already been received or lawfully recognised'.57 The grounds on 
which the minister could refuse recognition were so vague that the Law might 
as well have left the matter entirely to the discretion of the minister. Recogni-
sed Churches, under the protection of the state, were to enjoy limited 
autonomy. In contrast with the received Churches, they were not entitled to 
administrative help in collecting church taxes which they did, however, have 
the right to impose. They were under the administrative tutelage of the local 
authorities, to whom they had to submit the minutes of all Church meetings 
and whose permission they had to obtain to acquire property.58 The civil 
authorities approved the appointments of their Church officials 'if their moral 
conduct and attitude as citizens of the state did not give rise to objections'.59 
Should their conduct be 'hostile to the state',60 the kultusz minister could 
demand their removal from office. These stern stipulations protected the 
discretionary powers of the civil authorities rather than the rights of dissenting 
minorities. 
The balance sheet of church-state relations 
Notwithstanding the egalitarian liberal rhetoric of statute law, the two 
agencies of the crown's and of society's customary laws generated a motley of 
privileges and practices within a hierarchy of three broad classes of religions. 
In fact one could not find two Churches in Hungary whose position with 
respect to civil law and the state authorities was identical.61 Statute law all too 
frequently merely recognised the diverse changes that had already come about 
in the legal position of the individual Churches and had acquired social 
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acceptance. Custom proved stronger than parliament-made law when the latter 
tried to settle contentious points of the sectarian conflict between Catholics 
and Protestants. This is demonstrated by the long saga of para. 12, Law LIII 
of 1868 on the religion of children born to parents in mixed marriages.62 
Short of a statutory system, what in fact evolved might still have been the 
best remedy available against the direct intervention by the executive branch 
of the state in church affairs. It was a considerable achievement that the 
overwhelming majority of the citizens belonged to received Churches most of 
which enjoyed either influence or self-government and, occasionally, both. 
Furthermore, the individual was able to surmount the difficulties he faced in 
changing religion and after 1895 even to be without any. 
But the system as such had little in common with the ideals that liberals 
cherished. Quite plainly, it was not based on the conception of civil society in 
which every member had basic rights. The faults of a graduated system of 
privileges, as opposed to a system based on common statutory rights to all, 
were obvious.63 Under a system in which customary rights, backed by 
communis opinio, could progress within a hierarchy, rights could also regress. 
The Jewish religion, merely tolerated before 1869, became recognised in 1871. 
The Tiszaeszlár case in 1883, a Jewish ritual murder trial, was (notwithstand-
ing the bad press which Hungary incurred abroad) a triumph of the liberal 
principle of the rule of law.64 The Jewish religion, moving up in the hierarchy, 
was declared to have been received in 1895 by statute law. It could, and was, 
however demoted a few decades later in 1942 to the rank of a recognised 
religion by another statute law.65 The system of graded privileges turned the 
Churches on each other rather than induced them to co-operate, and society's 
sense of justice was not violated when the state withdrew some privileges.66 
Under a liberal statutory system, a right taken away from one is an attack on 
all; under a hierarchy of privileges, it is not. 
The system made all religions more dependent on the goodwill of the civil 
authorities than they would have been under a liberal statutory system. 
Churches coexisted on the basis of a variety of different, insufficiently defined, 
rights. Imbued with envious sectarian spirit, they were competing with each 
other for government favours. They queued up for 'state benefits',67 financial 
help, and for administrative support from the civil authorities. The mentality 
such a system encouraged was not conducive to the growth of independent, 
critical social attitudes that one would expect to find in civil society.68 Further, 
the system could not cope with social change. The hallmark of a Western 
liberal system is its ability to tolerate dissent and secession from established 
social institutions. The Hungarian system never developed that ability. Relig-
ious freedoms were confined to a 'closed shop', a rigid set of received religions. 
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The class of recognised religion, a product of ministerial úzus, turned out to be 
a failure. The security it offered was insufficient. Created by ordinance, a 
recognised Church could lose its status by another ordinance.69A recognised 
Church's dependence on the local authorities, without any compensating 'state 
benefits', was nearly complete. Apart from the Jewish and the Muslim religions, 
both special cases, only the Baptist religion ever attained legal recognition. 
All in all, it was the government which turned out to be the true beneficiary 
of the system of privileges and of the sectarian strife that the system 
exacerbated. The spectacular increase in the discretionary powers of the 
ministry shifted the balance of power further towards the overweening auth-
ority of the state at the expense of the received and non-received Churches, 
whose ability to act as foci of independent social centres of power had 
diminished by the end of the nineteenth century. 
In the first four decades of the twentieth century the system of church-state 
relations did not substantially change. Institutional continuity was ruptured 
during and after the Second World War. 
Church-state relations under the Communist system 
The Communists rejected the principles of civil society, and their rejection 
was complete. They abolished private property as well as civil rights and did 
not tolerate the existence of autonomous social institutions. Political power 
was to be undivided.70 The new rulers preached 'democratic centralism'. It 
meant the arbitrary power of the single autocratic party and its state officials 
in the name of the 'working class'. 
All the Churches were placed under the strict administrative control of the 
civil authorities. Marxists professed the principle of the 'separation of Church 
and State' which they understood to mean the separation of the State from the 
Church but not vice versa.71 Church autonomy was uniformly denied. Ap-
pointments and even daily pastoral work came under the control of the 
government and of the State Office for Church Affairs created in 1951.72 
Associations under church patronage were disbanded, religious publishing 
houses closed down, and the population subjected to harsh anti-religious 
propaganda. Furthermore, the clergy were for many years ordered to partici-
pate in political campaigns. Nevertheless, the regime disingenuously claimed 
that it realised the principles of the liberty of conscience and of the free exercise 
of religion, both being enshrined in the country's constitution.73 
Oddly enough, the regime also made another claim which takes us back to 
the subject of the Churches' legal position during the pre-Communist era. It 
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was held that Law XXXIII of 1947, which had abolished the division between 
the so-called 'received' and the 'lawfully recognised' religions,74 had estab-
lished equality among the country's religions.75 
A cursory glance at the legal and institutional arrangements of the regime, 
however, reveals a surprising degree of diversity in acquired rights and duties 
and even in the legal status of the different Churches. This is not surprising; 
there were no general regulations which set out the rights and obligations to 
be applied to all the Churches. In order to exist lawfully a Church needed 
permission from the state authorities to function. This was the so-called 
recognition that the State Office for Church Affairs had the right to grant to 
each Church community. The most common form of permission was the 
agreement drawn up between the church leaders and the civil authorities acting 
as two unequal parties. The Calvinist (Reformed) Church was the first of the 
larger denominations to sign an agreement, under pressure and intimidation, 
with the government, and did so on 7 October 1948.76 The small Unitarian 
Church followed suit on the same day. The Jewish leaders signed an agreement 
on 7 December and the Lutheran bishops on 14 December in the same year. 
The Roman Catholic and Uniate Church, to which well over half of the 
country's population adhered, held out longer and signed a megállapodás 
(agreement) on 30 August 1950 - after protracted crises, intimidation, arrests 
and imprisonments.77 
Most of these agreements were confiscatory in character: religious orders 
were dispersed, property taken away and the vast majority of church schools 
closed, in return for the 'recognition' of the Church by the state, the right of 
worship (largely confined to church buildings) and some financial subsidy to 
pay the salaries of church personnel and building maintenance.78 The treat-
ment meted out to one recognised Church differed from the next. The Catholic 
Church was, for example, allowed to keep only eight of its grammar schools 
- a considerable restriction on its earlier endowments. The Calvinists ended 
up, however, with keeping a single grammar school while the Lutheran Church 
had none. 
Moreover, the position of the smaller religious communities, the so-called 
sects, differed from that of the larger, so-called historic, Churches and it 
showed particularly great diversity. Of the smaller religions only the Baptist 
Church attained 'lawful recognition' before 1945. Some of the communities, 
notably the Baptists, the Seventh Day Adventists, the Methodists, the Free 
Christian Brethren and the Salvation Army, formed the Free Church Alliance 
in 1944. All had grievances against the ancien regime, the 'historic Churches' 
as well as the government, and co-operated with the post-war regime. The 
government gave permission {engedély) to the Alliance to function in July 
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1945™ and recognised its member-churches by ministerial rendelet in 1947 
without any formal agreement.80 In the following year the Alliance was 
reorganised to become the Free Church Council which was eventually placed 
under the authority of the State Office for Church Affairs. 
Not even the smaller Churches escaped the confiscation and persecution 
which affected all religions throughout the 1950s.81 Furthermore, government 
policy maintained many of the disadvantages under which most of the pacifist 
'sects' had earlier existed. For example, while the Catholic, Calvinist, Lutheran 
and Unitarian Churches received regular state subsidies, the member-churches 
of the Free Church Council (also the Orthodox Church) did not receive any 
regular aid.82 Again, the 'historic' Churches were allowed to keep a few 
seminaries in the 1950s while the smaller Churches were not allowed to have 
access to any. An arrangement was finally worked out in 1966.83 Nor could 
the Council protect its member-churches before 1956: the Salvation Army was 
dissolved by a ministerial rendelet in 1949 and the Adventists left the Council 
in 1950, thus losing their recognised status, which they regained only in 1958.84 
On the other hand, the Council, authorised by the State Office, exercised 
supervision over those small Churches that had not yet attained recognition.85 
Among others, the Pentecostals, the Nazarenes and the Methodist Community 
of Evangelical Brethren had been in this position before they secured recogni-
tion in 1958, 1971 and 1981 respectively.86 But several unrecognised sects 
functioned 'unregulated' even in the 1980s. The largest was the Jehovah's 
Witnesses.87 Independent Pentecostal groups and unofficial Adventists also 
existed unlawfully, that is without permission secured from the State Office for 
Church Affairs. Refusal to do military service was the intractable problem. A 
further source of diversity was that individual preachers of some unrecognised 
sects were from time to time granted a licence {engedély) to operate. 
The diversity was clearly recognised by József Szakács, president of the Free 
Church Council, who declared a couple of years before the collapse of the 
regime that as regards their legal status there were three classes of religious 
communities in Hungary: 
1. legally regulated communities 
2. communities whose status was under review and 
3. legally unregulated communities.88 
As the regime settled down, it became less repressive; the worst forms of 
discrimination against believers diminished.89 Churches, still expected to 
support government policy in general, were no longer forced to participate in 
political campaigns. They acquired a few concessions in their pastoral work. 
In church-state relations co-operation largely replaced antagonism and suspi-
cion although the process did not lessen the Churches' dependence on the state 
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authorities.90 The Catholic hierarchy did the bidding for the regime in October 
1986 by reprimanding members of the 'basis communities' for refusal of 
military service.91 
As church-state relations improved, the legal inequality grew among the 
Churches, which the system of permission-recognition had necessarily generated. 
The Catholic Church and the other 'historic Churches', through the policy of 
'small steps forward', acquired minor concessions and secured more advantage-
ous megállapodások92 concerning religious instruction in schools, seminaries and 
publishing.93 Likewise the smaller communities, most of which operated on the 
basis of their own recognised Church Statutes. The Free Church Council 
consolidated its position as a quasi governmental body. As a unique privilege, it 
had since 1971 taken over the authority of the State Office to approve all Church 
appointments of the smaller religious communities. The election of the Council's 
president, though, required the prior approval of the head of the State Office.94 
Church-state relations in crisis 
It is a paradox of history that the Communists, who had pushed the 
autocratic principle of law to extremes when they acquired power in the 1940s, 
started the dismantling of the very system of church-state relations based on 
the traditional autocratic principle forty years later, when their regime entered 
into terminal decline. The growing economic crisis, Gorbachev's policy of 
glasnost, the influence of the reform Communists and pressure from the 
democratic Opposition brought political reform to the fore. 
After 1987 the regime could no longer count on the automatic co-operation 
of the bishops and leaders of the recognised Churches. The lower clergy of the 
Catholic Church and Protestant ministers, dissatisfied with the policy of 'small 
steps', put pressure on their superiors to be bolder. By the influx of new 
bishops in the Catholic Church and the appointment of a new Archbishop of 
Esztergom, László Paskai, in April 1987,95 the regime had to face a less elderly 
and ineffective Catholic hierarchy.96 The process of change was increased 
when János Kádár was replaced by a new party leader, Károly Grósz, in May 
1988. Soon the Bishop's Conference, largely bypassing the State Office for 
Church Affairs, began a dialogue with the government which from the autumn 
of 1988 was in the hands of reform Communists headed by Miklós Németh.97 
The Catholic Church now demanded a 'new contemporary agreement' to 
replace the one imposed on it in 1950.98 
The development of church-state relations, however, took a different turn. 
Instead of new agreements with individual Churches, the comprehensive 
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reform of church-state relations emerged as the new political agenda. This was 
a part of the process to reform the country's political system by the revision of 
Hungary's 1949 (ineffective) Constitution. Even before Kádár was replaced in 
March 1988 the government had announced in parliament that legislation 
concerning church-state relations was being prepared." In July the Central 
Committee of the party approved a plan to establish the rights of association 
and of assembly, and in August two draft Bills were published in the press for 
public discussion.100 The Bill on associations was to make the courts, rather 
than the administrative authorities, competent in disputes concerning the 
exercise of the right.101 This was a significant shift in policy towards the 
Rechtsstaat, the establishment of the rule of law, which by then had become an 
accepted part of political discourse, and contained obvious implications for the 
position of the Churches. 
The working out of the general principles of legislation for church-state 
relations was, however, left in the hands of the State Office for Church Affairs. 
(Herod was entrusted with the protection of small children.) The first draft of the 
'Guidelines'102 prepared in the State Office on the legal position of the Churches 
accepted the principle that the exercise of religious rights should be limited only by 
statute law.103 Undoubtedly a breach in the autocratic principle of law as regards 
church-state relations,104 the significance of this shift was nevertheless limited; the 
authoritarian State was not to lie down or not just yet. The 'Guidelines' underlying 
principle was the traditional 'concessionary view' of rights. It treated religious 
freedom as 'self-limitation' on the part of the State105, which was to 'permit' 
{megengedi) the profession of religious faith as a right.106 The State was to 
'recognise' {elismeri) the legal personality, independence and authonomy of the 
Churches107, which were to possess equal rights {egyenjogúság).10* The 'Guide-
lines' maintained the system of'central and local offices of Church administration' 
which the law was now to identify {nevesít), define and place under constitutional 
authority.109 Thus state supervision was not to be abandoned. The 'recognition' of 
the Churches was, however, to be administered by the Constitutional Court 
through a system of registration.110 With the Catholic Church in mind the 
'Guidelines' stipulated that church leaders could be appointed by their foreign 
superior authority only after the approval of the head of the Hungarian State. All 
elected and appointed leaders of the recognised Churches had to take a 'State 
oath'.111 A revised draft of the 'Guidelines', prepared in the spring of 1989,112 
weeded out some of the authoritarian terms of the text.113 The State was still to 
confer 'recognition' on religious groups, but the necessity of establishing 'legal 
guarantees' for the Churches appeared as a new principle.114 
The critical question at this stage was the future of the State Office. And 
the Office, supported by the party headquarters, put up a vigorous fight for 
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its survival in some form.115 At a press conference on 5 April 1989 Sarkadi 
Nagy announced that the Office would be replaced by a new one which would 
be without the right to issue rendelet and would work under the supervision of 
a new consultative council that was to include church leaders.110 
The Németh government had different ideas: it was prepared to dispense 
with the generally hated State Office altogether. Kálmán Kulcsár, Minister of 
Justice, interviewed by John Eibner of Keston College in January 1989, plainly 
stated that he did not see the need for a special institution for church-state 
affairs. 'If there is any such business', he went on, the Ministry for Culture and 
Education could handle it.117 The Council of Ministers, largely disregarding 
the revised 'Guidelines' prepared by the State Office, drafted its own 'Prin-
ciples' of legislation on the 'Freedom of Conscience and Religion'118 and 
published it for debate in June.119 
An impeccably Western liberal statement of 14 sections, the 'Principles' 
abandoned the authoritarian view of church-state relations. It did not 'recog-
nise' the Churches as a 'concession' by the State. The starting point of the 
'Principles' was the liberty of conscience as a basic human right, set out under 
eight clearly drafted principles. The rest of the document was also clear, 
specific and contained procedural rules. The ordinary courts were to register 
Churches and religious associations if they wished to become legal persons. 
Section 14 stipulated that it should be declared illegal to impose special duties 
on Churches by the civil authorities and likewise to 'maintain or create 
institutions, other than specified in statute law, in order to administer and 
supervise church affairs'. Shortly after the publication of the 'Principles' the 
Presidential Council abolished the State Office for Church Affairs120 and the 
Council of Ministers decided to create the National Council for Religious 
Affairs - a consultative body for negotiations between the government and the 
Churches.121 
The reconstruction of church-state relations 
Meanwhile the Churches were in turmoil. They now understood (along with 
everybody else in the country) that a regime change, rather than mere reform, 
was about to take place. Church leaders who had hitherto co-operated with 
the outgoing regime lost much of their authority. The public letter from József 
Szendi, the Bishop of Veszprém, to Cardinal Primate Páskai amounted to an 
unprecedented rebuke of the head of the Catholic hierarchy by an ordinary.122 
The establishment of the National Council for Religious Affairs on 20 October 
in the parliament building marked a public reconciliation between Church and 
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State.123 Prime Minister Németh led the government side.124 The leaders of the 
larger Churches and most of the smaller communities were present.125 Németh 
described the previous forty years' government policy toward the Churches as 
wicked. The task at hand, he explained, was not the 'recognition' of religious 
rights but the protection of religion by legal guarantees. Then Kálmán 
Kulcsár, Minister of Justice, spoke of the Bill which his ministry had 
meanwhile prepared. He was well received: Church leaders welcomed the legal 
guarantees offered by the draft. A notable upshot of the debate concerned the 
system of appointment of Catholic bishops which the draft Bill left open. 
Primate Páskai observed that the Vatican would never accept that the 
appointment of bishops should require the approval of the head of the state. 
There and then Németh and Kulcsár accepted the Catholic Church's position. 
The renunciation by the civil authority of the claim, which used to be called 
ius patronattis, put an end to a centuries' old source of conflict. 
On the anniversary day of the 1956 revolution, the country's revised 
Constitution was promulgated.126 Its paragraph 60 defined the liberty of 
conscience as an individual right and declared that 'the Church functions in 
separation from the State'. The Bill, prepared by the Németh government with 
the consent of the Churches, 'On the Liberty of Conscience and of Religion 
and the Churches', passed by parliament on 24 January and promulgated as 
Law IV of 1990, is a basic law whose revision requires a two-thirds parliamen-
tary majority.127 
Law IV does not entirely separate State and Church from each other. In 
Hungary the Churches have never demanded that in Hungary. It is undoubted-
ly with the history of church-state relations in mind that paragraph 16 (1-2) 
of the Law stipulates that although the Churches operate under the law, 'the 
State cannot set up offices to guide or supervise the Churches'. Also, the State 
is not to help the Church to enforce internal regulations (paragraph 15, 2). 
With this rule the practice called brachium in the Middle Ages came to an end. 
The courts can register a religious association if it is to become a legal 
person.128 As such, the Church can apply for state subsidies to carry out 
educational, charitable and other tasks. The funds are shared out by parlia-
ment in the course of the annual budget debate.129 
Law IV of 1990 rescinded the Laws of XLIII 1895 and XXXIII of 1947 as 
well as the rendelets issued during the Communist regime, including even No. 
14 of 1989 by the Presidential Council.130 Also, upon the enactment of the 
Law, the 'agreements' imposed on the Churches after 1947 were by common 
consent declared void.131 Since 1990, for the first time in Hungarian history, 
church-state relations have been governed by parliament-made laws which 
apply equally to all religions. The Communists were wont to boast that they 
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took power in order to accomplish, together with the socialist transformation of 
society, 'bourgeois democratic' tasks. Nothing was further from the truth. 
Communists in power stretched the inherited autocratic principle of law as far as 
it could possibly go. It is true, however, that when the world was about to collapse 
around them, under pressure from their opponents, the reform Communists were 
prepared to introduce laws, like Law IV 1990 on church-state relations, which 
laid the foundations of civil society and established basic institutions of the 
Rechtsstaat. Today freedom of conscience is guaranteed by adequate statutory 
provisions which include procedural rules for judicial review by independent 
courts and by the democratic control of a freely elected parliament. 
To sum up, as long as the autocratic principle of the law operates withouth 
the mitigating effects of Rechtsstaat institutions it tends to generate diversity 
and growing inequality in the legal position of the Churches - as it undoubted­
ly did after 1867 and again after 1956. In contrast, the principle of civil society 
and the institutions of the Rechtsstaat, partly realized after 1867 and more 
extensively after 1989, help to reduce the diversity between and increase the 
equality in the treatment of the Churches by the law. This contrast is likely to 
be seen in other spheres of social life. 
Notes 
1. Only the western parts of eastern Europe have so far demonstrably moved away from the 
traditional patterns of church-state relations although the aspiration to do so exists in the 
whole region. 
2. This was common ground among West European natural-law school philosophers. The 
principle went into the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen: 'All that is not 
forbidden by law cannot be prevented, and no one can be forced to do what the law does 
not prescribe', Western Liberalism, E. K. Bramsted and K. J. Melhuish (eds), London, 1978, 
p. 228. This was the presumption of the law on which justice was administered in the liberal 
states of western Europe in the nineteenth century. 
3. The widely-known bon mot, which originated among German law students in the nineteenth 
century, had more than an element of truth in it: 'In England ist alles erlaubt, was nicht 
verboten ist. In Deutschland ist alles verboten, was nicht erlaubt ist.' The intellectual setting 
of the authoritarian state in Germany and the corresponding social attitudes associated with 
the 'ostelbische Mentalität' were discussed by Hans-Ulrich Wahler, Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 
(1871-1918), Göttingen, 1973, esp. pp. 105-07 and 133-34. 
4. Georg Jelűnek, Gesetz und Verordnung, Freiburg, 1887, pp. 255-56. Jellinek discussed the 
right in the context of the distinction between formal and substantive law, Pt. II, Section ii, 
ch. l ,pp. 226 ff. 
5. Anton Virozsil, like others, argued that the praesumptio juris (die rechtliche Vermuthung) was, 
in doubtful cases, on the side of the king and that the monarch's government possessed the 
right to issue decrees as long as it did not conflict with statute law, Das Staats-Recht des 
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Königreichs Ungarn, Pest, 1865, II, paras 36 (esp. p. 5) and 46; Antal Cziráky, less clear on the 
question of presumptio juris, stoutly endorsed the monarch's right to issue decrees, Juris publici 
regni Hungáriáé, Buda, 1851, Tom II, paras 323 and 442. Pál Szlemenics listed some 
ordinances enacted under 'special royal powers' which, 'without ever being accepted by the 
diet have become a part of judicial practice and have been continuously in force', Törvényeink 
története, Buda, 1860, p. 136. On the attitudes of jurists after 1867 see below note 10. 
6. in rebus legi conformibus 
7. Paras. 2 and 3. 
8. a törvény alapján keletkezett 
9. The Central Committee of the House replaced the ministerial draft with the requirement that 
the rendelet was 'issued on the basis of specific authorisation by the legislature'. The House, 
however, restored the ministerial draft, Képviselőházi irományok, I, pp. 59, 121 and Napló, 9 
July 1869, II, pp. 486-91. 
10. Consuetudo, as Béni Grosschmid argued, in addition to statute law set limits to the 
enforceability of a royal ordinance but where those limits lay was left entirely unclear. 
Magánjogi előadások, Budapest, 1905, pp. 125-29. Győző Concha considered even the 
government decree which had been challenged by an adverse resolution of parliament to be 
valid law for the law courts, Hatvan év tudományos mozgalmai között, Budapest, 1928,1, pp. 
405 and 416f, and see Kálmán Molnár, Kormányrendeletek, Eger, 1911, esp. 34-43. 
11. Half of the kingdom's population belonged to the Roman Catholic Church. The rest were 
Uniate, Eastern Orthodox, Calvinist, Lutheran and Jewish. There were also Unitarians and 
a large number of small religious communities, the so-called 'sects', see statistics in Moritz 
Csáky 'Die römisch-katholische Kirche in Ungarn' in Adam Wandruszka and Peter Ur-
banitsch, Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918. IV, p. 302 and 282-83. 
12. In many districts elements of a 'plural society' existed in J. S. Furnivall's sense of the term. 
For instance, in parts of the Highland Slovak Roman Catholic peasants, German Lutheran 
burghers and Hungarian Calvinist gentry lived together; cf. J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy 
and Practice, Cambridge, 1948, pp. 117-18 and esp. 303-06. 
13. According to Werbőczy the pope had the right only to confirm the appointment made by the 
king, Tripartitum, para. 1, Tit. XI, Pt. I; Ferenc Eckhart, Magyar alkotmány- és jogtörténet, pp. 
166-67, 297f; Andor Csizmadia, Rechtliche Beziehungen von Staat und Kirche in Ungarn vor 
1944, Budapest, 1971, pp. 48-50. After 1867, next to foreign policy and army affairs, it was in 
regard to the Roman Catholic Church that the monarch's autocratic rights were best preserved. 
The appointment of prelates was the very first item on the list of subjects compiled in 1867 which 
required the monarch's 'preliminary sanction' so called. See Emma Iványi, Magyar miniszterta­
nácsijegyzőkönyvek az első világháború korából 1914—1918, Budapest, 1960, pp. 531-32. 
14. The stereotype of the Catholic Church being indifferent to the national cause was largely 
false; see László Péter, 'Hungarian Liberals and Church-State Relations (1867-1900)' in 
Hungary and European Civilisation, ed. György Ránki, Bloomington, 1989, pp. 85-86. 
15. Sándor Kőnek, Egyházjogtan kézikönyve, Pest, 1867, pp. 141-47; Andor Csizmadia, A 
magyar állam és az egyházak jogi kapcsolatainak kialakulása és gyakorlata a Horthy-
korszakban, Budapest, 1968, pp. 93-94. 
16. Maria Theresa's Systema consistoriale (1779), summary by János Prodán, 'Az államfő 
legfelsőbb felügyeleti joga a magyarországi autokefális görögkeleti egyházban', in Notter 
Antal emlékkönyv, Budapest, 1941, pp. 949f. The approval of appointments did not become a 
mere formality after 1867. When the monarch, on the advice of the government, refused to 
approve the elected prelate, Congress was forced to select another instead. See László Katus 
in Magyarország története 1848-1890, ed. Endre Kovács et al, Budapest, 1979, VI, p. 1339. 
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17. Also, the Bishop of the Calvinist Church in Transylvania had to take an oath of allegiance 
to the crown: Church Statutes, para. 178, Sándor Dárday, Közigazgatási törvénytár, 
Budapest, 1893, II, p. 174 (30). 
18. The ius advocatiae, applied to the Protestant Churches, was comparable to the brachium 
granted to the Catholic (and to the Eastern Orthodox?) Church; see para. 4 of the Statutes 
of the Calvinist Church, ibid., p. 174 (1). 
19. The 'funds' accrued from intercalaris revenues, private donations, as well as from the 
confiscated properties of former religious orders, were administered under ius patronatus by the 
government as a trustee, so to speak, for the purposes of paying the clergy and the maintenance 
of Church schools. After 1867, the funds were managed, in co-operation with the hierarchy, by 
the Ministry of Religion (the kultusz) and Public Education; Moritz Csáky, Die röm.-kath. 
Kirche, pp. 272-75; László Csorba, 'A katolikus autonómia és a közalapok problémája a 
századforduló Magyarországán', Protestáns Szemle, 1992 April-June, pp. 116-36. 
20. The Bill, passed by the House egyhangúlag (nem. con.), on 20 Dec. 1867 (Képv.jkv., Ill, no. 
1524), after the proposal of the House's Senior Chairman, the Protestant Zsigmond Bernáth 
(21 June 1867, Képv. irom, II, p. 230) had been approved by the House. Deák had urged the 
ministers to act on 26 June 1867; Manó Kónyi, ed., Deák Ferenci beszédei, V, pp. 114—15. 
On the significance and the limits of Law XVII of 1867 see László Gonda, A zsidóság 
Magyarországon 1526-1945 (hereafter A zsidóság), Budapest 1992, pp. 116-19. 
21. Arts. XXVI and XXVII of 1790. 
22. The liberal slogan, which appeared in Hungary in the 1840s, was equivocal; some understood 
by it the Church's freedom from the State, others the State's freedom from the Church. 
23. In 1843; Eötvös was already an ardent promoter of a general enactment on religious freedom 
and equality in his speech in the Upper House on 11 July 1843; József Eötvös, Kultúra és 
nevelés, Budapest, 1976, pp. 85-86 and 512. 
24. Eötvös's answer to a question set out government policy on 24 June 1868, Képv. napló, VIII, 
pp. 137-39. 
25. a vallásfelekezetek egyenjogúsága 
26. Christians had the obligation to be members of a received Church (para. 20). 
27. Képv. irom, VII, pp. 3-7. 
28. Eötvös himself never abandoned the plan to secure the equality of all religions by the 
enactment of a comprehensive statute law. He said so repeatedly in the House in November 
1869. Képv. napló, III, pp. 181-82, 187-88, and 198, and on 7 April 1870 he brought in a new 
Bill which, however, never got further, ibid, VII, p. 388; see also his letter to Prince Primate 
Simor on 19 Decembwer 1869 in József Eötvös, Levelek, Budapest, 1976, esp. p. 634; also 
Andor Csizmadia, A m. állam és egyh., p. 84. Eötvös's efforts to bring in legislation on the 
freedom of religion was carried on in the House by the 448er leader Dániel Irányi who 
submitted a 12-paragraph bill (6 July 1869), Képv. irom, I, pp. 292-93, and subsequently 
demanded the introduction of civil marriage and the enactment of the freedom of worship at 
the beginning of each parliament. A most articulate promoter of religious toleration, Irányi 
spoke up in the House for the so-called sects, see László Kardos and Jenő Szigeti, Boldog 
emberek közössége, A magyarországi nazarénusok, Budapest, 1988, p. 203 and passim. 
29. László Péter, Hung. Liberals, pp. 85-91; on the other political obstacles of comprehensive 
liberal church reform, pp. 82-85. 
30. After the proclamation of papal infallibility in July 1870 Eötvös, as kultusz minister, in order 
to ban the promulgation of the papal bull in Hungary, bypassed parliament and declared by 
rendelet that the ius place turn (a legal dinosaur) was in force; László Péter, Hung. Liberals, pp. 
90-91. Another example was the elkeresztelés (coined on weglaufen) crisis which grew out of 
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the interpretation of Eötvös's law on mixed marriages in the 1880s. Eötvös's successor 
Ágoston Trefort issued a rendelet which gave a new, widening, interpretation of para. 12 of 
the Law concerning sanctions against elkeresztelés which conflicted with court rulings. And 
when the courts did not heed the ministerial pronouncement another kultusz rendelet 
transferred all elkeresztelés cases to the administrative authorities. The minister of the Interior 
then fined and sent to prison Catholic priests for elkeresztelés, ibid., pp. 93-102. 
31. While the anticlericals - noted a Catholic historian - hoped to 'separate the State from the 
Church, they would not allow the Church to separate from the State but wished to make it 
more subordinate to it than ever'. Gábor Salacz, Egyház és állam Magyarországon a 
dualizmus korában 1867-1918, München, 1974, pp. 53-54. 
32. Minister Trefort used political muscle in the 1880s to hoist government supporters into 
episcopal sees especially for dioceses in the nationalities' districts; cases discussed by Ferenc 
Eckhardt, A püspöki székek és a káptalani javadalmak betöltése Mária Terézia korától 1918ig, 
Budapest, 1935, pp. 55-63. Episcopi hungarici sunt magis politici quam catholici was appar­
ently a general view in the Curia of the Hungarian prelates in the late 19th century, quoted 
by Gábor Salacz, Egyház, p. 75; see also Gyula Szekfű, Magyar tört., V, pp. 522-23 (similar 
points). 
33. Eötvös, in responding to a question, frankly admitted in the House on 23 February 1869 that, 
authorised by the monarch, he had settled a large number of important matters without any 
instruction from parliament on the sole authority of the monarch: József Eötvös, Kultúra, 
pp. 229-36. On the background of the distinction between those enactments which were 
signed by the king (rescripts) and those which were not (decrees), see Antal Cziráky, op. cit., 
para. 656. 
34. bevett (recepta religio), elismert and megtűrt. 
35. Para. 13, the context implies the Lutheran and the Calvinist Churches which are contrasted 
with the Catholic Church. The paragraph alludes to the Vienna Peace of 1606. (Ad primum 
art), Art. 1. of 1608 ante cor. and to para. 5 Art of 1647. The influence of the Transylvanian 
legal term recepta religio is very probable. 
36. The Roman Catholic Church claimed to be avita rather than recepta religio, yet the Law did 
not, of course, mean to leave out Catholics. 
37. Art. 27 of 1790 and Art. 10 of 1792. 
38. Opposition to the emancipation of the Jews (the Judenkrawalle in the larger towns) was 
probably the chief reason why egyenjogúság was confined to the received religions; see Lajos 
Venetianer, A magyar zsidóság története, Budapest, 1986, pp. 166f. 
39. Sándor Konek, a leading jurist on Church Law, claimed in 1867 that the Roman Catholic 
Church 'could be described as the state church', which he distinguished from the 'received 
religions'; op. cit., para. 52. A decanal meeting in Veszprém County passed a resolution in 
October 1887 to the effect that the Catholic Church was still avita religio rather than recepta 
religio, and other districts expressed support for the resolution. Trefort then issued an 
ordinance on 28 December 1887 in which the minister insisted that the Catholic Church was 
a received religion, Ernő Nagy, Közjog, 1891, pp. 100-01. 
40. On 13 August 1868, Sándor Dárday, op. cit., II, p. 27. 
41. törvényes oltalom 
42. See note 39 above. 
43. Jewish religion between 1871 and 1895 and the Muslim religion after 1916 were protected by 
the law without being received. Recognition by statute law rather than by rendelet does not 
work as a criterion, nor does the possession of self-government (some non-received Churches 
had it while the Catholic Church did not). Nor did a necessary link ever exist between 
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received status and political representation. The law never received the Roman Catholic and 
the Eastern Orthodox Churches yet they possessed political representation in the Upper 
House, whereas the three Protestant Churches before 1885 did not (although the Unitarian 
Church had been received for centuries in Transylvania). Jewish church leaders had been 
personally appointed members of the Upper House after 1895. The Jewish religion was given 
representation by Law XXII of 1926 when the Upper House was restored. Law XXVII of 
1940 rescinded the provision of Jewish representation, though the Jewish religion was 
deprived of its received status two years later by Law VIII of 1942. Received religions were 
given administrative assistance by the state authorities in the collection of church taxes 
(frequently lumped together with the state tax) and in enforcing internal discipline in the 
Church. These rights and practices developed out of the ancient brachium saeculare and the 
ius advicatiae and were, to a different extent in each case, extended to the received Churches 
in the nineteenth century. The government supplemented the salaries of the clergy, where this 
seemed necessary, and provided subsidies to maintain schools. The kultusz ministry handled 
all the disputes arising out of these arrangements, without the participation of the courts. 
These privileges and practices were the consequences of a Church's received status rather than 
the reasons for a particular religion being included in the class. 
44. Eötvös used Iberal statutory argument in the House on 9 December 1869 in his answer to 
the Serbian member Miletic, who had complained that the government had allowed the 
Patriarch to dissolve the Congress of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The government, 
Eötvös said, had proceeded on the basis of Law IX of 1868 and had refrained from 
interfering in the matter 'because it is not called upon and authorised to do so by law', 
Képv. napló, IV, pp. 63-65. For another example, see Eötvös's letter to Primate Simor on 19 
December 1869 in Eötvös, Levelek, p. 630. Moreover, Eötvös was a firm adherent of the 
liberal principle that the minister could not lawfully impose a legal obligation on the citizen 
without being authorised by statute law; e.g. his attitude to compulsory education: speech 
in the House on 23 June 1868, Képv. napló, VIII, p. 128. As regards the property of the 
subject Eötvös unequivocally rejected the idea that the minister had administrative power at 
his disposal without statute law, although he himself had to arbitrate sometimes between 
the rival claims of townships and Churches over school property; see his answers to 
questions in the House on 28 October 1869 and on 14 March 1870. József Eötvös, Kultúra, 
pp. 418-24. 
45. Cf. note 40 above. The VKM rendelet, No. 12548, was issued on 13 August 1868. The 
Nazarenes appeared in Hungary in 1840 and spread among the Calvinist Hungarian peasants 
and urban poor. Eötvös sent the rendelet to Pest, which had passed on to the kultusz ministry 
an application of József Sollársch, a cobbler. He had asked whether the Nazarene Church 
would be permitted to run its own register of births, etc. or whether the authorities would 
administer it. See László Kardos, et al, op. cit., pp. 196f, 201f. 
46. The word used was hiteleseknek. Sándor Dárday, op. cit., II, p. 27. 
47. On 13 June 1875, see Sándor Dárday, op. cit., II, pp. 27-28. Trefort expressly invoked Eötvös' 
authority in his 1875 and also in his 1891 rendelet. 
48. 'Bios tolerirt, oder geduldet', wrote Anton Virozsil in 1865, Staats-Recht, I, p. 225. 
49. Liberals in all political parties resisted popular pressure to restrict the advance of Jews in 
public life. The government, in contrast with Austria, could stem the spilling over of the 
antisemitic tide into parliamentary politics. Győző Istóczy's Antisemitic party, established in 
1883, was driven out of parliament by government pressure within a decade. On the 
Antisemitic party see Gyula Mérei, Magyar politikai pártprogrammok, 1867-1914, Budapest, 
1934, pp. 149-55. 
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50. 15 November 1871, VKM rendelet, No. 26915 in Sándor Dárday, op. cit., II, pp. 298-303. 
On the complex issues concerning the position of the Jewish religion towards the government 
see László Gonda, A zsidóság, pp. 120-46. Internal divisions among the congregations 
allowed the civil authorities to exercise power over many aspects of Jewish relations even after 
the Jewish religion was declared received in 1895. The creation of administrative courts in 
1896 did not help: they were given hardly any competence in civil rights. 
51. A leading jurist of the period argued in 1907, however, that the recognised status of a religion 
could be cancelled by ministerial rendelet because recognition was attained by rendelet in the 
first place. Ernő Nagy, Közjog, 1907, p. 148. 
52. elismert vallás, coined on the German anerkannte Religion. 
53. VKM rendelet: 77092/1905. Ernő Nagy, op. cit., 1907, p. 141. 
54. Law XVII of 1916. See Andor Csizmadia on possible reasons for the statutory rather than 
ministerial recognition, A m. állam és egyh., p. 90 n33. 
55. Para. 7. 
56. faji vagy nemzetiségi. 
57. Para. 8. 
58. Paragraphs 9-12 and 19. 
59. Para. 13, erkölcsi és állampolgári magatartása kifogás alá nem esik. 
60. Pára. 15, államellenes magatartást tanúsít. 
61. In October 1905, the Fejérváry government promised, with qualifications, that 'complete 
equality and reciprocity among the received religions would be made effective in every 
respect'; Bertalan Lányi, A Fejérvári-kormány, Budapest, 1909, p. 118. 
62. The so-called elkeresztelés crisis, following the attempt by the legislator in 1868 (Law LIII) 
to determine the religion of children from mixed marriages which opened the Pandora's box 
of sectarian strife between Protestants and Catholics, Gábor Salacz, A magyar kultúrharc 
története 1890-1895, Vienna, 1938, chs. 1 and 2; and see note 30 above. 
63. However, leading jurists like Győző Concha supported the system of 'constitutional privi­
leges', Politika, Budapest, 1905, II, p. 344. 
64. The court procedure in a small town in eastern Hungary, including the state attorney's, was 
impeccable; all defendants were acquitted. Meanwhile the authorities, using vigorously their 
discretionary powers, suppressed the anti Semitic movement. 
65. Law VIII of 1942 On the Regulation of the Legal Status of the Jewish Religion. Paragraph 
1 rescinded Law XLII of 1895 and accorded 'recognition' to the Jewish religion. On the 
reception of the Jewish religion in 1895 and its demotion in the 1940s, see László Gonda, A 
zsidóság, pp. 158-62 and 209-20. 
66. In order to justify the demotion of the Jewish religion in 1942, a leading jurist pointed out 
that even after 1895 the rights of the Jewish religion had remained less extensive than those 
of the Christian received religions. István Egyed, A mi alkotmányunk, Budapest, 1943, p. 158; 
see also Andor Csizmadia, Rechtl. Beziehungen, pp. 24-25. 
67. A key term in modern Hungarian social history which would deserve a separate study, állami 
juttatások is mentioned occasionally in the literature. E.g. Andor Csizmadia, A m. állam és 
egyh., p. 93. 
68. Gyula Szekfű, himself a pious Roman Catholic, criticised his Church for lack of interest in 
social questions and even in pastoral work; Catholic prelates opposed social reforms of any 
kind. Magyar tört., V, pp. 521-26. 
69. See note 51 above. 
70. See László Péter, Montesquieu's Paradox on Freedom and Hungary's Constitutions, 
1790-1900, The New Hungarian Quarterly, vol. XXXII, No. 123, 1991, p. 10. 
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71. Although the Constitution declared the opposite, para. 54 (2) Law XX of 1949, see A Magyar 
Népköztársaság Alkotmánya (hereafter Law XX of 1949), Budapest, 1959 edn. 
72. A rendelet issued in 1951 stipulated, with retrospective force, that all Church appointments 
required the prior approval of the State authorities. See Sándor Orbán, 'Az állam és a 
katolikus egyház megállapodása', Történelmi Szemle (hereafter Az állam és egyh.), 1960, p. 
307. Law V of 1953 had rescinded the requirement which, however, was restored by 
ministerial rendelet in 1957, József Éliás, 'Az egyházak és az egyháziak szabadsága', Magyar 
Füzetek, 14-15, (hereafter Az egyházak), Paris 1984, pp. 208-09; Pál Fónyad, 'A magyaror­
szági protestantizmus rövid története, 1948-1978', in Magyar változások 1948-1978 (hereafter 
A magy. prot.), Vienna, 1979, pp. 116-17; on the breaking of the spirit of the Lutheran 
Church's resistance see John Eibner 'Lajos Ordass: Prophet, Patriot or Reactionary', Religion 
in Communist Lands (hereafter RCL), Keston College, England, Summer 1983, pp. 178-87; 
Imre András, 'A IL világháború utáni magyar katolikus egyház', in Magyar változások 
1948-1978, ed. Ernő Deák (hereafter A kat. egyház), Vienna, 1979, p. 131. On the unsavoury 
methods of the State Office see Konrád Szabó OFM, Az egyházügyi hivatal titkai, Budapest, 
1990. 
73. Paragraph 54 (1), Law XX, 1949. 
74. The badly phrased nine-paragraph Law rescinded all the differences between the two classes 
which were disadvantageous to the recognised religions (para. 1). Para. 2 maintained, 
however, the very stiff stipulations of paragraphs 7, 8 and 18 of XLIII, 1895, concerning the 
recognition of new religions, see above note 55 and after. 
75. As late as 1987 (!) József Lukács, who had prepared his work with the help of the State Office 
for Church Affairs, made this claim, Vallás és vallásosság a mai Magyarországon (hereafter 
Vallás), Budapest, 1987. p. 104, cf. p. 8. See also László Kardos et al. Boldog emberek, pp. 
309-10 and 321. 
76. Pál Fónyad, A magy. prot., pp. 113-16. Catholics were critical of the Protestants for rushing 
into agreements with the Communist government. The regime did not keep the agreements; 
see on the Calvinist Church, József Éliás, Az egyházak, pp. 207-08. 
77. On the megállapodás - a 'partial agreement' - see detailed but distorted accounts by Sándor 
Orbán, Az állam és egyh., pp. 280-308, and Jenő Gergely, A katolikus egyház Magyar­
országon, 1944-1971 (hereafter A kat. egyh.), Budapest, 1985, pp. 97f, 111; Idem, Katolikus 
egyház, magyar társadalom 1890-1986 (hereafter Kat. egyh. m. társ.), Budapest, 1989, pp. 
124-46 (better than the earlier work but still biased against the Church). The Vatican never 
approved the agreement; Imre András, A kat. egyház, p. 132; John Eibner, 'Hungary: 
overview', in: Philip Walters (ed.) World Christianity: Eastern Europe (hereafter Hungary), 
Eastbourne, 1988, p. 152. On the showtrial of Cardinal József Mindszenty see his Memoirs, 
1974, N. Y., p. 83, his Emlékirataim, 1974, Toronto, p. 223; A Mindszenty-per, intr. Gellért 
Békés (republication of the 'Fekete Könyv', the official record of the show-trial), I.U.S., 1986, 
Paris. Béla Szász, 'A Mindszenty-per', Irodalmi Újság, 1986, 4, pp. 3-4. Gyula Havasi's A 
magyar katolikusok szenvedései 1944-1989, Budapest, 1990, is a substantial collection of 
documents concerning the suppression of the Roman Catholic Church for the whole period. 
78. Sándor Orbán, Az állam és egyh., pp. 291-92 and 304f. Over the last twenty years the value 
of the regular state subsidies has considerably diminished, József Lukács, Vallás, pp. 62-3. 
Jenő Gergely, A kat. egyh., pp. 99f, 164. 
79. Ministry of the Interior ordinance of 30 July 1945. József Fodor, Vallási kisközösségek 
Magyarországon (hereafter Vallási), Budapest [1987], p. 106, and see a critical review of 
Fodor's Marxist work by John Eibner in RCL, 1988, No. 1, pp. 57-59. 
80. 1200/1947. II VKM rendelet, József Fodor, Vallási, pp. 52, 113 and esp. 125. 
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81. Examples given by József Fodor, Vallási, p. 112. The pejorative term 'sect' survived in official 
language. Barna Sarkadi Nagy, vice chairman of the State Office for Church Affairs, declared 
in 1988 that sects were those religious groups which operated without permission from the 
state authorities. Éva Árokszállási, 'Az állam és az egyházak', Magyar Hírek, 8 April 1988, 
p. 11. 
82. John Eibner, Hungary, pp. 147-48. 
83. József Fodor, Vallási, p. 130, cf. József Lukács, Vallás, p. 80. 
84. József Fodor, Vallási, p. 46; though József Lukács gives 1957 as the year of recognition, 
Vallás, p. 92. 
85. József Fodor, Vallási, p. 116. 
86. Tájékoztató a Magyarországon működő egyházakról és felekezetekről, State Office for Church 
Affairs (hereafter Tájékoztató), Budapest, 1987, pp. 70, 78-79. The persecution of Methodist 
groups in 1977 is described in 'A 12 metodista lelkész nyilatkozatának háttere', in: Magyar 
Füzetek, Paris, 1978 (hereafter A 12 metodista), pp. 109f. On the Nazarenes see László Kardos 
et al. Boldog emberek, pp. 324ff and 48Iff. 
87. In April 1988, 146 Jehova's Witnesses were in prison for refusing to perform military service, 
wrote John Eibner, the most knowledgeable foreign expert on the position of the Churches 
in Hungary, Hungary, p. 163. See also József Fodor, Vallási, pp. 84f, and József Lukács, 
Vallás, p. 95. 'Recognition' by the state authorities of a Church frequently involved the 
suppression of a dissenting group within that Church; see esp. A 12 metodista, p. 114. 
88. Postscript to József Fodor's Vallási, p. 145, also pp. 10 and 36. A confidential rendelet in 1976 
allowed members of some of the small communities to do unarmed military service. This 
privilege did not apply to the historical religions. On 22 April 1988 a government spokesman 
announced that 158 men were in prison for refusal of military service. Tamás Csapody '«Békés 
békétlenek» - Magyarországon', Századvég (hereafter Békés) 6-7, Budapest, 1988, p. 234. 
89. But for many a year after the 1956 revolution the Kádár regime, only slightly less intolerant 
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Origins of the Hungarian Cistercians 
Hungary was a century old when in 1098 the Cistercian order came to be: it 
owes, therefore, neither her historic existence nor Christianity to the Cister-
cians. Unlike the Benedictines who witnessed the birth of the nation and were 
first to bring the pagan Hungarians to the baptismal font, the Cistercian 
stepped into the stream of the spiritual and intellectual life of the young nation 
in order to respond to the call King Béla III extended to the Order in the second 
half of the twelfth century. Béla III, anxious to renew the profession of faith in 
his kingdom, wanted to reaffirm the allegiance of Hungary to the West. If, 
however, on the day of his coronation he had taken the whole country into the 
orbit of Byzantium where he had been raised and educated, he would have 
surprised no one. But against all odds, once he became a king, without 
betraying his former masters, he made an unexpected move and turned to 
France for moral and political support. He underlined his determination, first 
of all, with his marriages: after the death of his first wife, Anne de Chatillon, he 
married Princess Margaret, the sister of King Philippe II Augustus. Both 
marriages of Béla III, without doubt, were motivated by politics; history, 
however, when serving political interests, also promotes cultural causes. The 
second marriage of Béla III created between France and Hungary political, 
cultural, and economic relations in which the cultural impact of the political 
move proved to be the longest lasting. By pure coincidence, therefore, France 
shared, with Hungary the first phase of her cultural and spiritual splendor. In 
1172, when Béla III was crowned king of Hungary, France was under the spell 
of her Cistercian enthusiasm; Béla III became king just nineteen years after the 
death of Saint Bernard of Clairvaux. At the end of the twelfth century, French 
spirituality, civilization, culture were essentially Cistercian: Cistercians were 
heard even at the University of Paris. And that was the face of the "West" that 
the French Cistercians were going to make known to Hungary. 
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Cistercians in France 
The Cistercian Order was born out of a spiritual reform intended as a return 
to the purity and discipline of the Rule of Saint Benedict. The reformers were to 
implement the "Ora et Labora" in a Christ-like spirit. They intended to put an 
end to the trend that Cluny established, which was characterized by compla-
cency and a general worldly spirit of the members. After some initial difficulties, 
Citeaux (and soon after, Clairvaux, Morimond, La Ferté, and Pontigny) began 
to attract the best of the youth of France, and so the Order in France assumed a 
spiritual leadership, which transformed the intellectual, political, and even 
economic life of the country. Beginning with the last decades of the twelfth 
century, France and the Cistercian Order constituted an intimate union. The 
genius of Saint Bernard dominated the political, theological, social scene of the 
West: he preached the second Crusade, challenged Abélard in public debates at 
the University of Paris, promoted the liberation of the serfs, defended the 
freedom of the Church at large and, when signs of anti-semitism arose the cause 
of the Jews. The Cistercians were among the first to establish a "Collegium" 
(Bemardinum) next to the University of Paris to foster the higher education of 
their members. The "Marian Theology" of Saint Bernard greatly influenced the 
spirit of the court literature. It should also be recalled that in the great century of 
the French Classicism, all roads of France ran through Port-Royal, a Cistercian 
convent which was strong enough later to shelter Jansenism and Jansenists, to 
influence great geniuses like Pascal and Racine, to involve Kings and Ministers 
in the long-lasting quarrel, and to keep the religious conscience of the whole 
country attached to Christian values. But the movement - one might remark 
parenthetically - had also caused an immense spiritual crisis, a burden for the 
conscience of official politics. To end this struggle, in 1711 Louis XIV ordered 
the whole convent to be demolished. At the same time, however, thanks to the 
courage and enthusiasm of Abbé Ráncé, another Cistercian reform in 1700 gave 
birth to the Trappist Order. The Jansenism which was born outside of the 
orthodox Christian Theology vanished with time, while the "Strict Observance" 
of the Trappists remained faithful to the contemplative spirit of the Church. It 
was this aspect of the contemplative life that attracted the heart of Chateaub-
riand to Abbé Ráncé.1 This long battle around Port-Royal involved the whole of 
France. Royer-Collard, a nineteenth century politician used to say, "Qui ne 
connait pas Port-Royal, ne connait pas l'humanité" ("He who does not know 
Port-Royal does not know humanity").2 Taking into account all the possible 
major ramifications of the story of Port-Royal, one cannot help stating that the 
convent stood for the microcosm of the universe in one of the most splendid 
centuries of French history. 
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The tragic past of the Cistercian Order in Hungary 
The history of the Cistercians in Hungary never reached the heights and 
depths exercised by the influence of the Cistercians in France. While France 
had, at one time, over four hundred Cistercian monasteries - it sounds almost 
unbelievable! - the highest number of Abbeys in Hungary only reached 
twenty.3 The cynics might add that there was no Hungarian Saint Bernard, but 
one must always remember that people like Saint Bernard are not of everyday 
occurrence. 
In spite of the obvious differences between Cistercians in France and in 
Hungary, the Hungarian Cistercians symbolize in many ways the tragic destiny 
of the country. The Tartar invasion in the early thirteenth century devastated 
the country and wiped out the Cistercians; the Turkish occupation in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries left the country in ruins and the Cistercian 
abbeys empty. In 1950, Communism suppressed once more the whole Order. 
The success of its restoration, which has recently begun, will follow the rhythm 
of the renewal of the country. "Renaissance" being the mutual aim of the 
country as well as of the Order, they seem to share both the joy of the present 
renewal and the hope in which they savor an even more prosperous future 
which will be built on sound moral principles. 
Facing a difficult future 
What could, what should, and what will Cistercians contribute to the new 
moral order of Hungary? Just a few years after the fall of Communism, 
crossing the country from west to east and from south to north, one cannot 
help hearing the voices of the demon of pessimism: a generation of forty-five 
years lost faith both in God and man. Indeed, the greatest damage Commu-
nism inflicted on Hungary was not its "Socialism," nor, for that matter, 
"Communism," but the fruits thereof, a "practical materialism" that a whole 
generation had first to swallow, then practice because it was the only thing 
they had learned. One can suspect that "practical materialism" was not quite 
the dream of the Party - or was it? - but "ideological materialism," when it 
reached the level of the everyday life tended to lose its ideological impact and 
settled down with a stupefying materialism. Whatever the case may have been, 
ideological materialism left people empty-handed. 
Being aware of some of the problems resulting from the spiritual and moral 
decadence of a substantial part of todays Hungarian society, one cannot help 
having mixed emotions. Ultimately, the question is not one of pessimism or 
38 MOSES M. NAGY 
optimism - these are just words. To change the course of things and events, 
people in all walks of life will have to unite their strengths and dare to face the 
future, which fortunately looks much more promising than one might have 
thought ten or fifteen years ago. If things have been dismantled in the recent 
past, there must be a way to rebuild them. For beyond the disgrace of these 
past years, some values survived, and they live on in a dormant state, waiting 
for encouragement to return in full strength in order to make life meaningful 
again. Obviously, one cannot dream of anything like returning to the past: 
things of the past are dead, but the spirit of a nation is not a thing. It is -
according to the meaning of the Latin word - its breath, its soul. The 
redemption by Christ, as always, starts anew with every single soul that comes 
into this world. 
All Cistercians remember, some with a blush, the famous little essay of 
Bishop Ottokár Prohászka, called A Pilis hegyén ("On the Mount of Pilis," 
1927).* It will not be without interest to recall some of the major ideas which 
constitute the heart of the study. Prohászka was stunned that, while Cistercian 
historians at the beginning of the twentieth century were eager to uncover a 
part of their long and glorious past-insisting perhaps too much on fights, court 
citations, business transactions, financial quarrels - they seldom thought of 
what Pilís used to be, for what its ruins speak. At first, one has the impression 
that Prohászka lets his poetic inspiration lead him astray and turns him into 
a sentimental preacher whose soul is haunted by the silence, which replaced 
the antiphons, that the Cistercians sung so beautifully under the humble arches 
of their primitive gothic church. That is only a part of the truth. Prohászka 
the poet allows himself the delight of dreaming and visualizing the attitude of 
the monks of Clairvaux. And here Prohászka cites the story of the memorable 
visit of Pope Innocent II to Clairvaux in France. The simplicity and humility 
of the monks who passed in front of the visiting Pope without noticing his 
presence in the monastery made him shed sincere tears. Here in Pilis, 
Prohászka says, things happened in the same sublime manner: the supernatu-
ral and the natural coexisted here, too. He further reminds his readers that Pilis 
had become the permanent home for people like Gertrude of Meran who was 
buried in Pilis; Saint Elizabeth, while visiting Hungary with her husband in 
1222, came to visit her mother's tomb in Pilis, as so many other people of 
blessed memory: Blessed Margit, Kinga, Jolánta, and King Louis the Great. 
Beyond all that, Prohászka is anxious that we become aware of another 
dimension of the Cistercian tradition; the tradition of mysticism. The silent 
region - the forest, the valleys, the meadows, the mountains - witnessed the 
passing through of "the lights and shadows of thirteenth century mysticism," 
that form of divine love in which the monks explicated and interpreted the 
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redemption of the human race by Christ. Ultimately, what the Cistercians 
brought into the Hungary of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was what 
Prohászka calls, "the great unconscious realism" the desire of which had no 
other ambition than "to live," "to believe," "to love," "to walk toward eternal 
happiness," and "to know". What we like to consider in history as the first 
"Renaissance" in the West, turned out to be a second birth for Hungary: 
everything that was great in this Renaissance of the West was introduced into 
Hungary by the Cistercians. 
The role of the Cistercians in the rebirth 
What role then could history assign to the Cistercians in this new Renais-
sance at the end of the twentieth century? Or what role should Cistercians 
assume? In the "Ancien Régime," Cistercians prospered as most of the other 
religious Orders, but the Cistercian Order was different from the Jesuits, as 
were the Jesuits from the Benedictines. Orders are different by the very nature 
of their traditions and constitutions, each responding to a particular expecta-
tion or need of a particular segment of the society or epoch. Without wanting 
to make value judgements or comparisons between life-styles and methods in 
teaching of different teaching Orders, I will try to list some of those character-
istics which made Cistercian education unique and "Cistercian." These quali-
ties, I believe, if rediscovered and implemented, will greatly enhance the 
spiritual and moral rebirth of Hungary. 
Let us first recall that the real impact the Cistercians had on Hungarian 
society was pedagogical and educational, without their ever having sacrificed 
the nature of their Order or denying the place of the soul in their adventure. 
I would, therefore, state, first of all, that the most eminent quality of Cistercian 
education was its "Frenchness," its orderliness. One can feel from the very 
inception of the Order how much Cistercian monks cultivated the idea of 
orderliness. In the language of religious spirituality, the opposite of orderliness 
is what we call "riches," "idleness," "inactivity," "the excessive cult of the 
self." The foundation of the Cistercian Order resembles a revolution that a 
group of monks mounted against Cluny where the religious led a life of 
peaceful apathy. The French mentality which animates the Cistercians appears 
in many ways. It created Classicism, and highlighted its spirit in the creation 
of Versailles, Classical literature; then Jansenism, Pascal, and his concept of 
"Three Orders," "Trappistism"; it had also inspired Calvinism and the 
philosophy of Descartes, together with the Rationalism of the eighteenth 
century. 
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The relevance of the Cistercian teaching 
The hearty words and sincere concern of Bishop Prohászka, notwithstand-
ing, the spiritual and intellectual life of the Cistercians in Hungary reached 
heights in our century that no other historical age would surpass. Although 
the split of the Order into "Strict" and "Common" Observances - which 
finally created two independent Orders ("Trappists" and "Cistercians") - gave 
an edge to the "contemplative" Trappists, and thus made it possible for them 
to enjoy recognition and prestige for some time; the "active" Cistercians, being 
involved in teaching and ministry, honored both monastic discipline and 
"contemplation". In assuming "modern" activites, the Cistercians have essen-
tially translated the concept of "Labora" (Work) to a ministry in which they 
explicated the message of Christ and the beauty of knowing and art to several 
generations of young people. 
Most Hungarians agree today that the nation has to be re-educated in many 
ways, without implying that the country is uneducated, or that its education 
was neglected during the decades of Communist rule. As a matter of fact, 
many disciplines had been taught with outstanding results; there are in 
Hungary certainly many well-filled ("stuffed") heads ("des tés bien pleines"), 
but could we say in good conscience that those heads are also well made ("bien 
faites")?5 At this point I will return to Pascal who received his education at 
the school of Port-Royal. His teaching about the "Three Orders" also explains 
the essence of Cistercian pedagogy. What we had practiced in our schools for 
two centuries may yet prove to be the right thing for our future teaching. In 
the "Three Orders" of values, respect for the body, love for the spirit (l'esprit), 
and absolute dedication to the Order of Charity was taught. All schools and 
teachers can reach the first two orders, that of the body and of the spirit: they 
only require time and knowing. The third "Order," the Order of the Super-
natural can only be taught by living in it. The real problem is not a question 
of academics, we can teach any subject with great success. In the very name 
of academic freedom, we should let the soul speak of its own life, existence, 
and yearnings. And that is a question of Charity: the totality of the human 
being cannot be waivered. "Practical materialism" may be counterbalanced by 
poverty; misery by generosity and justice; anxiety, hopelessness and despair 
call for joy, confidence and the open skies of the Charity of God. Being and 
life, although constantly under threat of time and death, may be savored and 
enjoyed only when they have been promoted into the high regions of Charity, 
the order of God. 
A few years back, a historian, specializing in Cistercian history, stated that 
the Cistercians were the first "capitalists" of the West. His statement greatly 
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surprises; however, one could respond, not without a certain sense of humor, 
that, "Yes, but the first successful capitalists" \ long before the Cistercians came 
to be the Benedictines had already practiced the same economic system. The 
Cistercians, however, followed orderliness which lasted for centuries. And even 
when the economic system perished, the consciousness of the orderliness 
survived. 
"The heart has its reasons..." 
After this parenthetical remark I should dwell briefly on a somewhat 
different matter, which pertains to the essence of our Cistercian teaching. If 
implemented, it will enhance our endeavor in building a brighter future for 
Hungary. It has already been pointed out how much the affective life of the 
country has suffered during the past decades, and how much its decayed state 
is evidenced in the society of the post-Communist regime.6 The remark of 
Saint Augustine, that "Non movetur anima pedibus sed affectibus" ("The soul 
does not walk on feet but on affections")7 sums up the state of the matter; for 
if the social life of the whole country was programmed in such a way that the 
voice of the soul was not honored, the programming also meant silencing the 
voice of sentiments and affections. (With its thesis of "class struggle," 
Marxism, when reaching the individual, preaches hatred.) Liberation, there-
fore, should be extended also to affections. Love lives on affections, and so 
does justice. And I would even venture to state that knowledge, research, and 
science live on enthusiasm and affections which lend meaning to all human 
endeavors. What saves the world from the philosophy of "WHAT'S THE USE 
OF IT?" is the affective dimension of our heart and love. In the vein of the 
same thought, and in order to challenge our intelligence that it should listen 
to the voice of the heart, we might recall Pascal's well known sentence, i.e., 
"Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaít point" ("The heart has its 
reasons that the reason does not know at all").8 
One of the great values that we Cistercians inherited from Saint Bernard 
and which shaped and keeps on shaping our lives is the prominent role of the 
Virgin Mary in the life of the Church and the spiritual growth of the individual 
Christian. By sensitizing the world about this matter, Saint Bernard trans-
formed the cult of the woman which had become a fashion in court literature 
just about the time he began his public career. The sublime feminity became 
the source of salvation both in a religious sense and in its social connotation. 
By upgrading the affective life of his century, Saint Bernard was able to turn 
the excesses of court literature toward a more aesthetically oriented art, while, 
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at the same time, he also slowed down the advancement of Abélard's rationalism. 
It seems that the Cistercian alumni in Hungary, after having experienced the 
"other life-style," remember what they had received with their education, and they 
deplore what they see now in the life of their own children and grand-children. The 
spiritual and affective needs of Hungary may not differ very much from the needs 
of the rest of the world, but if Hungary was able to hold high the mirror in which 
the world contemplates the heroism of freedom, she may also take a leading role in 
matters pertaining to our affective life. It would be a mistake to let people think 
that the damage done is limited to religion; everyone should understand that a 
whole generation has been washed out (Egy egész nemzedéket kilúgoztak. - O n a 
lessivé toute une generation.) There is no time to be cynical about this. We should 
perhaps re-invent the language of the heart: COR LOQUITUR AD COR ("The 
heart speaks to the heart"). 
Conclusion 
The Cistercian Order is not the microcosm of Hungary; it does not hold the 
key to the secrets of the moral, spiritual, or intellectual problems of the 
country, but it does symbolize whatever the country can and should do in 
order to assure its survival. The members of the Order would like to be 
optimistic; they embrace new programs; re-establish "gimnáziums" in Eger, 
Budapest, Baja, Pécs, Székesfehérvár. But they cannot help raising the ques-
tion: With whom can we implement all these ideas of renewal? The number 
of vocations does not disappoint the optimist; however, no one dares call it 
an abundance. Yet, the future is not going to be built with purely human 
efforts. Everything is grace, the Scripture says (Rom. IV, 16). Everything is 
grace, Bernanos repeats in his novel, called The Diary of a Country Priest.9 To 
conclude then, let us recall the words of Father Teilhard de Chardin. He put 
his prayer and future confidence into the frame of his scientific "formula"; he 
says: "For having gone to heaven, after you descended all the way to hell, you 
have so much filled the Universe in all directions, Jesus, that from now on, we 
find ourselves in the blessed impossibility of escaping from you."10 
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During the Revolution of 1848, Lajos Kossuth wrote optimistically that 
"Hungarians and Wallachians [i.e. Romanians] alike shall find their bright 
future only in fraternal union one with the other."1 A half century later, 
another Protestant statesman of Hungary, István Tisza, asserted that Hungar­
ians and Romanians, surrounded by Slavs, ought to join hands for their 
mutual survival.2 Catholic compatriots of both nationalities, of course, shared 
a vision of Europe that had Rome at its center. For Roman and Greek 
Catholic nationalists of Transylvania, Hungarians and Romanians, this "fra­
ternal union" offered both the benefits and the dangers of a foreign alliance: 
powerful support, but also the need to defend oneself against Protestant or 
Eastern Ortodox accusations of allienation from the true national interest. 
This theme was particularly strong during the heyday of ultrám ontani sm, 
symbolized for citizens of Hungary by the Austrian Concordat of 1855, the list 
of doctrinal errors known as the Syllabus Errorum promulgated by Pius IX in 
1864, and the definition of papal infallibility by the Vatican Council in 1871. 
For Transylvanian Catholics, the crucial instruments of this relationship 
with Rome were their bishops, the Hungarian Lajos Haynald (1816-91) and 
the Romanian Alexandru Sterca-Şuluţiu (1794-1867). These striking personal­
ities were similar in their social origin in the minor nobility and in their 
profession of faith, but different in most other respects. Haynald, a native of 
Nógrád County in northern Hungary, was a well-travelled and erudite theolo­
gian and botanist before becoming secretary of the Hungarian Primate at 30; 
Şuluţiu, on the other hand, was a long-time village priest and rural vicar who 
first visited Vienna from his native Transylvania in 1856. The two took 
possession of their episcopal sees only two years apart, Şuluţiu in 1850 and 
Haynald in 1852.3 
Şuluţiu's first pastoral letter as spiritual leader of half of Transylvania's 1.2 
million Romanians was addressed "to his clergy and the Roman [or Roma­
nian] people" ("ad clerum suum, Populumque romanum"), asserting: "We are 
united not only by the communion of faith with the head of the Holy Roman 
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Apostolic Church, but also through ties of blood and nationality... The August 
Austrian House and the House of God, that is, the Roman Mother Church, 
are our only refuge and salvation!"4 Interpreting in a Roman sense the 
Romanian 1848ers' demand for the ecclesiastic autonomy and unity of the 
Romanians, he secured the approval of the Hungarian episcopate, the state, 
and finally the Holy See for the elevation of his see to a Metropolitanate with 
two new suffragan bishoprics in 1855, removing it from the authority of the 
Hungarian Primate. All parties were united, for the moment, in the desire to 
weaken the Romanians' gravitation toward the Orthodox Church and its 
coreligionists across the Carpathians. The Primate, János Scitovszky, later 
came to see this act, like the Concordat, as an Austrian attempt to weaken his 
own authority, but he could not openly oppose a measure he had endorsed 
repeatedly in 18 50-2.5 
Şuluţiu's Romanizing fervor did not extend to matters of church discipline, 
where he represented the orientalist wing of his church, rejecting all intrusions 
of western practices in matrimonial jurisdiction and synodal practices after 
1855.6 Rome's misgivings about the deficient theological training of the new 
Romanian Metropolitan deepened as the canonical dispute sharpened. After 
travelling to Blaj (Balázsfalva) for the investment of Şuluţiu, the Apostolic 
Nuncio Michèle Viale-Prelá reported that Bishop Haynald was his constant 
companion enroute. Haynald probably colored the Nuncio's description of the 
impoverished peasantry, in whom he found "not the smallest trace of civiliza­
tion."7 When Viale's successor, Antonio De Luca, visited Blaj in 1858 for 
extended consultations on the canonical controversy (once again spending 
considerable time with Haynald), he reported that Şuluţiu repeatedly confused 
matters of doctrine with those of discipline, and was completely under the 
influence of his militant canon, Timotei Cipariu.8 
Şuluţiu "the ultramontane" (as he was labelled indignantly by the Orthodox 
Bishop Andreiu Şaguna9) was certainly aware of the greater rapport that the 
more polished and sophisticated Bishop Haynald enjoyed with the Pope's 
envoys. The Uniate's unease in this regard is reflected in the private appeal he 
sent Haynald in March 1859, on the eve of the first of Haynald's two ad limina 
visits to the Holy See as bishop. Şuluţiu urged him to defend their "mutual 
Catholic interests" and take account of the oriental traditions that he, in his 
position, had a duty to defend.10 Şuluţiu, for his part, never made an ad limina 
visit, a fact lamented by the Papal curia.11 
Haynald's portrayal of their "mutual Catholic interests" was indeed at 
stake. His unusually detailed report on the state of his diocese, presented on 
May 2, 1859, culminated in the plea that his see be raised to the rank of an 
archdiocese. He supported this request in terms of the diocese's unique 
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historical role and its achievements in fighting Protestant heresy, the secession-
ist tendencies of the Romanians (despite the "faith, prudence, and moder-
ation" of the members of the "Wallachian hierarchy"), and the interest of 
strengthening the Latin church and Hungarian population as the Habsburg 
monarchy's most loyal subjects. Furthermore, he added, "Transylvania is in 
reality separate from Hungary and its church, constituting a distinct body with 
regard to politics, nationalities, and religions."12 
No action was taken on the request, despite a favorable response by both 
the Holy See and the Austrian government, in part because Haynald's 
archbishop opposed it, but even more because Hungary's political crisis and 
the role Haynald played in it soon overshadowed his proposal. At issue was 
the de jure (rather than defaciol) status of Transylvania. Baron József Eötvös 
wrote Haynald in November 1860 to ask that he give public support, as a 
councillor ex officio of the provincial government, to the Hungarian opposi-
tion's view that the union of Hungary and Transylvania, enacted in 1848, was 
still valid. Haynald's response was cautious: he agreed in principle, but added 
that in Transylvania " - the land of Protestant intolerance - the most justified 
Catholic activity will always be unpopular. The Reformed [i.e. Calvinists] are 
powerful, the Catholics willingly follow their lead."13 
Only weeks later Haynald abandoned this caution, taking the public lead of 
the opposition in Transylvania in speeches at a conference of the provincial 
government, in the House of Magnates in Pest, and finally in a memorandum 
he delivered to the leading Habsburg official of Transylvania, Count Ferenc 
Nádasdy. Nádasdy appealed to Haynald's sentiments as a fellow Catholic and 
loyal subject, but the bishop responded with a clever allusion to the common 
French and Italian adversaries of Austria and the Pope: "The egotistical 
gentlemen of the Umsturzpartei on the Seine and the Dora fight against the 
gilded parchments and extant treaties; Austria was renowned for always 
seeking to protect them, and this [is] the duty of the government as well."14 
Nuncio De Luca energetically supported the Austrian government's posi-
tion in his increasingly indignant reports on Haynald's opposition to Austrian 
policy. Far from accepting the arguments in Haynald's memorandum to 
Nádasdy, he recommended to Rome that it seek the dismissal of Haynald from 
his civil functions. Although Papal Secretary of State Giaccomo Antonelli 
conceded that Haynald's political activity might interfere with his religious 
responsibilites, he rejected De Luca's proposal.15 
Neatly disregarding the Papal States' dispute with Piedmont concerning 
the Italian risorgimento, Cardinal Antonelli remarked loftily that "the Holy 
See, for whom all political troubles are naturally foreign, cannot intervene."16 
Under the circumstances, either the ecclesiastic elevation or the public 
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reprimand of Haynald would have drawn the Holy See into a conflict whose 
outcome was uncertain. Haynald's representations were also having their effect 
in Rome. 
Haynald set out to counter the unfavorable light in which the Nuncio and 
the government were placing him by filing a series of unfavorable reports on 
the "rude and uncultured" Greek Catholics' susceptibility to Orthodoxy. 
Without mentioning Şuluţiu by name, Haynald stated that the Romanian 
clergy were agitating against his own, raising illegitimate canonical issues, and 
exploiting appointments to the Cathedral Chapter for political ends. This line 
of attack was a fruitful one. Already in January, 1861, Antonelli instructed De 
Luca to transmit the Pope's dissatisfaction with Şuluţiu's repeated and 
unjustified complaints of "Latinization."17 
Şuluţiu had meanwhile emerged as a key Romanian supporter of the new 
Austrian regime in Transylvania. He applauded the renewed Austrian guarantees 
of Transylvanian autonomy, and sought to mobilize his clergy against the 
Hungarian nobility. Within the church, he repeatedly presented the views of his 
more radical clergy concerning matrimony, the appointment of married clergy to 
canonries, and especially the holding of synods with a broad representative 
character. In the summer of 1861, Şuluţiu attended an Orthodox liturgy celebrated 
by Bishop Şaguna at the resort town of Vîlcele (Élőpatak) in southern 
Transylvania. One of Haynald's clergy reported the incident to his bishop, and the 
report soon found its way into the press and as far as Rome. Forced to defend 
himself, Şuluţiu wrote in a Hungarian newspaper that the Orthodox clergy and 
sacraments were "good and valid," and common prayer could not be a sin.18 He 
complained to the Transylvanian Governor in 1862 that Haynald treated him as if 
he were his suffragan bishop, and assered to another Romanian that Haynald was 
"the greatest enemy of my person and of our nation."19 The upshot of the affair 
was the decision of a Roman consistory to reprimand Şuluţiu for communicatio in 
divinis cum haereticis et schismaticis and various doctrinal errors.20 
Şuluţiu's politically motivated ecumenism was premature by a century. 
Several papal encyclica had confirmed the Holy See's determination to 
preserve the peculiarities of the eastern rite, while denouncing irregularities 
practiced by the Orthodox and calling upon them to unite with Rome,21 but 
the centralizing tendencies of the current pontiff worked against any broad 
definition of the inviolable eastern church discipline. Rome not only rejected 
the canonical programme of Şuluţiu, but appointed as his suffragan in Oradea 
(Nagyvárad), and consecrated in Rome itself in 1863, a thoroughly ultramon­
tane bishop, Iosif Papp-Szilágyi, who opposed Şuluţiu publicly.22 
The Pope's centralizing policy was most evident in his efforts to assemble 
his bishops in Rome and establish their personal loyalty to himself. From 1854 
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to 1867, the bishops in attendance at such periodic meetings rose steadily from 
206 to 500.23 The same purpose was served by the Pope's frequent condemna­
tions of doctrinal error and political liberalism, both of which weakened the 
ties of the people to the source of correct teaching on the faith in Rome. The 
unpublicized agenda of the bishops' meeting in Rome in May, 1862 - formally 
meant to canonize a number of Japanese martyrs - was to debate a compila­
tion of contemporary errors, the future Syllabus of Errors. 
While the Romanian bishops declined their invitations to Rome, Haynald 
was one of those who assembled there. He utilized the occasion to continue the 
presentation of his report of 1859, which had been interrupted by the outbreak 
of war. He also played a prominent role in the meeting's official activités. When 
the bishops' debate on the draft Syllabus ended in deadlock, the two sides chose 
Haynald, who impressed them with his oratorical skill and the favor he had won 
in the Curia since 1859, as the head of the editorial commission that composed 
their address to the Pope. Haynald influenced the adoption of a more moderate 
version of the response to the Pope's allocution of June 9, Maxima quidem, that 
condemned liberalism and the subjection of bishops to the civil power in Italy.24 
Future historians may be able to shed more light on the role Haynald 
played in the formulation of this address and in the debate on the Syllabus. 
Fully half of the Syllabus, it should be noted, concerns philosophical and 
theological questions only indirectly related to politics. Overall, it is likely that 
Italian and West European events exercised the greatest impact on the 
evolution of the document released in December, 1864 from the variants of 
1852 and 1862, but its repeated references to the interference of secular politics 
with the religious sphere also apply to the disputes concerning Haynald and 
Şuluţiu that reached their height at the same time. The list of 61 errors 
submitted to the bishops in 1862, and the eighty contained in the Syllabus of 
1864, both contained variants of the notion that bishops should be subject to 
the civil authorities. The chief difference between the earlier and the later list 
is the abandonment in 1864 of specific references to Italian politics, stressing 
instead fundamental principles. The Syllabus cites earlier papal statements 
where Pius IX had condemned the respective theses; and most of these 
documents were in fact commentaries on Italian events. But the relevance of 
Hungarian events is particularly evident in the condemnation of proposition 
51, that "the secular government had the right of deposing bishops from their 
pastoral functions."25 The most relevant documents, records for answering this 
question are preserved in the archives of the Holy Office, which are almost the 
last records of the Pontificate of Pius IX still closed to historical research.26 
After Haynald returned to Transylvania, his conflict with the Austrian 
authorities reached its height. 1863 was the year of political triumph for 
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Şulutiu and Şaguna - leading the Romanians into the Transylvanian Diet and 
the central parliament - and defeat for Haynald, who after encouraging the 
Hungarians' decision to boycott the Diet was pressured to resign from his see, 
and finally did so in December 1863. The Holy See waited an extraordinarily 
long time to accept the resignation, until September 1864. This reluctance was 
both a reflection of the Pope's personal regard for Haynald, and a matter of 
principle felt strongly in light of the assault on ecclesiastic authority in Italy. 
When the matter was finally resolved, Haynald took up a post in one of the 
Vatican congregations.27 
Transylvania's experience of the First Vatican Council (1869-1870) provides 
a surprising epilogue upon which to conclude this story. Ultramontanism had 
provided opportunities for both Bishops Haynald and Şuluţiu to enhance their 
ecclesiastic autonomy, and indeed their political authority. Şuluţiu ultimately 
had a more satisfactory relationship with the state than with the Holy See, 
while for Haynald the situation was the reverse. In 1864 Austria nominated, 
and the Holy See eventually confirmed, the more politically reliable Mihály 
Fogarasy as Haynald's successor. Following the restoration of constitualism 
in Hungary in 1867, Haynald returned as an archbishop, while Şuluţiu's 
successor after his death was loan Vancea, a churchman he had earlier passed 
over with the remark that he was "too Roman."28 
The ultramontane past of Haynald, Papp-Szilágyi, and Vancea appeared to 
guarantee their support of Pius IX at the Vatican Council. In fact, Haynald 
had already incurred the Pope's displeasure by conveying the liberal Dualist 
governments' renunciation of the concordat. Haynald, Papp-Szilágyi, Vancea, 
and Fogarasy proceeded to provide most of the leadership in the Hungarian 
episcopate's opposition to Papal infallibility, arguing that it was contrary to 
oriental church law and that it would arouse an unfavorable response among 
Hungary's non-Catholics, both Protestants and Orthodox. Papp-Szilágyi had 
taken over his see only seven years earlier as an agent of ultramontane 
retrenchment, but in his condemnation of the papal draft on infallibility he 
went even further than Haynald and Fogarasy, asserting the document "would 
make a return of the oriental church to the holy union impossible for all 
time."29 Thus it can be seen that while ultramontanism had divided Hungarian 
and Romanian churchmen between 1855 and 1864, it served to unite them in 
1870. Vancea and Fogarasy would be among the very last bishops of Hungary 
to publish the Council's decree on Papal infallibility, in 1872 and 1874.30 
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In 1888 a Literary Association of Hungarian Protestants was created in 
Budapest. The following year The Protestant Review was launched as the main 
organ of this Association. In 1889 it was published biannually, between 1890 
and 1894 on a quarterly basis, and between 1895 and 1919 it appeared ten 
times a year. In 1930 the journal became a monthly. After the end of World 
War II The Protestant Review ceased to appear. In 1989, the year of the 
collapse of Communism in Hungary, a Protestant Association of Public 
Education was organized. One of its aims was to reestablish continuity with 
the past and publish The Protestant Review as a quarterly. In 1991 I was 
invited to edit The Review and we published our first four issues the following 
year. 
Four periods can be distinguished in the history of this prestigious journal. 
The first lasted until the end of 1913. In the early years its editor was Béla 
Kenessey, a professor of theology in Kolozsvár. When he became the director 
of the theological faculty in Kolozsvár, he was replaced by Farkas Szőts 
(1851-1918). Born in Maros-Torda county, Szőts studied at the universities of 
Budapest, Marburg, and Utrecht. In 1879 he was appointed professor of 
theology in Budapest. Although he published relatively few articles of his own 
in The Review, he was largely responsible for the general character of the 
journal from the sixth issue of 1895 until the end of 1913.1 
Szőts was a follower of Liberal theology and decided to make his review 
cover a wide range of topics. Each issue contained longer essays as well as 
review articles on intellectual trends in Hungary and in other countries, in 
addition to shorter reviews. Since the editor's intention was to make the 
journal the organ of all Hungarian Protestants, particular attention was 
afforded to American congregations. For example in 1912, Sándor Harsányi, a 
clergyman in Homestead (Pennsylvania), summarized the principles underlying 
the presidential election in the U.S., and drew a portrait of Woodrow Wilson. 
Although religion was the subject of most of the essays, and the majority 
of the books reviewed were published in German, several contributors focused 
Hungarian Studies 10/1 (1995) 
0236-^568/95/$ 4.00 © 95 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
56 MIHÁLY SZEGEDY-MASZÁK 
on the philosophy, science, literature, and history of all the important cultures 
of the Western world. In 1913, for instance, the philosophical journal A 
Szellem (The Spirit), edited by Lajos Fülep, and the first Hungarian translation 
of Dewey were among the publications analysed. 
While during the first decades the main principles of Positivism were 
respected by most of the contributors, around 1910a new orientation made its 
influence felt. Philological articles about the history of Protestantism were 
replaced by essays on philosophical subjects. In 1911 József Nagy, one of the 
most important historians of Western philosophy in Hungary, examined the 
fundamental questions asked by Pascal, and others described the role of 
Christianity in the works of Madách, Károly Böhm, Lev Tolstoy, and Gerhart 
Hauptmann. 
Undoubtedly, The Protestant Review supported the Neoconservatism of 
István Tisza, who was the Prime Minister of Hungary between 1913 and 1916. 
In November 1911 Tisza gave a lecture at a meeting of the Association of 
Social Sciences. The text, entitled Nation and Society, was published in The 
Protestant Review. 
While the majority of the contributors were members of the Hungarian 
Reformed Church, they often had no ecclesiastical affiliation. Catholics and 
Socialists were frequently criticized from the perspective of bourgeois Liberal-
ism, but the legitimacy of science was never questioned. Knowledge and belief 
were regarded as two autonomous spheres of intellectual life. It should come 
as no surprise that Calvinist authors preferred to comment on social conflicts, 
whereas Lutherans were less reluctant to examine ethnic tensions. State and 
church were viewed as independent institutions. Most of the essayists agreed 
that the gap was widening between secular and religious life and preferred to 
see education as independent of the churches. 
There was only one Catholic leader who was praised in the pages of the 
main journal of the Hungarian Protestants. Ottokár Prohászka (1858-1927), 
who became bishop of Székesfehérvár in 1905, was undoubtedly the most 
controversial figure in the history of the Hungarian Roman Catholic Church. 
Although he was a harsh critic of Marxism, he called for some kind of 
Christian Socialism. The short article summarizing the lecture he gave at the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences is marked by an inferiority complex. Drawing 
on the philosophical works of Nietzsche and Bergson, the author of the article 
argued, Prohászka set an example for Protestants on how to reinterpret 
Christianity in the light of contemporary thinking. 
Unlike some Hungarian journals of the period, in this first phase of its 
history The Protestant Review never published any anti-Semitic material. In 
1913 one of the longest essays contained a historical analysis of anti-Jewish 
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attitudes. Its author, István Hamar, asked all Protestants to reject anti-
Semitism and urged them to enlighten uneducated people who were inclined 
to make "unfounded and unjust charges" against Jews.2 The editor's position 
was unambiguous: he considered anti-Semitism a superstition, and condemned 
it in any form. 
After the resignation of Szőts, László Ravasz became the editor of The 
Review. Like his predecessor, Ravasz was a Transylvanian. Born in 1882, he 
studied at the universities of Kolozsvár and Berlin. In Kolozsvár he studied 
under Hugó Meltzl, an outstanding early scholar of Comparative Literature, 
and the philosopher Károly Böhm (1846-1911). In 1905-1906 he had such 
illustrious professors as the philosopher Georg Símmel, the classical philologist 
Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, and the art historian Heinrich Wölfflin. 
In 1907, after his return to Kolozsvár, he received a doctorate for his book 
The Aesthetics of Schopenhauer. At the age of 25 he became a professor at the 
theological faculty in Kolozsvár. 
Although he never aspired to become a professional philosopher, the impact 
of Böhm was so strong on him that he never lost his interest in such fields as 
ethics, aesthetics, and even ontology. Böhm, a Lutheran who had studied in 
Göttingen, Tübingen, and Berlin, became the most influential Hungarian 
philosopher at the end of the 19th century. He urged his students to take a 
serious interest in axiology. Under his influence Ravasz focused on the theory 
of moral and aesthetic values. Without a doubt, this education prepared 
Ravasz for the important role he played in the intellectual life of Hungary 
between the two wars. 
I am not in the position to assess the significance of Ravasz in Hungarian 
culture. Let it suffice to say that no other Hungarian religious leader had a 
more far-reaching influence on intellectual life in the 20th century. Although 
since his death in 1975 and especially since the end of Communism several of 
the works he wrote after World War II have appeared, some texts still remain 
unpublished. 
In his early years Ravasz was a Freemason and sympathized with social 
Radicalism. When it became clear that the Radicals could not tolerate any 
kind of Christianity and their intention was not to transform but to demolish 
the edifice of the Dual Monarchy, he felt compelled to change his orientation. 
The goal he set himself as editor of The Review was to transform Protestant­
ism. Since he lived in Kolozsvár, the editorial office moved to that city, but 
The Review itself was printed in Budapest. 
The second stage in the history of the journal started with the introduction 
Ravasz wrote for the first issue to appear under his editorship. What was the 
meaning of Protestanism in the past? he asked. In the 16th and 17th centuries 
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Protestanism stood for a belief in the letter of the Bible, whereas in the 18th 
and 19th centuries it became synonymous with the legacy of the Enlightenment 
and the cult of tolerance which characterized Liberalism. Rejecting the 
tradition of Liberal theology, Ravasz urged his readers to adjust their 
interpretation of Protestantism. Opposed to both Conservatism and revol-
utionary utópia, he refused to view Protestantism in ecclesiastical terms and 
harshly criticized those for whom Protestantism was comparable to a political 
party. Although he insisted that "in the 20th century Protestantism was the 
only way of being Christian without any reservation", he criticized any form 
of fanaticism. "When the representatives of one theological trend regard those 
of another trend as non-Christian, it is very likely that those who are attacked 
are still Christian, while those who condemn others in the name of Christ have 
nothing to do with his teaching."3 
From January 1914 every issue of The Protestant Review had a clearcut 
structure, which Ravasz described in the following way: "The first item was a 
meditation on one of the fundamental principles of personal Christianity. This 
was followed by articles dealing with the widest possible range of subjects. 
(Before my editorship The Review had focused on ecclesiastical history.) In the 
next section topical issues and recent publications were discussed both in an 
international and in a national context. 'Signs and Interpretations' was my 
invention. This part contained short polemical notes. In later years my 
students, Imre Révész, József Vásárhelyi, and Sándor Makkai became its 
authors. At the beginning I was responsible for this section."4 
It was mainly due to the short polemical notes that The Protestant Review 
drew the attention of the general public. In the first year of World War I it 
contained articles on Fichte, Kierkegaard, and Zsigmond Kemény, the 19th-
century novelist and essayist, whose current unpopularity Ravasz interpreted 
as a sign of the cultural decadence of Hungary. A few months later there was 
another provocative statement in the same section about anti-Semitism. Three 
possible definitions of Jewishness were mentioned. The author dismissed racist 
and religious anti-Semitism but criticized "a spiritual trend, the mixture of 
hedonism and utilitarianism".5 Since there is every reason to believe that these 
words were written by the editor, this short article may have been the first sign 
of what some commentators later called the anti-Semitism of Ravasz. This is 
not the appropriate place to discuss this thorny issue. Let it suffice to say that 
under his editorship the attitude of The Protestant Review towards Jews had 
changed. 
Ravasz was on friendly terms with Prohászka and came to redefine the 
concept of predestination in harmony with the theology of Karl Barth. He 
dismissed fatalism as a simplified and even distorted form of Calvinism, and 
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insisted on the significance of a belief in a merciful God. This starting-point 
had far-reaching consequences. Even a superficial reading of the first issues 
edited by Ravasz indicates that his editorial policy was meant to combine a 
scholarly interest in ecclesiastical history with a critical analysis of contempo­
rary intellectual life. One of his students, Imre Révész (1889-1967) started 
publishing a long series of studies on the history of Christianity which later 
made him the most important Hungarian specialist of this field in the 20th 
century. Sándor Makkai (1890-1951), another student of Ravasz, focused on 
a synchronic analysis of religion, drawing on German hermeneutics, American 
pragmatism, as well as French and Hungarian sociology. Both contributors 
helped the editor transform The Review into one of the most exciting journals 
in the country. 
During the war years several Hungarian periodicals competed with each 
other. The Protestant Review proved to be well-informed about contemporary 
trends is Western and Hungarian culture. Such controversial works as 
L'Action Francaise et la Religion Catholique (1913) by Charles Maurras and A 
száműzött Rákóczi (Rákóczi in Exile, 1913) by Gyula Szekfű were analysed in 
long review articles by Révész, and Ravasz himself took issue with the 
interpretation of Protestantism made by the most famous poet of the new 
generation, Endre Ady. 
The Commune and the Peace Treaty of Trianon shocked Ravasz. Béla 
Kun's totalitarian régime was openly anti-religious, so The Protestant Review 
was not published in the first half of 1919. The ten issues appeared in one 
volume at the end of that year. Since Ravasz was cut off from the Hungarian 
capital, Géza Lencz was responsible for the editorial work. The next year 
Gyula Madai, a secondary-school teacher was appointed editor, but he could 
not save The Review, which was discontinued at the end of 1920. 
In 1921 Ravasz became the bishop of the Danubean region of the Reformed 
Church. Having settled in Budapest, he set himself the task of reorganizing the 
activities of Hungarian Protestants. In 1924 The Protestant Review was 
renewed under his editorship. Because of his many ecclesiastical obligations, 
the Literary Association of Hungarian Protestants decided to appoint a 
Managing Editor. Ferenc Zsinka, a librarian, was nominated at the beginning 
of April. He took full responsibility for the administrative work and continued 
to help Ravasz until his death in 1930. His successor was Lajos Áprily 
(1887-1967), a well-known Transylvanian poet, who decided to leave Romania 
in 1929. 
In the 1920s Hungarian cultural life was dominated by two journals. 
Nyugat, founded in 1908, continued to represent the values of the bourgeois 
Liberals who had been forced to be on the defensive since they were blamed 
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for their failure to resist the Communist dictatorship of 1919. In 1923 Napkelet 
was started with the idea of supporting the Neoconservative régime of István 
Bethlen and the policy of his Minister of Culture, Kúnó Klebelsberg. Since 
most of the contributors of The Protestant Review sympathized with the 
ideology of Napkelet, they felt a compulsion to devote serious attention to the 
activity of the Liberals. 
Great emphasis was put on the analysis of the international scene. In 1924 
Imre Révész gave a critical analysis of works about religious minorities. Two 
years later a book on the Soviet Union by a Scottish professor was reviewed. 
The article confirms the view that the attitude of The Review towards the Jews 
had changed partly because of the prominent role some Jews played in the 
Bolshevik Party and the Hungarian Communist movement. In 1930 Ravasz 
published a long essay on the Hungarian Reformed Church in North America. 
Important translations of outstanding Christian texts were given a close 
reading. Sándor Karácsony (1891-1952), a man of letters who was familiar 
with the most advanced trends in linguistics and semiotics, put forward ideas 
on educational reform. Among the new contributors were members of the new 
generation. Tibor Joó (1901-1945), a prominent representative of the Geistes­
geschichte school, started a long series of penetrating investigations of the 
main ideas of Liberalism and nationalism; the literary historian Dezső 
Kerecsényi (1898-1945) set himself the task of reinterpreting the Hungarian 
literature of the 16th and 17th centuries; and László Németh (1901-1975), one 
of the most influential Hungarian writers of the 20th century, sought to revise 
the national canon. Zsigmond Ritoók (1870-1938), a medical expert and 
Kálmán d'Isoz (1878-1956), the Director of the Music Department of the 
National Museum, extended the range of topics discussed. Theatrical perform­
ances, musical events, and exhibitions were analysed by professional critics. In 
February 1938, for instance, concerts given by such artists as the American 
black singer Marian Anderson, the Spanish guitarist Andres Segovia, and the 
great German conductor Wilhelm Furtwaengler were reviewed. 
In the interwar period the reputation of The Protestant Review was so high 
that Roman Catholics were pleased to publish in it. In 1938 a book on the 
great 19th-century poet János Arany by Dezső Keresztury, a prominent 
Catholic Liberal essayist, was given a scholarly critical assessment by János 
Barta, the leading Catholic literary historian of the new generation. 
The change between the second and third stages in the history of The 
Protestant Review was less decisive than the one between the first two phases. 
In March 1938 Ravasz was replaced by Sándor Makkai and Áprily by Dezső 
Kerecsényi. Born at Szentgotthárd, Kerecsényi came from the small Lutheran 
community of southern Transdanubia. The years he spent as a student at the 
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Eötvös College brought him into contact with Liberal intellectuals. As Manag­
ing Editor he modified the orientation of The Protestant Review in the sense 
that he asked authors of different political convictions to contribute, focused 
on the history of Hungarian culture and contemporary literature rather than 
on ecclesiastical issues, and made The Review one of the chief organs of 
Geistesgeschichte essay writing. Two eminent historians, Elemér Mályusz and 
László Makkai, the son of Sándor Makkai, discussed the role of Joseph II in 
the history of Protestantism, and Tibor Joó reviewed the important collection 
of essays What Is Hungarian? (1939), edited by Gyula Szekfű, which had both 
Ravasz and Kerecsényi among its contributors. Gábor Halász, who was later 
to perish in the holocaust, was given a chance to comment on any important 
publication, irrespective of religious affiliation. He published an essay on 
Kölcsey, a Protestant, and praised a monograph on Péter Pázmány, the leader 
of the Hungarian Counter-Reformation, written by Sándor Sík, a well-known 
Catholic. 
In 1940 the Northern half of Transylvania was returned to Hungary. 
Understandably, several articles were devoted to the past and present of the 
region. László Makkai examined the urban culture of Transylvanian Hunga­
rians, while his father made an inquiry into the historical reasons for the loss 
of Transylvania after World War I. Different conceptions of Central Europe 
were discussed. Panslavism was investigated by Tibor Joó, and the life of the 
Hungarians living beyond the Carpathians by László Mikecs, an expert on the 
subject. From Nazism to Masaryk's bourgeois democracy the political move­
ments of other countries were analysed. 
Although Ravasz and Révész continued to appear in The Review, and 
Makkai wrote longer essays on such important subjects as the interpretation 
of the story of Cain, the significance of Calvin's theology for the 20th century, 
or the meaning of the tragic suicide of István Széchenyi in 1860, members of 
the young generation represented the majority of both the authors discussed 
and the contributors. The first books of Sándor Joó, László Vatai, and László 
Mátrai were reviewed. It is instructive to remember the later careers of these 
three talented intellectuals. Joó would become one of the most influential 
pastors to be persecuted by the Communists, Vatai was forced to leave 
Hungary altogether, whereas Mátrai went on to become an official philos­
opher of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. One or two minor figures 
seemed to flirt with nationalism, but the intellectual integrity of the journal 
was preserved by the editors and by most of the authors. In the early 1940s, 
when most Hungarian periodicals sided either with the bourgeois Liberals or 
with the Populists, The Protestant Review tried to keep a balance, occupy an 
intermediate position, and keep a distance from the ideological tension caused 
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by World War II. The various articles on the posthumous works of Babits and 
on the essays and dramas of László Németh had one common denominator: 
they criticized Hungarian intellectuals for their resistance to serious meditation 
on the possible role Hungarians could play in Europe. In December 1940 the 
works of the Populist poet Gyula Illyés were highly praised side by side with 
The Breviary of St. Orpheus, a work in progress by Miklós Szentkuthy, one of 
the most emphatically urban writers. The first issue of 1941 contained a 
favourable review of a book by József Darvas, a Populist who was member of 
the illegal Communist Party, and an appreciative essay on Sándor Márai by 
László Bóka. Both Márai and Bóka were among the harshest critics of Nazi 
Germany and the strongest opponents to the Populist movement. The next 
issue devoted much space to a summary of the posthumous works of Dezső 
Kosztolányi, one of the major figures of the first Nyugat generation, but it also 
gave a favourable interpretation of the overtly political message of Mit ér az 
ember, ha magyar? (What is a man's life worth if he is Hungarian?) by Péter 
Veres, one of the leading Populists. In contrast to other Hungarian journals, 
which were affected by the growing German influence, The Protestant Review 
insisted on the importance of French culture and the works of writers who 
were opposed to the political right (Márai, Illyés, the historian Szekfű, the 
translator Marcell Benedek, the Catholic poet Sándor Sík, the Socialist writer 
Kassák, the Anglophile essayist László Cs. Szabó, the pro-Communist socio­
logist Ferenc Erdei) and/or were of Jewish origin (Antal Szerb, György Rónay, 
György Sárközi, Jenő Mohácsi, Imre Waldapfel). 
Was The Review affected by the German occupation? At the beginning 
continuity seemed to be almost unbroken. In May Gábor Gönczy spoke about 
intellectual decline and praised Kassák for his moral and artistic integrity. In 
June Endre Vajda made a comparative analysis of three verse collections, 
calling Sándor Weöres a great, Zoltán Jékely a fine, and Géza Képes a 
craftsmanlike poet. The influence of the growing political pressure was felt in 
the quantity rather than in the quality of the articles published. The January 
issue had 32, whereas the August issue had only 16 pages. In the latter 
Kerecsényi published a short article. Its title - Why are Hungarian writers 
silent? - had obvious political implications. The Managing Editor has to be 
given credit for the honesty of his conclusion. If a writer has a moral standard, 
Kerecsényi argued, he cannot be forced to make any statement that is in 
conflict with his beliefs. 
Although the names of Makkai, Kerecsényi, and Révész appeared on the title 
page until the last issue came out, they all stopped contributing after August. 
The November issue contained only one longer essay. Early in 1945 Kerecsényi 
died. As far as I know, he was shot in southwestern Transdanubia. 
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For almost a half century The Protestant Review seemed to be dead. The 
reasons for this are too complex to discuss here. Ravasz was forced to retire 
from public life, whereas others made compromises with the Communists. In 
some cases the compromise was justifiable, in others it helped to undermine 
the traditional churches of Hungary. Since 1945 the world has seen radical 
changes. Our first priority must be to find a place for The Protestant Review 
in a largely secularized age. It is by no means easy to know what sort of 
audience such a journal may have at the end of the 20th century. There are 
some who ask for a highly intellectual publication that would make religion 
meaningful for a sophisticated public. Others insist on the mission such a 
journal can have for the Hungarian minorities of the neighbouring countries. 
The present editor has no ecclesiastical function. Not only the Reformed 
Church and Lutherans, but also Unitarians and Adventists are represented in 
the Editorial Board. One of our goals is to make important theological texts 
available in Hungarian translation. I cannot see any reason for fundamental 
disagreement with Catholicism and Orthodoxy. No Hungarian Protestant can 
live without the tradition represented by Pázmány, Széchenyi, Babits, and 
Pilinszky. Our attention cannot be limited to Christianity; we intend to pay 
attention to other religions. The legacy of The Protestant Review is so 
distinguished that it will not be easy to achieve our goals. As T. S. Eliot wrote 
in East Coker, "For us, there is only the trying. The rest is not our business." 
Notes 
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1. Ordass's Image in the United States 
Strangely enough, in the English-speaking world not much scholarly work 
has been done on the Hungarian Lutheran Bishop Lajos Ordass (1901-1978). 
The most exhaustive study was a review-essay by John Eibner ten years ago1 
when Ordass's Selected Writings were published in Switzerland.2 Since that 
time, however, the Bishop's two-volume autobiography was published by 
István Szépfalusi,3 and a biography by László Terray, originally written in 
Norwegian,4 came out both in German5 and in Hungarian.6 In the preface to 
the Hungarian edition Terray writes: "Today, the Ordass-theme is more up-
to-date than ever."7 
It seems to be imperative for us to bring the significance of the Bishop to 
the attention of the English-speaking church-historians and theologians, es-
pecially because during his lifetime his image was indeed in the limelight of the 
American church-related media. This was perhaps due to the fact that both his 
imprisonment in 1948 and his second removal in 1958 were in each case 
preceded by his visits to the USA in 1947 and 1957 respectively. His first visit 
coincided with the beginning of Stalinism in Eastern Europe, and his second 
visit with the failure of the Hungarian revolution in 1956. In both cases the 
impact he left on the American Lutherans was enormous. Perhaps the most 
conspicuous sign of the Americans' reverence for Ordass is the Vinje Lutheran 
church in Willmar, Minnesota, in which there is an oak frieze encircling the 
sanctuary with names of "clouds of witnesses" from the Bible and the history 
of the church. The list begins with Enoch and ends with the name of Ordass 
following the names of Bonhoeffer and Berggrav. When the oak frieze was 
carved, Ordass was the only person in the group who was alive.8 
During his lifetime his enemies labelled him as "reactionary", and as 
"unbendingly stubborn",9 but for those who respected him, he was a man of 
"courageous sufferings", "a symbol of the kind of churchmen the world 
needs... a valiant man of God",10 a "typical Lutheran... loath to meddle in 
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politics",11 "a symbol of indomitable belief',12 a "man of indomitable be-
lief',13 "an undauntable and persistent church-leader";14 "tall, gaunt, ascetic 
Hungarian [of] ... tremendous spiritual force",15 "the chief obstacle of the 
subjugation of the Church as an instrument of the State",16 "the martyr of 
Hungary",17 "hero of faith",18 a "saint of our time" ... a man who stood fast 
victoriously".19 In the secular Western press he appeared as "one of Hungary's 
staunchest anti-Communist religious leaders".20 When he died in 1978, Ameri-
can church-leaders, his old friends, also payed tribute to him, saying that he 
was a man "who took orders from no one other than his Lord" (Schioz),21 
and that he was "unmovable when he believed vital principles were at stake ... 
[whose] timeless legacy is his unflinching determination to place loyalty to the 
gospel above personal considerations, regardless of the cost." (Empie)22 
However, this was a tribute already in retrospect. As a matter of fact, 
throughout the sixties and the seventies he seemed to have been forgotten, or 
as a recent reviewer put it: "After a period of lionization in the West, Ordass 
came to be regarded as an embarrassment for many."23 
2. The Dramatic Nature of a Life 
First I shall argue that Ordass's life was inherently dramatic, then I shall 
attempt to draw the portrait of this dramatic life in a "double mirror": by 
reading his autobiography on the one hand; and also by following how his 
activity was reflected in the contemporary American church-related press. 
Lajos Ordass was the Bishop of the Hungarian Lutheran Church from 1945 
until his death in 1978, i.e., for thirty-three years, but he could exercise his 
office for altogether less than five years, which was evenly divided into two 
different periods: first between 1945-1948, and for the second time between 
1956-1958. 
If one carefully reads Ordass's autobiography it is simply impossible not to 
be impressed by the successive heights and depths, namely, the dramatic quality 
of this life. Being a Shakespearean scholar rather than a church historian, I 
cannot help but find many Shakespearean "themes" in this unique and 
breathtaking life-story. For example the topic of the "world turned upside 
down" becomes the story of "the church turned upside down"; the Shake-
spearean theme of "appearance versus reality" becomes the theme of "career-
ists or the fake versus the faithful or the real"; the "unlawful usurper versus 
the lawful banished ruler" topic comes to us here as the de facto Bishop 
imposed upon the church versus the de jure Bishop removed from office and 
sent into early retirement. Another obvious Shakespearean device is "dis-
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guise", which we get to know here as "undercover state-agents within the 
church". And we could continue almost ad eternum: totalitarianism, dictator­
ship, deception, manipulation, fears, taboos, betrayals, on the one hand, and 
the faithfulness of a little minority (remnants, who stood fast in the tempests 
of history), on the other. Indeed, these are themes strikingly common in King 
Lear, Hamlet, Richard III, Macbeth, As You Like It, and the past four decades 
of Hungarian church history. 
But not only the themes are common. I find that Ordass's life has a 
dramatic shape, reminiscent of the pyramidal shape of the rising and falling 
actions of the great tragedies, in this particular case with two pinnacles like the 
"M" of a MacDonalds-emblem. After I had envisaged this structure I came to 
see that Ordass himself must have been unconsciously aware of it as he 
structured his four-part autobiography: Nagy idők kis tükre (A Little Mirror 
of Great Times) dramatically, in a way similar to what I am proposing here. 
So this recognition of the dramatic quality of Ordass's life encourages me to 
introduce it as a five-act drama rather than as a linear narrative. In Act I I 
will depict his life in pre-World War II Hungary from his birth to his elevation 
to the Bishop's seat in 1945. The action gradually intensifies. In Act II I will 
discuss his episcopal activity between 1945-1948 at home and abroad. The 
climax of this gathering tension is, undoubtedly, his visit to the United States 
in 1947, which in Act III will be followed by his struggle, arrest and 
imprisonment in 1948, a sudden fall after the climax. This period of tragic 
depth covers almost two-years of imprisonment and the six years of enforced 
silence, the years between 1948-1956. In Act IV a new plot develops: he is 
rehabilitated before the Hungarian revolution, assumes office in the midst of 
the uprising, and remains in power even after its failure. The new zenith or 
climax is undoubtedly his visit to the third assembly of the Lutheran World 
Federation in Minneapolis during the summer of 1957, where he is hailed as 
a hero of faith and elected to be the first Vice President of the World 
Federation. In Act V we shall see that soon after his return, despite his 
"new-found flexibility",24 he is gradually isolated, until he is officially removed 
by the state and the church in June 1958. The new de profundis period of 
silence and loneliness lasts for twenty years until his death in August 1978. In 
brief, the dramatic structure appears as follows:2S 
ACT I. The Making of a Bishop (1901-1945) 
ACT II. Episcopal Duties Home and Abroad (1945-1948) 
ACT III. In Prison and in Silence (1948-1956) 
ACT IV. Bishop Restored (1956-1958) 
ACT V. Isolated and Silenced Again (1958-1978) 
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ACT I. The Making of a Bishop (1901-1945) 
He was born as Lajos Wolf on February 6, 1901, in Torzsa in the Batschka 
district (known as Voivodina, an autonomous part of the former Yugoslavia) 
as the third son of a Lutheran German-speaking country-school teacher. His 
father came from the northern part of Hungary, but on his mother's side his 
family belonged to those Germans who were settled in the southern part of 
Austro-Hungary during the reign of Joseph II. He began his elementary 
education in his home village and continued his secondary education in the 
Lutheran Gimnázium of Bonyhád, in southern Hungary. Due to the Trianon-
Treaty after World War I, he became separated from his home, which now 
became a part of Yugoslavia. In September 1920 he began his studies at the 
Lutheran Theological Academy, which had been temporarily based in 
Budapest. Cut off from any support from his home, he had to earn his 
livelihood while studying theology, now already in Sopron, Western Hungary. 
He was awarded a scholarship to study in the University of Halle in 1922-23, 
but the sudden inflation made his scholarship almost worthless. Therefore he 
had to work in the coal-mines in order to maintain himself. Having been 
ordained in October 1924, he served in various congregations as an assistant 
pastor for two years. With the financial help of his father, he managed to travel 
to Sweden in September 1927. He studied at Lund for a term, where he 
attended the lectures of Gustav Aulen and Anders Nygren. With regard to 
religious movements he was most impressed by the Lutheran piety of Henrik 
Schartau and his followers. In Uppsala, where he spent the Spring semester of 
the academic year, he was a frequent guest in the home of Archbishop Nathan 
Soderblom who even took him for his visitation tours in his archdiocese. 
During this year he made friends and lasting fellowships with Martin Lind-
strom, Gunnar Hultgren, Ivan Hylander and, last but not least, Bo Giertz, 
who later became the well-known Bishop of Guthenburg and whose works 
Ordass translated during the 1940s into Hungarian. 
After his return he continued as assistant pastor in various congregations. 
Already married, at the age of thirty he became a pastor of the Lutheran 
congregation of Cegléd, in central Hungary. He served there for ten years. The 
congregation was reported to have grown and flourished during this time. In 
1941 he was invited to be the minister of the Kelenföld congregation in 
Budapest. Four years later, immediately after the war, at the age of forty-four 
he was elected as the Bishop of the Montana Diocese, the largest diocese of 
the Lutheran Church in Hungary. 
What are the most important features of Ordass's pre-1945 activity? The 
historian Eibner, focusing mainly on the social dimensions of the Bishop's 
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activity, finds that there are two prominent features.26 The first is Ordass's (at 
that time his name was still Wolf) effort to regenerate Hungarian society. His 
sermons, speeches and articles reveal his deep concern for social justice, his 
sensitivity to such issues as poverty, class-division, urbanization, breakdown of 
family-life, growing materialism, and so on. In this respect his model was the 
19th century Danish poet Grundtvig, who introduced the democratic system 
of "People's Schools".27 The other principle of his mission, according to 
Eibner, was Ordass's "dedication to the principles of national unity and 
independence".28 Here Eibner refers to two contemporary articles by Ordass, 
the first one was on Hungary's regaining some southern territories after the 
1941 invasion of Yugoslavia. The other one was a theological reflection on 
"Jesus Christ and the war".29 Eibner finds that some passages of these articles 
reveal Ordass's "identification with anti-Trianon Treaty sentiment". He even 
suggests that the latter article "implicitly sanctioned the action of the Hungar-
ian Government... [of declaring war on the Soviet Union] by supporting the 
just war doctrine".30 According to László Terray, the passages taken out of 
context and slightly misunderstood by Eibner were further distorted in a recent 
Swedish book that used only Eibner as a source. Thus a false image was 
created that Ordass was briefly supportive of Hitler's war. Terray pointed out 
to Eibner in a letter that in the first quoted article Ordass was not speaking 
about the invasion of Yugoslavia but about the Lutherans reunited with their 
motherrchurch; in the second case Ordass theologically meditated on the 
evident contradiction between war and the Gospel and raised simultaneously 
the occasional necessity of a "defensive war" (which is, in my view, in 
accordance with Luther's doctrine of the "two kingdoms"). But, as Terray 
concludes, that was something different from supporting the just war doc-
trine.31 
However, it is obvious both from Ordass's writings and actions that the 
political dimensions of Ordass's activity as a churchman (and always as 
churchman and never as politician!), during the Second World War, were 
undoubtedly anti-Nazi. But we are mistaken if we one-sidedly concentrate 
upon the socio-political aspects of Ordass's pastoral activity and disregard his 
less visible daily involvement with congregations living in diaspora and his 
commitment to translating books on religious education. Nevertheless by 
becoming a pastor in Budapest he was immediately confronted with some 
church-related social or political problems. By 1942 Ordass became aware of 
the extensive Nazi influence in Hungary. The wind of Nazi Germany had also 
touched the Lutheran Church in Hungary. One-third of the Hungarian 
Lutherans were of German origin. Some ministers of German origin compiled 
a Memorandum in which they not only sought remedy for their offences but 
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also declared their effort to form a church-organization that would break with 
the Hungarian church and would be linked administratively with the church 
in Germany. Ordass, who always believed in the integration rather than the 
division of the Church, wrote a long Response to the Memorandum in which 
he strongly condemned this effort and defended the interests of the Church in 
Hungary. In February 1942 he published it at his own expense and sent it to 
many church leaders.32 As a sign of personal protest against Hungary's 
occupation by the Germans on March 19, 1944, Ordass "magyarized" his 
surname from the German "Wolf into the Hungarian "Ordass". 
When Ordass read a Swedish Bishop's (Gustaf Aulen) account of the 
Norwegian Lutheran Church's purely defensive struggle under Bishop Berg-
grav against Hitler in 1943, he was so much impressed that he immediately 
translated it and distributed it to the leaders of the Church. Moreover, he 
openly lectured on this theme at an assembly of pastors and teachers in 
Békéscsaba, in the southeastern part of Hungary. Such an act was not without 
risk in the Hungary of 1943.33 
A new church-related issue was the Jewish-question. Many Jews were keen 
on formally joining the Christian church in order to save their lives. Among 
the members of the clergy there were some severe abuses: some clergymen were 
willing to issue certificates of babtism only at the expense of considerable 
payment. Ordass protested at such abuses. He tried to protect the Jews with 
the help of the Swedish Red Cross and he was even able to obtain a Swedish 
passport in one case. In 1944 there was a Swedish initiative that the three 
Hungarian historical churches (Roman Catholic, Reformed, and Lutheran) 
should openly and concommitantly protest against the pro-Nazi Szálasi 
government's deportation of the Jews. Thus Ordass, on behalf of the sick 
Bishop Sándor Raffay, paid an official visit to the residence of the Primate of 
the Roman Catholic Church in Esztergom. He travelled together with the 
Swedish Embassy Councilor, Valdemar Langlet. The Primate's response to this 
initiative was negative: the Catholic Church, said he, had already expressed 
her protest. During the siege of Budapest Ordass found shelter with some 
members of his congregation in the cellar beneath the building of his congre-
gation. While living underground for many weeks he translated the dramas of 
the Danish poet Kaj Munk (who himself was executed by the Gestapo), into 
Hungarian. The devastating war eventually came to an end. Throughout the 
spring Ordass was busy with burying the dead, sometimes digging the graves 
himself. 
In the summer of 1945 the 79-year-old Bishop Raffay resigned. Ordass was 
elected (with an absolute majority) to be the Bishop of the Montana District. 
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ACT II. Episcopal Duties Home and Abroad (19454948) 
Lajos Ordass became a new bishop in an entirely new historical period. In 
1945 Hungary was a country that had experienced both Nazi invasion and 
Soviet occupation. It had suffered great devastation but was still a democratic 
country. The Communists' totalitarian takeover took place only three years 
later. 
The Protestant churches responded to the new political situation in different 
ways. Pastor Albert Bereczky, later Bishop of The Reformed Church, for 
example, proposed a theology of contrition which stressed that the churches 
are responsible for the social evils of the past as they were beneficiaries. Now, 
therefore, God punishes his people just as he punished the people of Israel. If 
the state wants to nationalize their historical institutions they should interpret 
it as a judgement from God. The Lutherans did not see the church's task in 
such prophetic terms and, they "did not abandon the historic tradition of the 
church".34 In an advent pledge Ordas wrote: "We shall not allow anything to 
be deleted from our Hungarian past that God has given with his manifest 
blessing, and thus judges worthy of life."35 
In letters written to the ministers of his diocese, Ordass frequently discussed 
the theological relationship of the church to the state. It is important for us to 
understand that the basis of all his action was Lutheran theology. It was only 
his enemies that tried to create an image of him as a political reactionary. He 
was simply defending his church on theological, though not always explicit, 
principles. The following sentence, for example, undoubtedly reflects Luther's 
famous idea of the "two kingdoms", "our church knows her duties with regard 
to the state and democracy, and she wants to accomplish them faithfully. But 
the church also expects from the state that her preaching and teaching activity 
will not be hindered..."36 So Ordass's purpose was to work out a fair, 
theologically justified, relationship to the state. He offered to support the state, 
but not unconditionally, like some of his followers for whom the church became 
totally subservient to the state. In Ordass's theology the church and the state 
were meant to mutually recognize their spheres of interest and activity. He 
found that the church, by virtue of her cultural and social activity (schools, 
hospitals, charity institutions and so on) contributes to the welfare of the state 
and society. Therefore she could accept financial support from the state; and 
she should count on the state's guarantee of her established rights to enjoy 
autonomy, to preach the gospel, and to provide Christian education. The 
image Ordass frequently used was that "the church is the conscience of the 
state".37 The church should never have a political programme. Neither should 
she directly meddle in politics because that is not her mission. However, when 
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political events or measures touch either the body or the members of the 
church, it is the chuch's duty to speak out publicly on those issues. 
Before the great debate over the nationalization of church-schools in 
1948, there were at least two political issues on which Ordass felt that the 
church could not be silent. The first was the Hungarian-Czechoslovak 
repartition agreement in 1946, which he found incorrect in principle and 
immoral in practice.38 He also felt it was dangerously weakening the power 
of the Lutheran Church in Hungary.39 Another issue was the arbitrary 
deportation of the members of Hungary's German community. Since this 
practice also affected the Lutheran church, Ordass repeatedly protested 
officially against the deportations.40 While a couple of years before he had 
attacked the nationalism of the German minority in a country under 
German influence, now he defended this minority in a country hostile to the 
Germans. 
The political situation became gradually more and more severe as the 
government began its centralizing programme. The Ministry of Religious and 
Public Education began to interfere with the administration of church schools, 
and state censors were appointed to control the radio-broadcasts of church 
services. Ordass never failed to protest. 
In early 1947 he was given official permission to travel to Western Europe 
and the United States. His primary mission was to discuss the Western 
churches' financial support of their Hungarian brethren. He was invited to 
take part in a session of a post-war relief agency in Geneva (Department of 
Reconstruction of the World Council of Churches in Process of Formation) 
and also received an invitation to take part at the first assembly of the 
Lutheran World Federation (still in the process of formation) in Lund, July 
1947. It was decided that between the Geneva meeting in March and the Lund 
Assembly in July he should visit the Lutherans in the United States. Several 
years later he described how he met Dr Franklin Fry, President of the United 
Lutheran Church: 
Thus in April I traveled to the United States. I felt I was in a rather difficult 
situation. For many years we had had no connection with our brothers of the faith in 
America. This meant that I would be meeting strangers. Most difficult, however, was 
the realization that I would appear as a beggar from a totally impoverished church. I 
met Dr Fry... I related how I conceived of my visit to America... I wanted to visit all 
the Hungarian Lutheran congregations... I mentioned that... I would like to visit the 
Swedish settlements... Then Dr Fry spoke. I learned that the Lutheran churches of 
America intended to raise ten million dollars in two years, to help the damaged churches 
in Europe. He assured me that the Hungarian church would not be forgotten. He then 
proposed that I should indeed visit the Hungarian and Swedish churches, according to 
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my plan, but that I should also help promote our common campaign with addresses. 
I should explain the European situation at several synod conventions. In this 
way I could make a contribution to the success of the campaign... Dr Fry's 
words greatly eased my mind. Now I had the feeling that I was not in America 
as a beggar, but that I could regard myself as a co-worker in the relief-work 
for all Europe.41 
In Norway he met, for the first time, Eivind Berggrav, the Bishop of Oslo. 
He had been familiar with the Bishop's confrontation with the Nazis; now he 
became even more impressed by the personal encounter. Upon his return to 
Hungary Ordass was interviewed about his visit and he also quoted Berggrav's 
advice to him: 
On the basis of our Confessional Writings and the Holy Scripture our fight was 
purely a defence of the church... If you have to fight for the spiritual freedom of the 
church, be careful not to mix it up with political aspects.42 
Ordass's enemies frequently accused him of ambition to become a "Hun-
garian Berggrav". But as Terray points out, Ordass knew that Berggrav was 
the Bishop of a national church while he was the Bishop of a minority 
denomination. Moreover, he was aware that churchstructure and spirituality 
were basically different in these two countries.43 Nevertheless, as Terray had 
observed as early as 1956, the basic difference between the Roman Catholic 
attitude, led by Cardinal Mindszenty, and the Lutheran conduct of Bishop 
Ordass is that between "resistance" and "defence". "Bishop Ordass has not 
become a symbol of the Hungarian people's struggle against Communism, as 
Cardinal Mindszenty has. Ordass's attitude should be characterized by the 
word 'defence' rather than the word 'resistance'. His spiritual mentor was 
Gandhi not Gregory VII."44 
In Lund Ordass was elected to the Vice Presidency of the Lutheran World 
Federation. In Terray's words: "There he gave one of his memorable sermons, 
short, simple words, expressing profound truth with great force and beauty. 
He called upon his hearers to 'Work while it is day'. Everyone knew how short 
Lajos Ordass's day might be. Many begged him not to return to communist-
dominated Hungary but he refused to desert his post... 'You pray,' he said, 
'we'll do the suffering."45 
Having returned to his home-country from the heights, the fortunes of 
Bishop Ordass were speedily beginning to decline. That takes us to the third 
act. 
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ACT HI. In Prison and in Silence (1948-4956) 
When Ordass returned to Hungary from his five-month-visit to Western 
Europe and North America he found that the political climate was gradually 
hardening, becoming more and more totalitarian. The tensions between the 
churches and the state began to grow, especially in connection with the 
nationalization of church schools. The historical churches were divided in their 
policies towards the state. The Roman Catholics led by Cardinal Mindszenty 
launched the programme of political resistance, while the Reformed churches 
following the advice of Karl Barth, went along with the nationalization 
programme. For the Lutheran church a severe conflict was about to develop 
with the state. But the Lutheran church was also divided internally. The 
majority, following the leadership of Bishop Ordass, found that giving up the 
schools would mean giving up a historical mission of the church. In order to 
impose its will upon the church the state turned to the strategy of using some 
laymen such as Iván Reök, MP and an active member of the Deák-tér 
congregation, and a government minister Ernő Mihályfi (a Lutheran clergy­
man's self-proclaimed atheist son) to split, manipulate and frighten the 
leadership and believers. Their task was to create an image of Ordass as 
reactionary. Moreover, they insisted that the lay-leaders of the Lutheran 
church, such as Baron Albert Radvánszky, the General Inspector, or Gábor 
Vladár, the former minister of justice and Inspector of Ordass's diocese, should 
resign. But Ordass was unwilling to dismiss these leaders, just as he was 
unwilling to give up the schools. Government newspapers launched heavy 
attacks on him: they wanted to discredit the Bishop's person in front of the 
members of the church. By May 1948 the state prepared an "Agreement" in 
which the desire of the nationalization of all church-related schools was 
expressed. It guaranteed, however, the free exercise of church life and that the 
state subsidy to the churches would terminate after twenty years. The govern­
ment made undoubtedly clear "that if the Church refused to agree, nationali­
zation would still go ahead, but other established rights, financial assistance in 
particular, would be in jeopardy".4* 
In June 1948 the Bishops of the four diocese (Lajos Ordass, Zoltán Turóczy, 
József Szabó and the Deputy Bishop Károly Németh) issued an episcopal letter 
to the congregations in which they informed them about the state's nationali­
zation programme and proposed "Agreement". In the letter they also suggest­
ed that congregations would have to make financial sacrifices if they wanted 
to maintain the schools that they had fought for in the past.47 
Though the episcopal letter was signed by all the bishops, it soon became 
obvious that for Bishops Turóczy and Szabó the schools of the church were 
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less important than for Ordass. They were supported by some younger 
clergymen like Imre Veöreös and Gyula Groó. Their conviction was similar to 
Barth's suggestion that the churches' primary task was the proclamation of the 
Word and not the defence of a church's structure.48 The "Turoczy-line" found 
that the schools did not belong to the body of the church. "No martyr-blood 
should be shed for the schools" - wrote Imre Veöreös, the editor of a Lutheran 
weekly Új Harangszó*9 a few days before the Parliament was to vote for the 
confiscation of the schools. Ordass wanted to be informed how the congrega-
tions felt about the tense situation. At various meetings he informed the 
members of his diocese about the alternatives facing the church. The first 
alternative was to keep the schools and the legally elected leaders, and, as a 
consequence, possibly lose the state subsidy. The other alternative was to 
"offer" the schools and dismiss the church leadership but consequently to keep 
the state subsidy. There was a dramatic moment at a conference arranged by 
the Lutheran evangelistic association "Friends' Movement" in Fót, outside 
Budapest. All the Bishops were invited to this conference but only Szabó and 
Turóczy could attend. The participants (though in their theology they were 
undoubtedly closer to the visiting Turóczy than to Ordass) all kneeled down 
to pray in support of the "Ordass-line".50 As it was described those days, the 
"Turóczy-line" was characterized as a "two-sentence church politics" while the 
"Ordass-line" as a "one-sentence view". According to the two-sentence view 
the church acknowledged the secular power ("Render unto Caesar which be 
Caesar's") in the first statement, while affirming faith ia the second statement 
("[Render] unto God the things which be God's").51 Here the great theologi-
cal-ethical question of compromise is at stake: how far should we go in our 
compromise? Should we give everything a Caesar demands from us? Or is 
there a limit where we should stop? But what if a Caesar cunningly, in disguise 
does nothing but demand our souP.52 That was the real issue, or the 
controversy, between the "Turóczy-line" and the "Ordass-line". The 
"Turóczy-line" was more inclined to compromise because it wanted to protect 
the proclamation of the word (undoubtedly, even if implicitly a Barthian 
influence) but Ordass's view (probably also explicitly) was more in accordance 
with the teaching of Luther and of the Confessional Writings of the Church, 
namely, that during the time of persecution the otherwise secondary issues 
should be taken as primary.53 
Since Ordass's consequent and persistent defence of the church's autonomy 
and historical rights could not be broken, the Communist state turned to some 
new means to discredit him and to remove him from his office as an obstacle 
to "normal church-state relations". First, on August 24, 1948, he was briefly 
detained without charge. On September 7 he was given 24 hours to resign as 
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Bishop. Having refused to do that, he was rearrested. This was followed by 
the typical Stalinist show-trial where he was charged with violating the 
country's currency laws. That is, he had failed to report receipt of relief funds 
which the Church had received from the American Lutherans. He was 
sentenced to two years in prison. Albert Radvánszky, the Supervisor General, 
and Sándor Vargha, the Secretary-General, were also imprisoned. At the trial 
Ordass, according to a contemporary shorthand record, maintained his inno-
cence saying: 
During these five weeks I have asked myself and God many times if I am guilty. I 
have had plenty of time to ponder the question... I must state that I ...have never lived 
with such a peace in my heart as I have received during this time... As I now stand here 
I carry a wound... If the judge sets me free, then the wound will not hurt so much that 
I could not work and serve my fatherland. But in any event, the blessed will of God 
will be done.54 
In this Autobiography Ordass later recorded as follows: "It has become my 
conviction that God has called me for the episcopal service because he wanted 
to use me to utter the word which he thought the Lutheran church was meant 
to utter."55 The state achieved its purpose to break the spirit of resistance 
within the Lutheran church: while Ordass was in prison, Bishop Zoltán 
Turóczy and the lay Supervisor-General Zoltán Mády signed the "Agreement" 
in December 1948. Eibner is probably right in perceiving that, "although the 
concordat enshrined most of the principles of religious freedom that Ordass 
thought fundamental to the mission of the Church, it implicitly anulled the 
Church's claim to autonomy, upon which all its other freedoms ultimately 
depended. The government thus gained control of the Church's governing 
apparatus..."56 
The world was outraged. It is interesting to observe how well and accurately 
informed the contemporary American press was. The Christian Century, for 
example, wrote: 
The arrests in Hungary charged that Bishop Ordass and his lay companions had 
engaged in black market transactions with $ 500.000 they received from America. 
Lutheran officials in this country call this a lie out of whole cloth, since Bishop Ordass 
never received any such sum, and all money sent from this country has been forwarded 
through the National Bank of Hungary. Newspaper reports from Budapest state that 
no one in Hungary believes the financial charges. But the Lutherans in Hungary have 
refused to go along with the Reformed Church in approving the nationalization of all 
schools. Arresting the Primate is the government's retaliation.57 
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The World Council of Churches immediately protested: 
The World Council replies that it has assurances from American Lutheran head-
quarters that the black market allegations are false, that it has reason to believe that 
the imprisonment was actuated by political motives, and that it is forced to bring the 
case to the attention of the world as an example of the denial of religious liberty.58 
There was also Bishop Berggrav, among others, who immediately wrote a 
letter of protest to the Hungarian Prime Minister.59 
What is perhaps most shocking is that the Hungarian authorities could 
arrange that their version of the bishop's story should also appear in the 
American press. The man responsible was a Reformed theologian Alexis 
Mathé who wrote an article for The Christian Century with the title: "Are 
Hungary's Churches Persecuted?" He argued that the Hungarian Protestants, 
unlike the Catholics, had always been progressive in throughout their history. 
Bishop Ordass and Bishop Ladislas Ravasz, however, were following the 
Roman Catholic lead to oppose the present regime. On Ordass's "personal 
tragedy", he said, "The Bishop unfortunately allowed his political convictions 
to influence his duties and activities as a church leader... Secretary Varga kept 
the books in a confused and inexperienced manner ... large sums cannot be 
accounted for ... the court gave Bishop Ordass the mildest possible sen-
tence..."60 
It was Paul Empie of the National Lutheran Council, whom Ordass had 
met two years before and who denied Mathé's false allegations in an article 
"The Case of Bishop Ordass". He said that the allegations that Ordass joined 
Roman Catholics in opposing the present regime "is not true... Bishop Ordass 
not only held no sympathy whatever for with the Roman Catholic position in 
the matter, but as a typical Continental Lutheran he was loath to meddle in 
politics..."61 He demonstrated that the funds in question were cabled from 
New York directly to the National Bank of Hungary, and pointed out that the 
real issue was the nationalization of the parochial schools. Empie confirmed 
that "Bishop Ordass saw his fate well in advance... He felt that ... the Church 
in Germany had blundered by failing to resist immediately when Nazi 
ideologies crowded in upon Christian principles. The lesson was clear - the 
church cannot do business with a police state. For that reason, and for that 
reason alone, he now lies in prison. That's the tragedy of the Mathés, the 
Mihályfis and the Reöks."62 
So much for the unsuccessful protest of the West. In the meantime Ordass 
at the "Star-Prison" of Szeged shared his cell with fifteen Roman Catholic 
priests. One day Bishop Turóczy visited him and conveyed to him a message 
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from the state: if he resigned, he would be freed immediately. Ordass was given 
an hour and a half to think about this offer. He asked for a Bible that he wanted 
to read during this time. He went through the Acts of the apostles. At first he 
stopped at the fifth chapter, "We ought to obey God rather than men" (v.29). 
Then he came to chapter sixteen, which is about the imprisoned Silas. Having 
read this, Ordass gained peace and confirmation that he should stay in prison. 
He told Turóczy. When Turóczy had left, Ordass returned to his cell. The 
Catholic priests were curious about what had happened. When he had related 
everything to them, they were relieved. They admitted that in the meantime they 
were praying that Ordass should be able to stand firm and protect his soul from 
damage or injury.63 On Christmas 1949 he preached for the Catholic priests. In 
prison he worked out a ten-point daily agenda for himself including devotions 
in English and in Swedish, as well as imaginary visits to members of his 
congregation; a recollection of the faces whom he had met; proverbs, hymns, 
jokes and folksongs. On April 1, 1950, shortly before his release, the Special 
Disciplinary Tribunal of the Hungarian Lutheran Church formally stripped 
him of his office.64 The American press commented on the event as follows: 
This action by the Hungarian Lutherans in deposing their bishop at the govern-
ment's behest shows that the division between them and the rest of world Lutherianism 
is now virtually complete. From now on this branch of Protestantism must be regarded 
as being as subservient to the Communist state as is Orthodoxy in Russia and its eastern 
satellites.65 
The American Lutherans, of course, could not know that the action of the 
deposition was taken because of the threat from the Stalinist Dictator Rákosi, 
namely, that "if the decision of the tribunal in the case against Ordass is not 
condemning, they [the State] will raise a charge of treason against him, and the 
sentence will, without any doubt, be death".66 The frightened Tribunal of the 
church felt forced to choose, what they believed to be, the lesser evil. 
On May 30, 1950, the doors of the Vác prison opened for Bishop Ordass. 
He returned to Budapest to begin six years of total seclusion, earning his living 
by knitting. He and his wife had to work hard to provide bread for their 
children. In Lutheran circles it was fashionable for a while to wear a scarf that 
was knitted by Bishop Ordass. During this time of silence he began to write 
Passion meditations and to work on a translation from Icelandic. At the same 
time he completed the first part of his Autobiography with the title: Little 
Mirror of Great Times. During these years Bishop Ordass was completely 
isolated. His pastors, being frightened, deserted him. There is only depth, 
suffering and silence. But this is only the end of Act III. 
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ACT IV. Bishop Restored (19564958) 
Stalinist terror was in its full swing in the early 1950s in Eastern Europe. But 
after the death of Stalin in 1953, and particularly after the 20th Congress of the 
Soviet Communist Party in 1956, the hard political line softened somewhat. The 
Protestant churches claimed to have found their place in the "socialist Hungary". 
The leaders of the Reformed Church were Bishop Albert Bereczky and Bishop 
János Péter (after 1956 openly Communist and the Foreign Minister of the Kádár 
Government). The leaders of the Lutheran Church were Bishop Lajos Vető and 
Bishop László Dezséry (after 1956 a Communist publicist, self-proclaimed 
atheist, and Parliament representative). In the beginning, the Reformed leader­
ship received open support from the theologian Karl Barth. But some years later 
Barth, in a famous letter, reproved Bereczky of being "on the way to making [his] 
affirmation of communism a part of the Christian message..."07 
The Lutherans, fortunately or not, had no such authoritative voices behind 
them. 
On August 17, 1955, The Christian Century reported that "the Central 
Committee of the World Council of Churches ... in Davos ... has accepted the 
invitation of the Hungarian churches in the World Council to hold its annual 
meeting next year in or near Budapest".68 Why should this meeting take place 
in an Eastern-bloc country? The point of the Western churches is easy to 
understand: 
By this decision the executive agency of the council has told the world that it does 
not intend to allow political or social barriers to balk the spread of the ecumenical 
movement. At the first sign of lessening cold war tension, the World Council has voted 
to make this spectacular gesture of fellowship with the churches in communist areas.69 
But why were the "Red" bishops so keen on having this meeting behind the 
iron curtain if they were representing the interests of the state and not of the 
church? Recent research in archives has shown that in the early fifties these 
church leaders had been commended to try to occupy important posts in the 
world organizations.70 In their home-rhetoric they cunningly condemned these 
organizations as "anti-Communist" bodies. But in the meantime they tried to 
exert their influence by grasping these positions. 
Indeed, the meeting of the Central Committee of the World Council of 
Churches was to take place in Galyatető in August 1956. During this summer, 
Ordass's home, unvisited in the past six years, now suddenly became a very 
busy place. The first unexpected visitor to knock on his door was Bishop 
László Dezséry. Ordass usually recorded his significant meetings as Pro 
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memoria notes immediately after the events. His conversation with Dezséry is 
also recorded in his Autobiography, this time in the form of a dramatic 
dialogue. Therefore we can get an authentic and vivid image of what actually 
happened.71 The reason for Dezséry's visit was the impending WCC Central 
Committee meeting in Galyatető. The leaders of the great church organization 
would undoubtedly want to meet Bishop Ordass, who had been the Vice 
President of the Lutheran World Federation between 1947 and 1952. It was in 
the interest of the leaders of the Hungarian church that this meeting should 
proceed smoothly and that Ordass's report should not discredit them. The 
Hungarian leaders did not want the visit of the foreign church-leaders to turn 
into a pilgrimage to Ordass's home. Therefore they planned to organize a 
"package-visit" with one of the bishops accompanying the visitors.72 On July 
7, János Horváth, the President of the Hungarian State Bureau for Church 
Affairs, also came to Ordass's home.73 He immediately offered financial 
support: an increase in pension and a recompensation for the loss of the past 
six years. On July 24, four days before the arrival of the delegates, Horváth 
visited Ordass again.74 Now he raised the possibility of his rehabilitation by 
the state. In the mutually courteous dialogues on the present situation of the 
church, Ordass never failed to mention that his possible rehabilitation could 
not be separated from the rehabilitation of two Budapest Pastors: András 
Keken of the Deák-tér congregation, and György Kendeh of Kelenföld 
congregation. Both of them had been imprisoned in 1950 in order to force the 
Disciplinary Tribunal to formally strip Ordass of his episcopal office. 
On July 28, 1956, two leaders of The Lutheran World Federation indeed 
arrived in Ordass's home: the President Hans Lilje and the General Secretary Dr 
Lund-Quist. Hans Lilje said that it was not an accident that they had accepted 
the invitation to organize the meeting in Hungary. They came with the purpose 
of helping their Christian brothers in Hungary, especially Bishop Ordass, the 
former Vice President of the Lutheran World Federation. "Your steadfastness 
in faith has become a symbol of Christian steadfastness in the Western world",75 
said Lilje when they were leaving. This first visit lasted only for half an hour, for 
Bishop Vető was waiting for them in front of Ordass's home. 
On August 1, he was revisited by these leaders. Their company was joined 
by Dr Franklin Fry, President of the United Lutheran Church in America70 
(from 1957 President of the Lutheran World Federation). Fifteen years later 
Ordass remembered this visit as follows: "Dr Fry, weighed down with work, 
still found time ... to deal with the Hungarian government regarding my 
case."77 Two days later the negotiations took an official form in the State 
Bureau for Church Affairs with the foreign church-leaders present (this time 
including Willem A. Visser't Hooft, General Secretary of the World Council of 
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Churches).78 An agreement was made the following day, August 4, and was 
announced officially at the closing section of the Galyatető-meeting. Accord­
ing to the declaration, 1. The World Council of Churches will be entirely 
satisfied only if Bishop Ordass is restored as Bishop. 2. The official rehabilita­
tion of Ordass on behalf of the state is in progress. 3. Both the state and the 
church will work out the possibility of Ordass's practical episcopal activity. 4. 
Temporarily Ordass will lecture as a Professor at the Theological Seminary.79 
The excited atmosphere and the delegates' concern for Ordass is well reflected 
in an article of The Christian Century on August 29, 1956.80 
However, the rehabilitation was not going to take place as quickly as 
expected. Almost two months passed without anything happening. On Septem­
ber 21, János Horváth eventually called Ordass to his office.81 He explained 
to Ordass that the belatedness of his rehabilitation was due to the recent 
American press-image of Ordass having been "the Lutheran Mindszenty" and 
with the excited, anti-Dezséry mood of the Pastors' Conferences of Fót in early 
September.82 But because of letters urging the rehabilitation from abroad, the 
state did not want to delay it any longer. On October 6, when the Communist 
martyr of the Stalinist era, László Rajk, was officially reburied, Ordass also 
received the letter of the Supreme Court announcing that they had overturned 
Lajos Ordass's conviction on the grounds that no crime had been commited. 
Three days later, in Ordass's words: "tottering after the measures of the 
state",83 the General Court of the Lutheran Church declared the 1950 
deposition illegal. Ordass preached first on October 14 to the Budahegy vidék 
congregation. His text was on the King's Marriage Feast in Mt.22:1-14. He 
said among other things: 
When everybody deserted me and I shook with fear my Savior called me and took 
me in his two strong arms. He led me through a burning flame and showed me the 
beginning of a new life. I know that if nothing is constant in this world, God is 
unchanged; and to Him which was sin yesterday remains sin today and that which was 
holy yesterday remains holy today.84 
Ordass was to begin his lectures on Scandinavian research on Luther at the 
Lutheran Theological Academy on October 24 but the sudden political 
changes interfered with the ecclesiastical plans. The Hungarian revolution 
broke out on October 23. Bishop Dezséry resigned on October 30, "giving over 
the episcopal seat" to Bishop Ordass.85 Thus on October 31, Reformation 
Day, Ordass could preach from the pulpit of Deák-tér congregation as the 
restored bishop. He was reported to have been greeted by "eyes glistering with 
tears of joy".86 And with the resignation of Bishop Lajos Vető on All Saints 
•) 
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Day,87 Ordass was automatically restored to the primacy of the whole church. 
When it became evident that the Soviet troops were reinvading the country on 
November 2, Bishop Ordass was asked to give a Radio-Appeal along with 
Cardinal Mindszenty and the restored Reformed Bishop, László Ravasz. 
Ordass delivered his speech in Hungarian, Swedish, German and English. The 
speech was more confessional than political in tone: it addressed the Lutheran 
brethren abroad to support the Hungarian people with medicine, food and so 
on. The only political touch was his request "to give us any possible help 
[it (T.F.)] you can for the recognition of the declaration of the neutrality". But 
if we read the text carefully, we can recognize that he was saying this not "in 
the name of the church" but "in the name of the nation"88 (again, a careful 
distinction between the "two kingdoms"!). On November 3, the Bishop 
organized a meeting for Pastors and Seniors and Professors he could reach. If 
one reads the minutes of the meeting one cannot but be impressed by the 
dynamic revitalization and restructuring of all aspects of church life, including 
ministry, education, media and so on.89 
The Russians invaded Hungary on November 4. Ten days later the 
American journal The Christian Century reported on the Protestant churches 
as follows: 
The picture is one of a vital and vigorous Protestantism, ripping through the terrible 
tarpaulin of repression, springing out to reorder and redirect its own valiant life. The 
bloody brutality of Russian butchers has now pole-axed all that new life and hope.90 
However, this "pole-axing" was not so obvious, not so immediate in the 
case of the Lutheran church. "Large-scale arrests, executions and deportations 
characterized the restoration of Communist authority, but despite his open 
association with the revolution, Ordass was allowed to continue at his post."91 
- writes Eibner. 
Here we arrive at a very exciting question. Why and how could Ordass and 
the Lutheran church under his leadership survive for almost two years? At first 
sight we receive a disturbingly incompatible image: exodus from Hungary, 
terror, imprisonments in the country and the Lutheran church meanwhile 
flourishes. How is it possible? Various solutions can be given to answer this 
dilemma. The first and most obvious answer is that changes within the churches 
usually follow the political changes with a certain delay. But two years seem to 
be too long a delay! Another reply is perhaps of minor significance: it concerns 
the initial good relationship between János Horváth, President of the State 
Bureau for Church Affairs, and Ordass: it is recorded in the minutes of the 
November 3 meeting that Ordass offered protection and help for János 
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Horváth and his family during the time of the revolution. When in March 1957, 
Decree 22 of 1957 was issued about the "advance state-approval of higher 
church-office nominations", Horváth called Ordass saying that "the Lutheran 
church is all right in this question".92 This humanitarian reason may be a 
factor, but again not a full explanation. A more rational argument could be 
that Ordass was extremely skillful to restructure the church by appointing new 
persons to key positions immediately, in the first days of November 1956. His 
enemies later called this "the counterrevolution in the Lutheran church". 
Another reason, not unrelated to the previous one, could be that Dezséry 
resigned not only his episcopal seat but also his "church-membership". By this 
I do not mean any formal resignation but only the fact that he ceased to be 
interested in church affairs. He had probably no ambition to know what course 
the church was going to take: he was in the process of reconverting the 
direction both of his life and professional career. The lack of his presence could 
undoubtedly suggest a sense of liberty within the church. We may argue that 
the state wanted to keep Ordass for tactical reasons: to uphold him as the sign 
of the freedom of the churches in postrevolutionary Hungary. They were keen 
on his leading the Hungarian delegation to the Lutheran World Federation 
Assembly to be held in Minneapolis during the summer of 1957. We may 
continue with various explanations. But it is undoubtedly true that during his 
twenty months of leadership the Hungarian Lutheran Church was reactivated, 
the church-press and theological work revitalized, the congregation-life and the 
intercongregational conferences began to flourish again. The church became a 
church, and not a subservient tool of the state. 
Eibner is probably right when he finds the explanation in Ordass's "new-
found flexibility" in dealing with state-authorities.93 Far from being "unbend-
ing" or "stubborn", as his enemies earlier called him, now he was willing to 
compromise. He must have recognized that the church was in a totally 
different situation in 1957 than in 1948. He accepted this new situation: that 
"the Church fulfills its mission in Hungary by following the course of 
socialism".94 We could draw up two lists: the first containing those questions 
on which he was willing to compromise and another list of questions on which 
he was not. What may surprise us at first sight is, perhaps, that now he 
approved and accepted the same 1948 "Agreement" that he so much opposed 
ten years earlier. Eibner remarks: "he could not have taken such a step lightly, 
for he was implicitly abandoning the Hungarian Lutheran Church's historic 
claim to autonomy, formerly at the root of his conception of the Church's 
service to the nation."95 Moreover, he agreed that the Church should partici-
pate in the work of the government-sponsored National Peace Council and 
accepted the request to become a member of the Presidium of the Patriotic 
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People's Front, an organ of the Kádár-regime's "politics of alliances". We get 
a more subtle picture of these compromises from the Autobiography of Ordass 
that was published four years after Eibner's article. We can understand the 
necessity of compromise. Though Ordass's acts seem to be at first sight 
somewhat different from those ten years before, he still remained true to 
himself. My thesis is that the "new" Ordass is ultimately the same as the "old". 
In both cases, though in different situations, he fully understood that he had 
to defend his church or people against the state. Ordass did represent the 
interest of the church against the state and not the other way round as interim 
Bishops Dezséry or Káldy, the latter being the one who was made to fill 
Ordass's place after his removal in 1958. 
There is also another group of questions in which he was not willing to 
compromise because he found that by doing so he would damage his soul 
and that of the church. He insisted that on these issues there should be a 
"halt", otherwise he would lose himself. However, they will dramatically 
emerge only in the autumn of 1957, after his return from the Lutheran World 
Assembly in Minneapolis. Again, before his "downfall", he has yet to reach 
the "heights". 
In August 1957 Ordass led the delegation of the Hungarian Lutheran 
Church to Minneapolis for the third Assembly of the Lutheran World 
Federation. When he arrived in New York he met Paul Empie, the old friend 
whom he had seen ten years before. He learned from him how some of his 
compatriots tried to undermine his reputation in the West and that efforts were 
being made by the Americans on his behalf. In Minneapolis at the opening 
service he preached before an audience of 12,000. The Lutheran Herald that 
published his sermon, "The Fruits of the Death of Jesus Christ", also 
described the dignity and modesty of his appearance, 
hero of faith ... whom the Lutheran World Assembly chose to honor by designating him 
preacher at the opening service... His eyes are deep-set... For they are the eyes that have 
looked deeply into the hell that evil men can make for one another ... that have seen 
the suffering and deprivations of his people: that have witnessed the perfidy of those 
who had been his friends.96 
In his simple sermon of brief sentences he referred to himself in third person 
singular and the congregation was deeply moved: 
You have heard these words from an aging disciple of Christ. The disciple would 
now in concluding his formal message give a personal testimony of his Lord and 
Saviour. He would like to say how many times in this life he has experienced the 
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forgiving grace of Jesus Christ. And he would also like to say that when he was in 
bondage in the most literal sense of the word, Christ gave him kingly freedom. And 
what a joy it was to be able to experience this freedom!97 
When he gave an interview to the reporter from Time magazine, instead of 
praising the political system (which was expected by the government officials in 
Hungary) he praised the vivid church-life. This was no lie: "today there is 
tremendous enthusiasm for the church and its leaders".98 
It was a joy for him to learn that another old friend, Dr Franklin Clark Fry, 
the President of the United Lutheran Church in America, had been elected 
President of the Lutheran World Federation. Ordass was elected as the first 
Vice-President and his old Swedish friend, Bo Giertz, the other Vice President. 
Ordass later reported that on August 1957 Franklin Fry spent his fifty-seventh 
birthday with the six-member Hungarian delegation at his home in New 
Rochelle." 
The last days of this summer mark the second zenith of this dramatic life. 
When Ordass returned to Hungary in the autumn of 1957 a new confrontation 
with the state was about to develop which would necessarily lead to his 
isolation and his second and last tragic downfall. This will be the subject of 
the last Act of his dramatic life. Here we shall try to show that we can speak 
about a "downfall" only in a material sense. With the eye of faith one sees the 
opposite. With the well-known words of the apostle, unlike the "natural" 
person, the "spiritual" person is able to discern that what actually was taking 
place was not defeat but victory. 
ACT V. Isolated and Silenced Again 
Upon his return from the United States Ordass had to experience that the 
political climate was becoming more and more unfavourable towards the 
churches. Now it would become obvious that Ordass's "new-found flexibility" 
was different not only in degree but also in kind from that of those who had 
made the church simply subservient to the state. We have seen the questions 
in which Ordass was willing to compromise, and now we will come to see that 
this compromise had clear-cut limits. He was conscious of how far he could 
go, and where he had to stop. He knew that only by stopping, standing and 
remaining firm could he preserve integrity and identity. For Ordass "standing 
firmly" meant, of course, standing and remaining in faith. He found that any 
further compromise would result in a fall (not simply "falling into line" but 
becoming "fallen in faith": lapsi, as the Fathers put it). 
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Wherein lies the particularity of Ordass's compromise? To be sure, to a 
certain extent and to a certain point, he was willing to cooperate or even 
support the Kádár-regime! But as Eibner rightly perceives it, this was a 
conditional support: "He placed conditons on the Church's cooperation ... he 
made the Church's support for the Kádár government conditional upon its 
efforts to work for national reconciliation, the establishment of the rule of law, 
the cultivation of patriotic virtue, the creation of a healthy and just social 
order..."100 His participation in the Peace Council and the Patriotic People's 
Front were both conditional. He was willing to take part in these activities as 
long as the church's participation did not harm the integrity and the identity 
of the church. He knew that if he went any further, he would harm the 
church's integrity, and this would be a betrayal. "Further flexibility would be 
infidelity."101 He had no particular ambition, personal, political or whatso­
ever. His purpose was modest: he only wanted to let the church be a church 
and nothing else. The state, however, had a different "vision". 
What were the questions that he found non-negotiable, in which he was not 
willing to compromise? They become evident from the sincere and courteous 
twelve page letter he voluntarily wrote to János Horváth in October 1957. He 
began with the personal questions. He protested that the state wanted to 
restore the church's secular leaders: Supervisor-General Ernő Mihályfi and 
Supervisor of the Southern Diocese, József Darvas who had abandoned their 
offices during the 1956 revolution. Both of them were self-professed atheists 
and wanted to subjugate the church to the interests of the state. Another issue 
was that of the press. Ordass's position was that the church press should serve 
the interest of the church and nothing else. Therefore he protested against 
censorship or external demands of any kind. As the publisher of the Hungarian 
Church Press he disagreed with the publication of an article that condemned 
missionary work as imperialistic activity. When the article was nevertheless 
published, he resigned. He was astonished to discover at the meetings of the 
Patriotic People's Front that those who were publicly supporting the state were 
condemning it in private conversations. Towards the end of the letter he 
complained that pastors were arrested, persecuted or unjustly harrassed. 
Due to the letter the official negotiations between the Lutheran church and 
the state began in November 1957. Ordass's Autobiography at this point, as in 
most cases, perfectly coincides with the report in the American press. There­
fore I shall quote from the latter source: 
The government arranged negotiations. János Horváth, director of the state office 
for church affairs, tried first to select the church's representatives for the negotiations. 
To sit with Bishop Ordass he appointed four officials ousted by the church after the 
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October revolt! The four are Bishop Lajos Vető; Nicholas Pálfi, former dean of the 
Lutheran seminary in Budapest; Károly Grűnvalszky, former general secretary of the 
church; and Ádám Mekis, former assistant to the ignominiously deposed László 
Dezséry. Bishop Ordass rejected Mr Horváth's proposal. But when he was then allowed 
to appear at the negotiations seconded by Bishops Zoltán Turóczy and Bishop Szabó, 
the three discovered the four rejected government [recte: church] men sitting in as 
representatives of the state. As in the August 1956 negotiations to reinstate Bishop 
Ordass, it was these government "Lutherans" who were more violently opposed to the 
church's freedom than was the Communist state.102 
There was disagreement not only concerning the membership of the 
delegation but also over the agenda. The subjects to be discussed were the 
relationship between the state and the church, the question of the press, 
personnel questions and the church's relationship to Hungarian ecumenical 
efforts. The representatives of the state tried to negotiate from a position of 
power. János Horváth said: "We came together not on the basis of the law 
but on the basis of utility."103 "All churches, including the Lutheran church, 
have power. If she is not willing to give this power over to the state, the state 
may be offended."104 So the state demanded extensive control over the church 
and openly wished to interfere in her life, including the election of leaders, 
deans, determining what should be published in the church-press and so on. 
These issues, however, for Ordass were non-negotiable. The negotiations 
continued, then were suspended, continued again and eventually reached an 
impasse. Ordass's views were incompatible with those of the state's. The state 
then decided to take action without seeking the approval of the leaders of the 
church. They restored Ernő Mihályfi as the Supervisor General of the 
Northern Diocese. On December 19, Mihályfi proposed that Bishop Veto's 
resignation not be accepted by the state because Decree 22 of 1957 concerning 
the advance civil approval of nominations for church leadership was valid in 
retroactive force. That was the way Bishop Turóczy was removed as a Bishop 
of the Northern Diocese (he was installed in his office by Ordass on February 
6) and he was replaced by Lajos Vető whom the state considered as Primate. 
But what happened in Ordass's diocese? When the negotiations failed and 
Ordass remained unbending, János Horváth announced promptly that the 
church was forbidden to have foreign connections and a government commis­
sioner was appointed to run the affairs of the Lutheran Church, to control her 
correspondance and activity. The task was given to Károly Grnák at the end of 
November. With the appearance of "The Voice of a Stranger ... in the church", 
as the American press well observed: "The church, instead of being God's, is 
on the way to becoming an instrument in the hands of somebody else, in this 
case the Hungarian state."105 From here on Ordass refused to open any letters. 
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By the end of the year it became clear that the battle had been won by the 
state. Ordass, as always, refused to resign in the face of external pressure. Then 
why was Ordass allowed to be in office for another six months? Why was he 
not removed as drastically as Turóczy, by appealing to the retroactive force of 
Decree 1957? The answer, I think, lies in a sentence of Horváth, "In 1948 the 
Rákosi-system committed a mistake when they made a 'world-affair' out of 
Ordass's 'affair'. They could have kept Ordass in his office while at the same 
time creating a 'moral zero' out of him".106 (This sentence, a crucial one in my 
view, well illustrates the difference between the short-term "hard" Commu­
nism and the long-term "soft" Communism; how the latter by being more 
subtle, was able to demoralize the church, ultimately a moral body in society!) 
That was indeed now the policy of the state: to humiliate Ordass by 
creating, if not a "moral zero", a scapegoat out of him. Ordass, who was so 
much supported by his people, was now gradually being abandoned. On the 
one hand he was openly attacked by men like Lajos Vető, Miklós Pálfy, 
Károly Grünvalszky, Emil Korén and eventually Zoltán Káldy who tried to 
force the pastors to issue statements of no-confidence in him. They hoped to 
achieve this because the state announced it would withdraw the financial aid 
owed to the Pastors of Diocese unless their bishop relented.107 "To forestall 
the possibility that pastors would be forced to issue statements of no-confi­
dence against their bishop, he asked the church court to investigate whether 
he retained the confidence of his diocese, but no action was taken."108 
Thanks to the manipulations of the pastors by these "Government Lu­
therans", the bishop became somewhat isolated. Nevertheless, as long as he 
could, he continued to visit the parishes throughout his diocese. 
The state waited until mid June 1958, when it eventually brought forth a 
decision. Throughout the long and tense period of the first six months of the 
year the state seems to have achieved its purpose of seriously damaging (if not 
mortally wounding?!) the small body of the Hungarian Lutheran Church. The 
removal of Ordass (the "beheading" of the Church) seems to have been 
motivated by some immediate political events. On June 19, three days after the 
execution of Imre Nagy, the Prime Minister during the 1956 revolution, Ordass 
received a letter from Ernő Mihályfi. Due to the retroactive force of Decree 22 
of 1957, he wrote, the state did not recognize the resignation of Bishop Dezséry 
in October 1956. It meant that Bishop Ordass had been removed for the 
second time from his office by the force of the state. 
During the summer László Dezséry was restored for two hours so that he 
could now "officially" resign. In November 1958 the thirty-nine-year-old 
Zoltán Káldy, the Dean of Pécs was consecrated as Bishop. 
For Ordass the rest was twenty years of silence. 
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Epilogue 
Imre Veöreös in his recent book A "harmadik" egyházi út [1990] (The 
"Third" Way of the Church) argues that Ordass in the second period of his 
episcopal activity, unlike in 1948, was ready to compromise with the state. 
That reveals that he had changed his style of conduct, and now he recognized 
the "truth" of the "third way", then led by Bishop Turóczy. The more I study 
Ordass's writings, the more I realize that this is basically a mistaken view. 
Ordass did not change his attitude or "policy" (a wrong word in connection 
with Ordass) despite the apparent differences in his conduct. In both cases 
Ordass was defending the church. In 1948 the parochial schools were parts of 
the body of the church. Ten years later that was not the case any more. By 
endorsing the 1948 "Agreement" (perhaps a difficult decision) Ordass con-
ceded that the boat of the church was now smaller. But he found that it was 
still a boat that could be navigated, provided its inner autonomy was 
respected. As he himself noted in his Autobiography, in 1948 he had felt that 
God wanted to use him to speak the word, and in 1958 the mission he had 
from God was to try to defend the rights of the Church provided by the 
constitution. Indeed, he took orders from no one other than his Lord. He did 
what he had to do. He could not do otherwise. 
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JEWS, JUDAISM AND ZIONISM IN HUNGARY 1945-4953 
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Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv, 
Israel 
The fate of the 140,000 Jews in Post-Holocaust Hungary, a figure from 1949 
based on denominational grounds, has been the subject of numerous studies, 
which have tackled the various issues from several viewpoints. For years the 
"Jewish question", and the life of Hungarian Jewry was a taboo topic, 
although this began to change with the process of liberalization in the last 
years of the Kádár regime. The collapse of the one-party-state, naturally 
removed all still existing barriers, and new vistas, based on previously less 
accessible sources were opened. Not only a flourishing historiography has 
emerged in Hungary, based on the work of Jewish and non-Jewish scholars, 
but scholars from the West and Israel currently enjoy the full cooperation of 
the authorities and institutions in Hungary. 
Among the historical periods and issues on which current research focuses 
are the events of the period of the Communist take-over and the heyday of 
Stalinism in Hungary. While it seems that no surprising or spectacular 
documents and findings will emerge from the present trend in scholarship, the 
de-ideologization of the past along with the combination of various methods 
and approaches, drawing on sources from both inside and outside of Hungary, 
none the less allows a reexamination of past events and of the role of the 
various persons and organizations involved. 
Naturally, the gradual aging of those persons who were active in the period 
under discussion, the rise of the post-war generation, as well as the understand-
able "deconstruction" of the myths of the Communist regime, are all factors 
which indicate the need for a critical reexamination of the past. It seems that 
the scholarship dealing with the period is rapidly and successfully emerging 
from unilateral dependence on official sources on the one extreme, and 
personal memoirs, on the other. 
Among the many issues concerning the fate of the Hungarian Jewry after 
the War, and the "Jewish question" in general, we shall concentrate on several 
major issues. First, the phases of reconstruction following the Holocaust, 
secondly the denominational aspects of Jewish life and thirdly the place and 
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role of Zionism in shaping Hungary's Jewry in the period under discussion. 
These points shall be presented against the background of crucial factors 
influencing and shaping Hungarian Jewry's life, namely the psychological 
aftershocks of the Holocaust, the changing social structure, the revival of 
antisemitism, the emerging policies of the new regime and the Communist 
take-over, and the impact of the establishment of the State of Israel. 
The crisis of identity 
The remnants of the Hungarian Jewry returning home after the end of the 
War faced several urgent tasks. These included not only the grave problems of 
rebuilding shattered lives and problems of daily existence, but also the 
problems related to the restitution of property and rights. It seems that parallel 
to these burning questions shaping daily life and behaviour, there was a deeper 
problem: that of a crisis of identity1 which manifested itself in the forthcoming 
years in a variety of ways. There was a sense of lost direction, of the failure of 
assimilation, of the failure of the Hungarian nation to defend the Jews (this 
most loyal element which considered itself as an integral part of the nation), 
culminating in a parting of ways, a radical break with everything that the 
recent past represented. Internal divisions among Hungary's Jews on the road 
to be taken were among the most acute among the surviving Jewish commu-
nities in Eastern Europe. Internal polarisation2 took various forms, not only 
on the ideological aspects, but gradually also on the organizational level. 
Hungary's Jews had to decide, and daily realities compelled them to decide as 
soon as possible, between the few existing options - to assimilate, in spite of 
the former failure of assimilation, to try to rebuild and live a Jewish life in 
Hungary, or to take up the Zionist challenge and leave for Palestine, and after 
1948 for the State of Israel. Each solution reflected in a way the crisis of 
identity, the political, social, economic realities of those days. Each option, 
whose chances of success fluctuated with the changing developments, pres-
ented a challenge to which it seems every person of Jewish origin had to relate 
and to take a personal decision. Each option had its appeal. The Communist 
one, promised the chance of integration into the "new, socialist Hungarian 
nation", thus a repetition of the old, nationalist assimilation into the Messianic 
promises of a new, egalitarian, internationalist world which promised to erase 
the class and national divisions between people. The role of Jews in the 
Communist movement, which falls outside our present discussion, though a 
fascinating topic in itself, is frequently mentioned, even in post-Communist 
Hungary, as proof of the disloyalty of the Jews, without any real attempt to 
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understand the psychological and pragmatic factors behind the Jewish partici-
pation in the Communist movement. From a sociological point of view, Victor 
Karady's thesis that "Jews as a group... could offer many more suitable 
candidates for responsible positions in the new system than any other politi-
cally fit social group"3 could serve as a major starting point for the debate on 
why and how Jews took part in the establishment of the Communist regime. 
The belief that Jewish life could be rebuilt in Hungary was based on the 
notion that a truly democratic Hungary would provide the legal and material 
possibilities to practice the Jewish faith. In spite of the deep differences 
between the three main branches of the Jewish religious and community 
structure,4 those adhering to this option, felt that there were enough possibil-
ities and chances to rebuild a Jewish life in Hungary. 
The Zionist challenge was a crucial one. Zionism never took firm roots in 
pre-War Hungary, and Zionists did not play a major role in shaping pre-War 
Hungary's Jewish life. Their role during the Holocaust, especially that of the 
youth movements, is a saga that recent scholarship has only started to deal with 
in the past decade or so. After the Holocaust, thousands, especially from the 
younger generation, flocked to the various branches of the Zionist movement, in 
its secular, religious, socialist or middle class forms. Zionism had one major aim, 
even if its implementation could take various forms - the reorientation of the 
Jews to Palestine/Israel, and the negation of the "galut" - the Diaspora. Thus, 
the Zionist option apriori had to negate the two other ones, both of which were 
based on the continuing existence of Jews on Hungarian soil. Zionism attempted 
to solve the crisis of Jewish identity in its most blunt and direct form - those who 
are and feel Jewish, should leave and build up their historical homeland. Thus, 
from a purely Zionist perspective the nature of the political regime is important 
only in its attitude toward emigration and Zionist activity prior to that step, and 
the renewal of Jewish spiritual, religious life along with communal and 
educational institutions is important as a staging ground for the next step, that 
of implementing the Zionist ideal. Without elaborating on the complexity of 
Zionist ideology or rather ideologies, in its religious, secular, socialist, even 
Marxist, and ultra-conservative, nationalist forms, it should be clear that one of 
the main pillars of Zionism is that Jews have prayed for two thousand years to 
return to Jerusalem, but have done very little to do so in reality. 
Did Hungary's Jewry solve the crisis of identity in the post-war years? The 
answer is: only partially, and in Hungary, as elsewhere, there were those who 
oscillated between the various options, and we have to remember that it was 
often the political regime, and day to day realities which compelled people to 
take one road or another. In fact, the completion of the Communist take-over 
left few options to choose from. 
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Reconstruction 
The reconstruction and revival of Jewish life in post-war Hungary is a very 
complex story, and present day historians still do not have all the necessary 
information at their disposal. Reconstruction entails the complicated struggle 
for the restitution of Jewish property as well as rights, the organized opposi-
tion to all manifestations of antisemitism, together with the reorganization of 
pre-war structures, and the formation of new ones. The problem of Jewish 
unity and the unification of the religious, communal organizations became a 
top priority, a fact never realized until Hungary's Jewry was compelled to do 
so by the Communist regime. 
The Hungarian Jewish community showed a remarkable vitality in recon-
structing its religious and communal structures, taking into consideration the 
difficult post-war times, the polarized political atmosphere and the rising tides 
of antisemitism. While much was done through foreign financial aid, in line 
with the Jewish world's mobilisation after the Holocaust to aid the destroyed 
communities, the groundwork on all levels of Jewish communal life was done 
by Hungarian Jewish organizations. What was even more remarkable in this 
period of reconstruction, was that it took place against the background of an 
intensifying power struggle between the various forces active in the commu-
nity, especially in Budapest, the major center of post-war Jewish existence. 
The intricate Jewish politics of post-war Hungary, centered around the 
emergence of Lajos Stöckler, and the gradual involvement of the new regime, 
especially the Communists, in promoting reliable elements from their perspec-
tive, was not much different from the models that emerged in other East 
European states. In Hungary, as in other East European states like Poland, 
Romania and Czechoslovakia, the achievement of "Jewish unity" among all 
segments of Jewish public and religious life was a top priority. However, in 
Hungary as elsewhere, the efforts for unification took a different turn when 
the Communists started to intervene and manoeuvre, in order to promote loyal 
elements. 
At least until 1947, when the Communists intervened more forcefully into 
shaping Jewish politics, the reconstruction in Hungary proceeded in such 
forms that it provided a workable framework between the surviving Jewish 
community and the post-War Hungarian state. Communal and religious 
institutions, educational facilities, social services built up by the Jewish 
community were not in contrast to the post-war efforts of reconstruction in 
Hungary. As we shall indicate later, the Zionist activity and the attitude of the 
Communists was to change drastically the rules of the game between the state 
and the organized Jewish community. 
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The process of "democratization" of the Jewish community took on similar 
forms in Eastern Europe. In Hungary, however, the Communists did not opt 
for the formation of a "Jewish Democratic Committee", as for example in 
Romania, formed already in June 1945, which was to swallow gradually, by 
salami tactics, all elements of Jewish activity, including the religious one. In 
Hungary, the Communists were determined to channel the newly reconstructed 
Jewish life into full cooperation with the regime. To this end, Stöckler and his 
colleagues were employed, until, having completed their mission, they were 
removed, as were other top Jewish leaders in Eastern Europe almost without 
a trace. We can conclude that the organizational framework and the various 
representative bodies of the Hungarian Jewry were presented on a silver plate 
to the Communists, only to be destroyed by them, when these bodies had 
completed their tasks. After 1949-1950 Hungarian Jewish organizations be-
came a tool in the hands of the regime, not different from other public 
organizations. The Hungarian Jewry had at its disposal in the first post-war 
years a remarkable structure of civil society, which from a Communist point 
of view had to be destroyed. The various forms of so-called "unified represen-
tation of the Jewish faith" in Hungary were not much different from those in 
other states, and in fact one can trace an almost exact comparative timetable 
of parallel developments between the various states. Thus, the Communist 
take-over of the reconstructed Jewish life can serve as a case study for the 
process of communization in Hungary. The last years of Stalinism in Hungary 
were the Jewish community's dark years. Coupled with the anti-Zionist 
campaign, the community's so-called "unification" erased in fact all remnants 
of the period of reconstruction built up after the War. 
Denominational aspects of Jewish life 
By the beginning of 1950 the unification of the three branches of Judaism 
in Hungary was achieved, in the classical pattern of the Communist take-over 
of religious establishments. Ironically, it was the Communist regime that 
forcibly and artificially erased the long held traditions of the Hungarian Jewry. 
The process by which the new regime brought Jewish religious life under its 
heel has been discussed by, among others, Prof. Csorba. We have a fairly 
complete picture of the phases of that process, especially from 1948 on when 
it was clear that any form of independent religious activity would not be 
tolerated. The separation of state and religion, as indicated in the December 
1948 agreement between the Hungarian State and the leadership of the Jewish 
community, went on quite smoothly as significant features of the free pursuit 
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of religious life and education were restricted, and those which were promised 
were usually not kept in subsequent years. In spite of the fact that some 
activities were preserved, such as the Rabbinical Seminary, which often served 
a propaganda purpose, and other activities amply described by Professors 
Csorba and Tamási,5 the limitations on Jewish religious life were very evident. 
Without presenting here the doctrinal aspects of denominational activity, or 
the process through which all religious establishments became by the early fifties 
poor reflections of their previous forms (forms that were rebuilt after the War), we 
shall limit our comments to several main features of the process of the Communist 
take-over of religious life. One of these is that the Communists were pursuing the 
integration of the churches into the new system, and within the Jewish community 
they found the leadership, which of course was promoted by the new forces, very 
cooperative in this project because, ironically, both the Communists and the 
Stockier leaderhsip had found a common enemy, the Zionist movement. 
Secondly, the regime was interested in fostering a leadership that would 
stress religious matters, and thus, the emerging regime was ready to allow a 
certain degree of freedom of activity, as long as it was disconnected from 
Jewish life abroad. The result was that by and large, Jewish life in Hungary 
acted in a void, in which religious holidays and other elements of Judaism were 
practised as if Judaism was a sect particular to the Hungarian environment, 
without any outside roots or base. At best, small scale cooperation was 
allowed with other socialist states. 
Thirdly, although Jewish religious life was cut off from the outside world for 
many years, the regime, it seems, needed for public relations purposes and as 
proof of the freedom of religion, a shadow of religious activity, which in some 
cases was even more liberal than the policy pursued towards the Christian 
Churches. 
Yet, the regime was very careful that the small scale practice of Judaism would 
not become a widespread phenomena among the Hungarian Jewry, and that the 
Jews would not identify religion as a symbol of national identification, as indeed 
was the case in the sixties and later on. Furthermore, it seems that the more 
advanced one was in age, the greater the tolerance of the regime. While the more 
elderly were considered a lost generation, the clear aim was to keep the younger 
generation from practising the freedom of religion that the regime was so proud of. 
The Zionist factor 
As indicated, Zionism became a major force in Hungarian Jewish life. The 
Zionist movement took an active part in the reconstruction of Jewish life, and 
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the emissaries from Palestine, representing the various political movements were 
very active among the younger generation. The Communist leadership, with its 
large proportion of members of Jewish origin, allowed for a time a free hand to 
the Zionist movement. Hungary became a primary transit point for the 
post-Holocaust emigration to Palestine, part of which was illegal, because of the 
position of the British government. Yet, the Communist-Zionist cooperation was 
based on pragmatic lines, namely Soviet support (with reservations) for the 
Zionist plans in establishing the state of Israel, a policy that lasted until 
September 1948. The Hungarian Communists made clear in Erik Molnár's article 
in 1946 that they reject Zionism, and that total assimilation had to be the solution 
to the "Jewish question".6 Yet, with ups and downs they tolerated the activities of 
the movement, and it even became a convenient source of income in hard 
currency, which the Zionists paid to the Party. It seems that the Communists 
became annoyed with the Zionists not only after they denounced most forcefully 
the resurgence of antisemitism7 and criticized the left for not doing enough, or 
even promoting the mass hatred towards Jews, but especially after the Zionists 
entered and took over some significant positions in the Jewish community. As 
indicated, in the ensuing power struggle the Zionists had to be blocked, as they 
opposed Stockier and his friends' perception of "Jewish unity". Reports from the 
Zionist Federation in Hungary sent to Palestine in 1947 indicate that the Zionists 
opposed the "autocratic" line of Stockier, and the attempts of the community 
leadership to "orient the congregation and community totally toward a religious 
line".8 How ironical that leftist Zionists were opposing the religious trend of the 
official leadership, which was in fact supported by the Communist Party, for the 
reasons mentioned before! The Zionists acted in this way because they clearly 
understood that the Judaism allowed by the Communists would be one emptied 
of its national-Zionist content. 
The fate of the Zionist movement was sealed with the change in the Soviet 
policy by the end of 1948. Új Élet would be a very poor source to read about 
the existence of a Jewish state, unless mentioned in the connection that 
Zionism is a reactionary movement, and that Israel is a spearhead of Western 
imperialism. Hungary had its own Zionist trials, that of Dénes Béla, and some 
references in the Rajk trial. Fortunately Mindszenty, accused of being an agent 
of most existing Western intelligence services, was not accused of being an 
Israeli one too. It seems that the big show in Hungary was to have taken place 
later, spoiled by Stalin's death, in which Zoltán Vas and others would have 
been the accused in a major Zionist trial. 
The history of Zionism in post-war Hungary has yet to be written, and its 
tremendous impact among Hungary's Jewry has yet to be assessed, but we can 
conclude with several major points. 
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One of these is the great appeal of the movement among Hungary's Jews. 
Secondly, Zionism, in all its forms, challenged the emerging power structure 
of the Jewish community, as it stressed the need for enthusiastic activity aimed 
in fact at closing down the final chapter of Jewish existence on Hungarian soil. 
The new regime along with its limited policy of emigration had to assure the 
complete loyalty of the remaining Jews. Zionism presented a greater danger to 
them than the Jew who wished to remain a Jew and sought the possibility to 
pray for Jerusalem, in its spiritual sense. The Jew wishing to implement the 
prayer, was considered more of an enemy. It seems that the Communist 
regime's calculation was that a Juäaism emptied of its real content, cut off 
from outside communities, along with the social restructuring of the Hungar-
ian society, would not present any real challenge. Thirdly, Zionism, and not 
so much Judaism, reminded the Jews of their true identity. Thus, for those not 
opting for assimilation, Zionism, including religious Zionism, was a danger 
which the Communists and those Jews who cooperated with them, had to 
combat. 
The existence of the State of Israel was a great source of pride for the Jewish 
communities in the Communist countries, and there is no doubt that one of 
the major reasons for the turn to the worse in the Soviet attitude, followed by 
the other bloc states, was the attraction of Israel, either for emigration, or for 
expression of national identity. The taboo on Israel imposed on the Jewish 
community after the end of 1948, was yet another clear manifestation of this 
policy of Judaism emptied of its present day significance. 
The revival of Jewish life in Hungary in the last years enables us to look 
again into the history of those turbulent years when officially the "Jewish 
question" ceased to exist. Only today, can we perhaps realize the complexity 
of the issues facing the generation which placed so much faith in the new 
post-war era. 
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POLITICAL DILEMMAS OF THE RELIGIOUS 
JEWS IN THE 1960-70S 
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"We want to restore the Jewish Community's good reputation which - to 
tell the truth - was slightly jeopardised here as it was abroad." Endre Sós made 
this statement on being elected as the new leader of the largest group of 
Hungarian religious Jews in the summer of 1957. With this address he hoped 
to begin a new period in the history of the Hungarian followers of the so-called 
"Moses-faith". 
To understand how the "reputation" of the official organisations of 
religious Jews was jeopardised in the post-war period, we need to survey the 
consequences of the collapse of Stalinism in Hungary from the point of view 
of the whole Jewish community during and after the revolutionary uprising of 
1956. We shall focus on religious life because this topic reveals the most 
general problems of Jewish families insofar as a public self-identification of 
Jewishness only assumed religious forms during the socialist period of Hun-
garian history. The question of religious relations is also important in showing 
the manner in which the leadership of Hungarian churches and religious 
communities was politically manipulated. In particular, their sources were only 
made available for research on one occasion, neither before nor after which 
historians were able to have access to such materials. 
The reason for this apparently strange occurrence was actually quite simple. 
Following the election of the Polish Karol Wojtyla as the Pope of the World 
Catholic Church in 1978, the leadership of cultural policy in the Hungarian 
"White House" - the well-known nickname of the central office of Hungarian 
Socialist Workers' Party - suddenly discovered the regenerating influences of 
religions and churches on the "building of socialism". Lacking accurate 
information about their real political abilities, György Aczél, responsible for 
the ideology and control of culture at the top of the communist leadership, 
entrusted one of his close co-workers, József Lukács, to start a research 
program settled to the Philosophical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences. As a director of that institute, József Lukács undoubtedly served the 
so-called "hand-operated cultural policy of Aczél" but it must be said to his 
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credit, however, that he was among the first who analysed religion as an object 
of social science instead of as an object to be simply denounced. The final 
conclusion of this research, presented in 1985 inevitably reflected the claims of 
the regime, though it is important to note that the authors of research papers 
were free to work without direct control. Moreover, having been interested in 
discovering what the real situation was, the State Office of Church Affairs, the 
main instrument of communist ecclesiastical policy, was able to offer import-
ant help with the program. 
As a member of a group of scholars surveying the history of the Hungarian 
Jews between 1918-1980,1 received a permit to examine the neglected papers 
of the rapporteur of Israelitic Affairs at the Library of the State Office of 
Church Affairs. I am convinced that the employees of this library had no idea 
of the contents of these materials. The information contained in these miscel-
laneous fi?<5s can start to reveal the trends of the political manipulation of 
religious communities in Hungary in the 1960s. After completing this research, 
the archives of the library were once again closed for research purposes and 
have not been opened to this very day. Following the silent death of the 
communist regime, the materials of the abolished State Office of Church 
Affairs were delivered to the National Archive (Department of the Modern 
Age) and - the best part of them - to the Ministry of Education. According 
to official opinion they have recently come under inspection for research 
without any deadline. But it is time to start a brief account of the problems of 
Jewish religious life in postwar Hungary. We should say first of all that the 
survivors of the darkest episode of Hungarian history have very contradictory 
experiences of persecution. On the one hand, the new "people's democratic" 
regime started a process of judicial and financial compensation, called the 
perpetrators of the anti-Semite atrocities to account and legally declared the 
freedom of lifestyle for different religious and ethnic groups. On the other 
hand, however, the regime was unable to stop the revival of anti-Semitism. 
More than one bloody public disturbance of the unruly crowds of Communist 
and Peasant Party sympatizers revealed the dangers of a policy which opened 
the gates of parties to the "little Fascists" in an effort to gain mass support. 
But the experiences of the failure of assimilation faithfully followed in the 
previous decades resulted in only a minority of the Hungarian Jews choosing 
religious identity with a perspective of Zionism. The majority of them were 
once again willing to follow the new leadership of the religious community in 
joining the official - currently "people's democratic" - policy. From a 
historical perspective this was nothing more than a renewal of a long tradition 
in the life of Hungarian Jews: an attitude in which the Jewish character was 
identified in religious, instead of ethnic, terms and a policy that sought to 
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secure Jewish life not through numerous autonomous organizations but only 
through the general protection of the state in exchange for political loyalty. 
The above-mentioned political orientation of Jewish leaders undoubtedly 
had a certain logic and was supported by a real, but one-sided interpretation 
of several historical experiences. Therefore it caused a paradox in the Hungar-
ian Zionist movement. Although sympathising with the idea of a Jewish state 
in Palestine and increased religious activity for the sake of the Jewishness 
outside of Hungary, many Hungarian Zionists did not want to emigrate from 
Hungary forever. They chose Zionism, rather, for an opportunity to oppose 
the official Jewish policy and, on the other hand, to provide different - not 
always religious - ways of Jewish self-identification. Therefore it might be 
considered that the contentment of Jewish leaders with the official condemna-
tion of Zionism was an important event by which the leadership of the Jewish 
community compromised itself in the eyes of their contemporaries abroad. 
Furthermore, it was a generally accepted notion in 1956 that absolute loyalty 
to the "people's democracy" during the Rákosi-era had been determined not 
only by the well-known antireligious policy of the communist dictatorship, but 
also by the corruption and degeneration of the leaders. 
The materials at the Archive of the State Office of the Church Affairs 
mentioned earlier, contained no data which might have verified this serious 
charge. But Endre Sós and his followers, although they were aware of logistical 
problems, didn't want to begin their activity with a juristic "clean sweep". The 
solution to a multi-faceted crisis of Jewish religious life caused by the fleeing of 
around 200,000 persons in the fall of 1956 required a new policy to compensate 
for the miserable stagnation in the first half of 50s. "We don't want to sink to a 
level of 'soup-kitchen Jewishness'!", the newly elected president said and added: 
"We have been 'cultured-Jews' and we want to remain as 'cultured-Jews'." The 
majority of the approximately 100,000 Hungarian religious Jews probably 
preferred, however, Sándor Scheiber's formulation mentioned in his address to 
the new leadership: "We remained here, because we were held back... by 
shouldering responsibility, by caring for those who depended on us, by caring for 
the fate of our institutions, by our affection for the Hungarian language and 
culture, by scientific goals - abscence of a thousand years - whose search for data 
can only be accomplished here." One thing is certain: it was not the positive 
qualities of the new leaders, but two other elements of the new political situation 
that were responsible for the rapid consolidation of basic necessities in the 
following decade: first, the increasing activity of the believers' groups operating 
within the greater freedom of movement afforded by "Kádárism", and, secondly, 
the increasing aid of international Jewish organisations which flowed into the 
country through channels recently opened by the communist government. 
• 
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I have neither the time nor the space to survey in detail the impressive 
prosperity resulting from the restoration of synagogues to a greater availability 
of kosher foods, from the reorganisation of kindergartens and schools to the 
restoration of orphanages and hospitals, from the abundant cultural programs 
of more then forty Jewish communities to the Public Institute of Rabbinical 
Studies, which was one of a kind during the whole socialist period in Eastern 
Europe. Our focus, instead, is on the strange events resulting from a conflicting 
relationship between 'Síp utca' - one of its buildings houses Budapest's 
Hungarian Jewish community - and the Embassy of Israel. A confidential note 
that President Sós sent in 1965 to János Pratner, the then President of State 
Office of Church Affairs, complained that the Israeli diplomats had became 
active in an "incredibile number" and "they are penetrating all spheres of the 
Hungarian Jewry". They had made a strong impact on the parents of Jewish 
educational institutions supported by the directors of secondary schools and 
they managed to utilize the commemoration of the Holocaust as well as 
medical assistance from abroad to spread their dangerous ideas. 'Zionism' was 
the magic word which alarmed the communist leaders, who faithfully followed 
the Soviet interests in their one-sided support of Arab countries in the 
complicated political situation of the Middle East. 
The 'Zionist' label had at least five different meanings in the 1960s in 
Hungary. As in all countries in the communist block, the official media used it as 
a synonym for the current policy of Israel, as a sort of feature of American 
imperialism, and as a servant of the interests of worldwide capitalist exploitation 
in the Middle East. Secondly, 'Zionism' referred to a historical movement aimed 
to organise Jews into a modern nation and to establish a new country with an 
Israelite/Jewish national consciousness. Thirdly, a particular national conscious-
ness of an ethnic or religious minority was called 'Zionism' if its followers sought 
to realise a special Jewish way of life in their own countries while recognizing 
Israel as a distant homeland of Jewishness. Fourthly, any kind of claims for an 
autonomous Jewish life and community outside of Israel -with the exception of 
the strictly-controlled religious organisations - was qualified as 'Zionist'. And 
finally, mere sympathy or friendly feelings towards Israel and its inhabitants 
were also branded as 'Zionist'. In his unconditional political solidarity with the 
communist government, president Sós did not want to separate the different and 
confused meanings of this complicated idea. He probably put his faith in a policy 
that guaranteed the security of Jewish life through loyalty to the state, but was 
also aware that 'Zionism' was a traditional manifestation of the opposition of 
Hungarian religious Jews against its leadership. 
Those responsible for communist ecclesiastical policy understood the ul-
terior motives in the president's note, because their similarities provided a basis 
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for the building of a system of mutual dependence between religious leaders 
and the State Office of Church Affairs. Instead of an answer to this letter, I 
have found a denunciation of Endre Sós written in the fall of 1965 in which 
Sándor Scheiber, the famous historian and director of the Public Institute of 
Rabbinical Studies was labelled a "favourite of the Embassy of Israel" and his 
institute as a centre of Zionist opposition during the campaign for the new 
election of the Jewish community's leaders. Although president Sós lost his 
office, his successor, Géza Seifert developed even stronger ties to the organs of 
state ecclesiastical policy. At the end of the first decade of the Seifert period, 
a rapporteur of State Office of Church Affairs honoured Seifert's achievements 
in a non public address as follows: "the development of ecclesiastical policy 
and political pressure have resulted" in the fact that the leaders of the 
Hungarian Israelites have always reconcilied their positions with official 
opinion. This relationship was mutually beneficial: the State Office of Church 
Affairs "provided sufficient political assistance to religious leaders both in 
international and internal (personal) affairs". President Seifert really deserved 
this "progressive" label, a favourite of the regime in its political classification 
of Church leaders. Seifert was willing to support official communist foreign 
policy with respect to the Middle East, and he offered the following stereotypi-
cal response to the most important questions of Jews living abroad: first, 
Hungary had no Zionist movement because Hungarian Jews did not want to 
emigrate; and secondly, there were no anti-Semitic tendencies in Hungary, 
only anti-Semites, but even their influence was minimal because the state 
deterred them through educational and judicial means. 
President Seifert's opinion written in this address, however, differed from his 
speech. Contrary to the above-mentioned denial of Zionism in Hungary, he 
informed the State Office of Church Affairs about "Zionist organisations" in a 
letter dated December 20th, 1966. Chief Rabbi Imre Sahn in Debrecen and Chief 
Rabbi Artur Geyer in Budapest - the latter being one of the former leaders of 
Hungarian Zionism in the postwar period - organised programs among Jewish 
youth about the Israeli State and taught courses in the New Hebrew language. 
Seifert considered these actions as an "immediate encouragement for defection" 
- this act, "defection" (in Hungarian 'disszidálás') was one of the deadly sins in 
the communist world because it symbolised the failure of a real salvation of 
human creatures within its boundaries. For this reason Seifert considered the 
activity of Rabbi Tamás Raj at Szeged more dangerous because he organized 
trips to visit Hungarian Jewish youths in Szabadka and Újvidék in Yugoslavia, 
where - according to Seifert - they were subjected to the influence of heated 
Zionist propaganda. The president declared that "in my opinion the Embassy of 
Israel in Budapest should remain in the background of this Zionist turmoil". 
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Although Hungary broke off diplomatic relations with Israel following the 
war of '67, the sporadic but on-going manifestations of a "nightmare" of 
Zionism made nervous both Jewish leaders and their partners in state ecclesi-
astical policy-making in the 1970s. The reason was quite simple: their desire 
to create a Jewish life separate from the close framework of the religious 
organisations, on the one hand, and the expression of sympathies towards 
Israel on the other. It was no surprise that when the Public Institute of 
Rabbinical Studies began to criticize Seifert's style of leadership, the President 
accused the director of this famous institution of Zionism. This same accusa-
tion resurfaced in a letter written by Miklós Máté, the director of the Jewish 
Secondary School, in September 1973. According to Máté, the reason the 
Rabbinical Seminary had been frequented by foreign visitors was that Sándor 
Scheiber had been judged "on the basis of information received abroad and he 
was considered a Zionist". This denunciation was effective because the 
following confidential conclusion was noted on the reverse side of that same 
letter by a rapporteur of the State Office of Church Affairs: "this note reflects 
the division between the Rabbinical Seminary and the progressive leadership 
of the Jewish Community." 
The folder at the Archive of the State Office of Church Affairs did not 
contain any confidential records following the death of president Seifert in the 
mid-1970s. When we conducted our research the papers of this period were 
still in use by the employees of that office. But the issues addressed in the 
so-called "samizdat" literature ofthat time indicated that the leadership of the 
Hungarian religious Jews could not defeat the phantom of Zionism. The 
beginning of a new political age and an unmistakable mark of an unsuccessful 
policy of loyalty to the communist regime was the formation of the illegal 
group, "Shalom" - but its history will be a topic of another lecture on another 
occasion. 
RE-EMERGENCE OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY 
IN HUNGARY 
THOMAS SZENDREY 
Gannon University, Eerie, Pennsylvania, 
U.S.A. 
The re-emergence of Christian democracy and related social reform move-
ments - as indeed numerous other manifestations of institutional and spiritual 
rebirth associated with it - is seen most evidently in the re-establishment of 
that political party which bears the name, specifically the KDNP or Christian 
Democratic People's Party. However, numerous other political parties and 
movements, including the MDF or Hungarian Democratic Forum, also claim 
to be involved in the resurgence of this tradition. Needless to say, the 
resurgence is not limited by any means to the political sphere. The reception 
accorded Pope John Paul II on the occasion of his historic visit to Hungary in 
1991 certainly illustrates the vitality of Hungarian religious life. 
Hence any discussion of this phenomenon should not be limited to dealing 
with political and other formal groups and associations; rather it must focus 
on the institutional and even personal/spiritual resurgence of Christianity, 
broadly conceived, as a factor in private and public life. Before dealing with 
some of the manifestations of a renewed and resurgent Christian life in 
Hungary since 1989, one should cast a glance, necessarily brief and episodic, 
backward at the major political parties and institutional structures. 
Just as in the rest of Europe, formal Christian democratic and social reform 
movements in continental political life date back to the waning years of the 
nineteenth century and reflect the influence of Pope Leo XIII and his 
epoch-making encyclical Rerum novarum, which provided the necessary sup-
port for democratic and social reform movements in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. 
Evidently influenced by German, French, Belgian, and English thinkers and 
reformers in this Christian tradition, there soon emerged a mostly Roman 
Catholic (together with some Reformed and Lutheran manifestations) social 
and political reform movement which culminated in the formation of the 
Catholic People's Party in 1892 and eventually led to other organizations and 
activities including the active involvement of Ottokár Prohászka in Christian 
social and spiritual reform and the myriad reforming activities of Sándor 
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Giesswein, in the decades following and the ongoing presence of these 
movements in Hungarian political life from thence until 1949. The vicissitudes 
of their activity is one of the yet to be told stories of Hungarian history. It 
should also be pointed out that in spite of cataclysmic changes in the era of 
world wars and competing ideological forces, a Christian institutional presence 
persisted nonetheless in Hungarian life, certainly until 1945 and in a more 
limited institutional manner until 1949. The current revival reaches back to 
both the older and more recent manifestations of this Christian democratic and 
social reform tradition. 
Until the closing days of World War II, Christian inspired political, 
institutional, and cultural life enjoyed a great measure of public support and 
institutional presence, albeit not without contradictions between the existing 
order and Christian ideals. Obviously, there always has been and always will 
be a dichotomy between a transcendental ideal and a secular, i.e. time bound, 
reality. Needless to say, this situation prevails into the present. It must be 
noted that much of the reason for the ongoing struggle between church 
structures, including especially parish priests and some of the hierarchy on one 
side and some of the bishops, regular clergy (at least in part), and most 
intellectuals and writers committed to Catholic reform on the other - focusing 
on the understanding of political and social reform, the role of the clergy and 
laity, and a host of other concerns related to the life of the Christian in an ever 
increasing secular world - can be traced back to the either incomplete or 
unassimilated understanding of the Second Vatican Council and the post-
conciliar church generally; this issue, and many of the conflicts and misunder-
standings stemming from it, must be eventually dealt with if the Roman 
Catholic church in Hungary is to have an impact now and in the future. Given 
the immense opening and opportunities for a Christian vision of the world, it 
is imperative that something be done. 
The end of the Second World War inevitably called attention to the 
contradiction between the altered political realities of inter-war and post-war 
Hungary and the eternality of the Christian message; even so, the effort to 
sustain the latter was by no means easy in the changed circumstances. After 
the resolution of internal differences among the various Christian political 
leaders, István Barankovics called to life the Democratic People's Party in 
1945. The name itself indicates not only the changed circumstances and a 
renewed emphasis on democracy, but also reflected a conflict with an institu-
tional Roman Catholic church which had been too closely identified with the 
old regime and its essentially public law and neo-Baroque mentality and 
values. However, even with the changed designation, Barankovics wished to 
realize an essentially Christian democratic political program. Its contours 
RE-EMERGENCE OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY 117 
become quite clear from his speeches and writings of these years. Consider the 
following from one of the party program speeches: "The ideals of Hungarian 
Christianity, its distinctive culture and its believing people carry such a civic 
desire within themselves that demands a role for itself in the struggle of the 
parties and the shaping of public life." The further refinement of his ideas can 
be witnessed in his other speeches, in the activities and writings of many who 
shared his Christian inspired political ideals, based mostly on the articulation 
of natural rights principles, from 1945 to 1947, some of which are being 
reprinted at the present time. During the elections of 1947, the Barankovics led 
Democratic People's Party, in spite of only limited and not particularly 
enthusiastic support from the Catholic hierarchy, received the most votes, 
indeed even a relative majority of the total number of votes cast. 
Not only was this broad based support the consequence of the program 
espoused, it was also the result of a spiritual and social reform movement of 
the 1930's and early 1940's (the Kalot, Kalász, village and town based youth 
movements, Prohászka circles, journals such as Korunk Szava and Vigília 
among others, the Soli Deo Gloria movement among Protestants, parish 
renewal efforts, especially in Budapest and the larger cities, the memory of 
Sándor Giesswein, Nándor Zichy, and other reformers) which now manifested 
itself in a large number of votes for a political party, which made every effort 
to connect with this movement. It was certainly not by chance that the city of 
Győr was the initial locale of the renewal of Christian democracy and social 
reform in the years just after World War II; this certainly recalls the central 
role of Sándor Giesswein in this context; indeed, the earliest Catholic trade 
unions had been established at Győr in the waning years of the nineteenth 
century and its bishops had generally supported efforts to foster Christian 
democracy and social reform. 
Closely tied to these mostly Catholic movements, one must also take note 
of similar efforts by the Reformed and Lutheran churches. While mostly 
independent of political parties at first, these Reformed and Lutheran struggles 
for Christian-inspired socio-political reforms, because of strong confessional 
differences and the close relationship of the Roman Catholic church to 
Christian democracy, tended to be more active in other political configur­
ations, especially the Smallholder's Party and its related organizations. Its 
basic orientation was certainly Christian-inspired, as its motto of "God, 
Homeland, and Family" amply demonstrated. These Protestant movements 
were also generally more nationalistic and more in evidence in eastern 
Hungary. 
However, forty-some years of an imposed Communist hegemony have left 
gaping holes in a Hungary characterized for many years by a Christian 
• 
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hegemony. Together with gaping holes in the social reality, there is an even 
broader breach in Christian consciousness, values, practices, and morals, 
together with the mostly still untold story of the institutional churches of 
Hungary in our own century. Some of these needs have been addressed by the 
publication of some volumes on church history. 
Even more problematic for the full understanding of Christian democracy 
has been the virtual silence until just recently about the origins, inter-war, and 
post-war Christian-inspired social, cultural, and political movements. This 
remains one of the great future tasks of Hungarian historical scholarship; one 
must first begin by collecting the documents and the memoirs of its numerous 
participants, then must follow the examination of the social impact of the 
movement, and finally there should emerge a comprehensive historical account 
before it disappears from our consciousness. 
Nor can one neglect to study the manifestations of the Christian-inspired 
political and social reform movements as these began to slowly re-emerge 
during the days of the revolution of 1956. Some of the political formations 
dispersed after 1949 (or earlier) reappeared this year in the form of fledgling 
political parties; most of these were inspired by the movement broadly 
characterized as Christian democracy. However, one cannot neglect the 1956 
role of Cardinal József Mindszenty and numerous Reformed and Lutheran 
churchmen; the spirit of both the institutional churches and the elemental 
force of Christian beliefs were and remained an integral part of the tradition 
of the 1956 revolution, but once again as a mostly neglected part of the larger 
historical record. After the glorious days of the revolution, much of it was 
again suppressed for many years, but not forgotten, as the resurgence of those 
revolutionary ideals was to fuel a multifaceted dissident movement that 
culminated in the restoration of democracy, including the ideals of Christian 
democracy, by 1989. 
Each historical situation, though, brings its own problems, and at present 
the problematic issue has become one of toleration for other views and 
traditions; this seems to be in short supply at present, but it is also, or rather, 
should be seen as an intolerance born of a committed struggle after many years 
of oppression or a condition of comfortable stagnation. However, even an 
essentially positive cast of mind on this issue cannot and should not obscure 
the concern. 
Christian democracy has had an opportunity to function on a mostly level 
playing field since 1989, and the political parties constituting the current 
governing coalition are each tied in some way to this political and social 
orientation. Whereas the opposition is centered mostly on those advocating 
some form of liberalism or a transformed market socialism. The tension arising 
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from this situation creates the furor over the issue of toleration in an ever more 
politicized and polarized society, focused, virtually of necessity, on very 
compelling economic concerns. 
However, let us focus on the intellectual (I hesitate to say ideological) 
orientations clashing with each other as we approach the elections of the 
coming year. The currently governing coalition consists of an amalgam of 
value orientations not alien to the traditions of Christian democracy broadly 
conceived; this is certainly true of the Christian Democratic People's Party and 
mostly true of the Smallholders, at least in terms of their earlier noted base-line 
values. The MDF or Hungarian Democratic Forum is a more variegated 
political entity and represents essentially the somewhat contradictory tradi-
tions of nineteenth century national liberalism, some elements of Christian 
democracy, and the numerous strands of populist thought with an evident 
sense of nationalism. Thus, it could be argued that Christian democracy is the 
common element in this center-right coalition faced with the unenviable task 
of sustaining the course of a democratic Hungary. To accomplish this, it must 
fight against the temptation to coalesce or harden into an ideological party 
because that would ultimately negate its self-professed Christian values. 
However, the temptation to do that is inevitably present because the combina-
tion of nationalism and religion is generally a dangerous, combustible, and 
often an intolerant one. The extent to which these dangers can be moderated 
will to a great extent determine the future of Christian democracy and its 
undeniably positive values in Hungary. This is what the more extreme elements 
of this orientation fail to recognize and many of the ongoing problems of the 
governing coalition can be traced to this situation. 
Certainly, as virtually all the opinion polls seem to suggest, the short-term 
prospects of the coalition are not very promising, but that certainly does not 
negate Christian democratic values in the long term. The ongoing institutional-
ization of Christian inspired ideals in the emerging social structure is indeed 
the promise of a future and on-going presence. There are many manifestations 
of this other than the political and the effort to achieve a greater presence in 
education is probably the most visible one at present. This too is not without 
its dangers in an ideologically charged society, but it is an activity which must 
be undertaken - and in a tolerant spirit - if the ideals of Christian democracy 
are to be maintained and preserved. The ongoing institutionalization of 
democracy is the major guarantor of toleration and diversity, an atmosphere 
to which Christian democracy has contributed in the past and must do so 
again in the future. 

TENDENCIES OF RELIGIOUS CHANGES 
IN MODERN HUNGARY 
ISTVÁN KAMARÁS 
National Institute of Public Education, Budapest, 
Hungary 
Religious people hold dual citizenship, subjects both of God and Caesar. They 
need not feel schizophrenic in consequence, nor do they have to serve two masters, 
as they may serve the Lord in both capacities. In Hungary, the construction of the 
anti-environmental Danube power plant at Nagymaros was prevented by a 
nationwide protest movement even before the change in the political system. A 
spiritual power plant had been in operation at the same Nagymaros as early as 
1971. This is where meetings of young Catholics were held, at first illegally, then 
quasi-legally, and since 1980, fully legally. How many people in Hungary aspire to 
such dual citizenship? How do they experience their twofold role? 
In a minority 
While practically all Hungarians declared themselves as adhering to one 
religious denomination or another at the end of the forties, twenty years later 
only half of the population declared themselves believers, and another ten years 
later only two-fifths did so. The loss of religious faith was faster and deeper in 
Hungary than in any Western European countries during the same period. All 
this is the result of worldwide secularization combined with the atheism forced 
upon people by a Stalinist state. However, there has been a religious renewal. 
The interest of young people in religion is growing, as is the number of 
intellectuals who think of themselves as believers. There are thousands of small 
religious communities and self-supporting units striving to realise a religious 
way of life. There is an increasing interest in religious knowledge and in 
religious art. As a result of two opposing trends, the spread of atheism has 
stopped and, after the change in political system, a slight reversal can be 
anticipated. 
For the past forty years, denominational ratios appear to have stayed 
relatively steady. Forty years ago (when denomination still featured on census 
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forms) 70.5 per cent were Catholics, 21.9 per cent Calvinists, 5.2 per cent 
Lutherans, 1.5 per cent Jews, 0.4 per cent Greek Orthodox, 0.4 per cent of 
other religions and 0.1 per cent professed no religion. In the past hundred years 
the proportions of Catholics has steadily grown, a trend that continued in the 
past forty years. A new element is the rising number of those baptized who 
profess no religion and stay outside rel igious traditions and culture. (Among 
children the proportion today is 30-35 per cent and may reach the same 
proportion in the adult population by the onset of the 21st century.) In the 
period of secularisation and enforced atheism, the Calvinists suffered the 
heaviest losses. Only half of those declaring themselves believers go to church 
even at Christmas or Easter, and the proportion of those practising religion is 
under one fifth. Among members of small denominations (in Hungary mostly 
Baptists, Seventh Day Adventists, or Pentecostals) this proportion is much 
higher, exceeding 70-80 per cent. The religious population are a minority in 
another respect as well: the religious people are found mostly among the 
elderly, the unschooled, the poor and village-dwellers. Religious intellectuals 
are scarce, and though a majority of the members in the present government 
are practising believers and the three parties of the governing coalition profess 
to be Christians, the current proportion of actively religious professionals is 
2-4 per cent, as against the general 10-15 per cent. 
The consequences of a minority situation are often assimilation, a set of 
minority complexes, a pseudo-martyr role, a rejection of responsibility as well 
as a denial of the facts, in favour of the pretence that "we are still a Christian 
country". 
Types of religiousness 
Superficial observations would show that traditional religiousness is still 
alive in villages, while towns display a new type of intrinsic religious behaviour, 
characterized by the recognition of minority status, a more absorbed spiritual-
ity, an increased intellectual interest, and a sense of community and solidarity. 
Taking a closer look, however, it turns out that both the traditional and the 
new types are in a minority. In towns as well as in villages, extrinsic (formal) 
religiousness prevails. The type rooted in folk customs and penetrating all the 
events of daily life is still alive, albeit only in small, reservation-like villages. 
Even today, children in the countryside are more likely to be born into 
Christianity than those in towns; yet it is also true that more young people 
lapse from religion after confirmation in villages than in towns. The commu-
nity and spiritual life in Hungarian villages is also undergoing a crisis, which 
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is another reason why atheism has reached new levels in villages. At the same 
time, there are a growing number of cases where traditional religiousness is 
grafted onto the new type. In towns, especially in those of over 50,000 
inhabitants, intrinsic religiousness is present mostly among secondary-school 
pupils and university graduates. In a considerable number of cases, they come 
from small communities. 
Only a third of religious people declare themselves to be believers in terms 
of the doctrines of their church; the others think of themselves as religious after 
their own fashion. A majority of these latter do not practise their religion, lack 
a sense of identity with a congregation or parish, have minimal religious 
knowledge and some are anticlerical. The rest, a clear minority, lead more-
than-average religious lives but feel their religion to be individual, cut to their 
personalities, and in some aspects they are critical of their church, particularly 
of its leaders. 
The zone between religiousness and non-religiouness is broad. Some of 
those religious after their own fashion quickly drop out. Among university 
students, the proportion of those professing religion after their own fashion is 
two or three times that of those who follow the doctrines of a church. The 
number of the latter is exceeded even by those who answer "I really consider 
myself to be a seeker for God\ In this circle, the proportion of staunch atheists 
(an approximately equal number of materialists, non-materialist and Marxist 
atheists) is relatively small, a third or a quarter of those who regard themselves 
indifferent, unsure, pragmatic, free of ideologies or rationalists. 
I have had the opportunity to examine this dual citizenship as experienced 
by young Catholics and Protestants who, attending church schools or belong-
ing to small religious communities, are more religious than the average person. 
One of many groups is characterized by a split personality of the "everything in 
its own place" approach, a schizophrenic state of mind of Sunday religion and 
weekday utilitarianism: "Body and mind are to be separately developed, each 
according to its own laws". Or, "When I say T , that means my personality. 
When I say 'we', that means Christians". "I accept Marxism concerning social 
problems, and religion concerning faith". "My tastes are not influenced by my 
faith, nor is my faith influenced by my tastes". The religiousness of the second 
group is the best characterized by calling it laic. They question the authority of 
religion, churches and the clergy in some important fields: "My religion aids 
me in many areas of my life - but definitely hampers me in my research." "As 
for me, Christianity means first of all the expression of my national identity." 
The third group includes those of overzealous behavior (we might even call 
them bigoted and dogmatic as well). They harbour prejudices concerning the 
world as a whole or some of its aspects: "A Christian must recognize barriers 
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around his personality." "Faith is more important than knowledge, even in 
science." "The finest poetry is in the prayer book." "A Christian may choose 
only a profession befitting a Christian." The members of the fourth group 
suffer a conflict in their dual citizenship: "I feel that my faith and knowledge 
must not contradict each other. At the same time, I also feel that the two 
cannot be brought into a harmony." "I long to enter non-religious communi-
ties as well, yet I must not serve two masters at the same time." "To remain 
an individual even as a faithful Christian while also evolving my personality, 
yes, that would be fine, but the two cannot go together." A fifth group includes 
people in whom the two citizenships are in harmony, with the transcendental 
and secular spheres welded into one: "As a religious person, I can be all the 
more of an individual." "Art, I think, is part of the supernatural. And that 
concerns the work of non-Christian artists, too." "I belong to both a religious 
community and a non-religious one. On the basis of the law of communicating 
vessels, I suppose the values of one reach the other." The overzealous strategy 
has a more-than-average number of supporters among people professing 
traditional religion: the wordly and split ones attract mainly people of extrinsic 
religiousness; those of intrinsic religiousness can be chiefly found in the 
conflict-ridden or harmonious groups. 
Of intellectual Christian strategies, one group aims at the individual, 
another at the small community, a third at the institutional church, and the 
fourth at the link between church and world. The scenarios of strategies aimed 
at the individual are as follows: 1) to love more, 2) to reach deeper into one's 
soul, 3) to become a more worthy Christian, 4) to become a more conscious 
Christian, 5) to be present as a sign in the word. In the second kind of strategy, 
the nature of the link is the basic unit of Christianity, or the Church: 1) family, 
2) small community. The third group is that of the strategies desiring to reform 
the institutionalized church in either a moderate or a radical way: 1) improve 
standards amongst the clergy, 2) increase the numbers of the clergy by 
recruiting laymen, 3) improve the liturgy, 4) transform congregations or 
parishes into efficient organizations, 5) shape congregations or parishes into 
living communities, 6) create an open, ecumenic church, 7) create a democratic 
church that works from the bottom up. The fourth kind, the strategies of 
dialogue, urge a change in the relationship between the church and the world'. 
1) creating a more political church, 2) appearing on public platforms, 3) 
moving out into the world through charity (social and psycho-hygienic), 4) 
participating in social life through cultural activites, 5) creating links in all 
directions and every way with the secular sphere, 6) evangelization and 
missionary work through dialogue. 
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Church life 
There is an essential difference between the historical (Catholic, Calvinist, 
Lutheran) and smaller churches with fewer than 30.000 members (Baptists, 
Jehova's Witnesses, Pentecostals and about three dozen others). The congre-
gations of these latter are intimate, their members live in a face to face 
relationship, and their activities often cover a wide range (help and support, 
culture, education and merrymaking). These congregations' composition ac-
cording to age, sex and profession is far more balanced than that of the 
historical churches, and is very similar to Catholic basic communities. 
Aside from exceptions in the 5-10 per cent range, the parishes and 
congregations of the historical churches reveal a picture that differs consider-
ably from those of small churches. Most of these parishes or congregations are 
not communities yet-or no longer so. It is conspicuous that even the Calvinist 
Church has become thoroughly hierarchical and, in many places, the faithful 
are neither partners nor brethren, but a mere flock. 
According to a recent survey, there are great differences in the Catholic 
parishes' equipment, personnel, activity forms and range of influence. Of 100 
priests, 6, aged 60-70, look after their parishes, each with 3-4 filiae, without 
any assistance. A single priest, aided by one lay helper, looks after a parish of 
400 as well as one of 5,000; in some, forty attend Sunday mass, in others seven 
hundred, the catecism is taught to fifty as well as to two hundred children. 
There is no end of examples of unequal burdens. The effect is, of course, visible 
also in religious life. 
Only a quarter of parish boards include members under thirty. A third of 
them are men only, a fifth have no members under 61. In an overwhelming 
majority of the cases, the parish priests holds the reins, and the number of 
conflicts between priests and laymen is limited only because there is no 
opportunity to express opposing views. 
There is no charitable organisation in one third of Catholic parishes. A 
massive majority of these are village parishes where a sense of social respon-
sibility seems to be even rarer than in towns. Charity work is haphazard in 
most villages. 
The number of baptisms is declining in 60 per cent of parishes, rising in only 
5 per cent, the conditions of administering the Sacrament differ widely. 50-90 
per cent of those confirmed (the number in villages, where confirmation is a 
folk custom rather than a Sacrament, exceeds that in towns) lapse soon 
afterwards; confirmation is often bitterly called "The Sacrament of leaving the 
Chruch". The number of confessions is steeply declining almost everywhere, 
and a majority of priests urge their flocks to confess more often, treating them 
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as children, instead of asking them to lead spiritual lives as responsible adults. 
"Instead of considering their actions, they confess them", complains a priest 
of an average village parish about a flock of infantile piety. "Characteristically, 
for the past thirteen years no one has confessed fornication or abortion to me. 
The most frequently confessed sins are 'I swore' or 'I quarrelled with the wife', 
says the priest of a secularized village. The number of church weddings is on 
the decline in two thirds of the parishes; yet there are still a few villages where 
all weddings take place in church. The (mostly not too intimate) ties estab-
lished with the couple during the premarital instruction are mostly broken 
immediately after the ceremony. 
In 1989, the year leading up to the major changes in the political system, 
10-15 per cent of children attended religious instruction, more in villages, fewer 
in towns. In most places, their numbers rose by 10-40 per cent after the 
change. Only 15 per cent of parishes or congregations provide religious 
instruction for children of kindergarten age, 50 per cent for young people, and 
25 per cent for adults. 
Cultural and community activities are poor and only improving slowly. A 
considerable proportion of religious small communities keeps apart from the 
parish, in a majority of cases due to the priest's dismissive or uncertain attitude. 
The parishes' links are uniformly poor with neighbouring parishes, congrega-
tions of other denominations and lay communities alike. Although the change 
in the political system led to the foundation of several hundred parish clubs, 
libraries, scout troops and newspapers, these are still relatively rare. 
Characteristically, only a third of the parish priests in the surveys answered 
the question, "What do you expect of the Catholic Church leadership?" Most 
of them want it to be more courageous and decisive. Though four fifths of the 
parishes have plans of some kind, a third of those concerns only the 
maintenance of the church and/or the presbitery. Other items at the top of that 
list are improving the quality of youth work and catechism classes, church 
schools or kindergartens, improving pastoral work, establishing communities, 
family care and boosting cultural activities. 
In a considerable proportion of Catholic parishes, pastoral work is limited 
to the administration of the Sacraments. Even in that respect, there are more 
and less efficient parishes. On a second level there is considerable Catechiz-
ation; on a third, there is even charity work; on a fourth, all that is topped by 
cultural and community activities; and on the fifth level, the presbitery serves 
local social life. 
Besides secularization and the previously enforced atheism, the present 
situation of parishes and congregations is significantly determined on the one 
hand by a kind of clericalism that is jealous of lay organizations and lacks both 
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timeliness and clearcut ideas, and on the other hand by the passivity of 
Christians adjusting to a ghetto existence and displaying a consumer mentality 
even in religion. There are, however, happy exceptions both is towns and 
villages, places where religion flourished even in the years of repression, where 
fresh ideas made up for underdeveloped infrastructure, where the faithful 
carried their parish forward on their shoulders. 
Movements and small communities 
In Hungary, the number of small communities made up of members of the 
historical churches is between two or three thousand. An exact number is 
difficult to establish for two reasons: 1) they surfaced after an underground 
existence barely a year ago and are still cautious of both the world and the 
church leadership which do not trust them, 2) it is seldom easy to establish 
whether the particular group are catechists with a strong community spirit or 
a genuine small community. 
Half of the small communities belong to four major and half a dozen minor 
spiritual movements; 95 per cent of them are Catholic small communities. Of 
four major movements, two are of Hungarian origin; the others are the 
international Focolare movement and the charismatics. 
Of the Hungarian movements, Regnum Marianum was founded early this 
century as a community of priests joining forces to educate adolescent boys. 
Though its main objective remains the education of youth, it now embraces 
both sexes, from toddlers to adults. Its main values are Christianity, self-
cultivation, the love of nature and national identity. The "Bokor" (Bush) 
movement, founded by the Piarist priest György Bulányi 45 years ago, 
emerged from obscurity in the early 1970s. Its aim is a radical experience of 
the Christ paradigm, its main values are poverty, donation, non-violence and 
an aware faith. Owing to its radicalism, this movement was relegated to the 
sidelines of Hungarian church life. Catholic "Bokor" members (like Jehova's 
Witnesses and Nazarenes) refuse to do military service. In their struggle, they 
clashed not only with the Communist state but also with the church leadership 
that collaborated with it. The other point at issue was their criticism of the 
rigid Catholic hierarchy. 
These four movements cover 100-200 communities each. Another half 
dozen movements, including the "Bárka" (Ark), "Hit és fény" (Faith and 
Light), the Neocathecumenic and Taizé groups, account for another 5-10 
communities each. A majority of the other half of small communities are parish 
communities; a minority of them are independent of movements or parishes. 
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These small communities are an elite within their denomination. There are, 
however, still some hurdles in the way of their recognition and integration, SL 
problem for all of them and not only for the "Bokor" movement. The lives 
and values of small community members are markedly more Christian, their 
faith deeper than those of regular churchgoers outside these communities, or 
even of church school pupils. In the birth of these groups, the following factors 
must be considered (in varying proportions for each movement and commu-
nity): 1) the growing influence of laymen, 2) a demand for personal involvement 
and community life, 3) political repression which forced them to go under-
ground, 4) deeper religiousness, 5) the challenge of small churches. 
One in every three or four Catholic small communities has one or two 
Protestant members. Thus, these small communities are also bases of a 
practical "grassroots" ecumenism in which the Taizé movement's influence has 
played a major role. In the early 1970s, young members of these small 
communities organized the first, at the time quasi-illegal, meeting in the spirit 
of evangelization. (The "spiritual power plant" at Nagymaros, mentioned 
already, is their achievement.) Their evangelizing activites joined forces with 
some pop groups and the ensuing amalgam with its emphasis on musical 
communication proved to be very efficient in attracting young people. 
Undoubtedly, the small communities are the elite force of the historical 
churches today: they intend to provide a warm hearth for those outside, a 
reliable haven in which people will not be disappointed, where individuals are 
not cogs in a social machine, but vessels of irreplacable value. 
Towards a new Christian course or a Gaudiopolis? 
"A new era is backoning to Hungary's Christianity. We have survived forty 
years of persecution! Bruised and diminished in numbers, we are considering 
our options. While cleaning away the debris, we are simultaneously taking care 
of valuable building material and avoiding hidden minefields. Many problems 
must be solved. On the one hand, we feel the increased need for Christianity, 
and are part of the religious renewal. On the other hand, we are painfully 
aware of our smallness, our limits, our helplessness. We are glad to say that, 
since the 1970s, it has been possible to give evidence of the renewal in figures. 
Yet we are awed by the multiplicity of options, but we have just no idea about 
how to use them." So wrote the sociologist Miklós Tomka, in early 1990. One 
of the hidden mines is a national church triumphant, maintaining close ties with 
those in power. The memory of the Christian course between the two world 
wars is still attractive to many Christians. It is there in the thinking of all those 
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bishops, chaplains, the ordinary faithful, whose ideas are not adjusted to the 
present. Albeit to a smaller extent than among non-religious citizens, an identity 
crisis can be felt even by Christians of dual citizenship. Against that, "Christian 
politics" is used as a panacea by many people. They vote for Christian parties, 
urge the introduction of obligatory or a least optional religious studies in schools, 
and consider themselves, though a small minority, as the majority. Those 
Hungarian Christians unsure of their identity also tend to use adjectives (most 
often 'Christian', of course) instead of ideas, and to speak of the devil (identifying 
him as the liberals). Though there is clearly a possibility that the ideology of the 
Horthy era may rise from the dead, several factors work against such a rebirth: 1) 
the unpleasant memory ofthat rightist, reactionary, ultra-conservative period, 2) 
those forty years which, beside the losses, were also responsible for the emergence 
of a new kind of solidarity, the sense of community of a minority that shared its 
thinking, and readiness for dialogue, 3) the spirit of the Second Vatican Council, 4) 
the Jesus paradigm itself, in which, according to St Paul, there are no more Jews 
or Greeks, slaves or free citizens, men or women, can be continued in today's 
Hungary by saying that there are no longer religious or non-religious people, 
former communists or formerly persecuted, government supporters, Christian 
democrats or liberal democrats, Catholics and Protestants. That is, we have them 
all. We have them as valuable differencies, complements of each other. And thus 
there is a chance for a Gaudiopolis based upon the spiritual power plants, a 
secular merger of the two states. 
Nevertheless, the road to Gaudiopolis is rocky, with a number of hurdles 
to be cleared away. Much has to be done. 1) Religious people should posses a 
better psychophysical condition, consciousness and identity together with the gift 
of forgiveness. 2) There is a need for a more up-to-date, dialogue-oriented 
theology presenting an image of man as well. 3) Rigidly hierarchical, obsolete 
church institutions must be democratized, 4) Small communities must be 
supported, promoted supplied with things to do and means withal, 5) Lay 
helpers must be found to assist the abandoned and exhausted priests. 6) The 
guarding of tradition must be balanced by modernization. 7) Hungary should 
be made a missionary target, though evangelization must be dialogue-oriented 
and a service rather than a constraint. 8) Spontaneous and politically, illegal 
or quasi-legal initiatives must be institualized with a simultaneous socialization 
of institutions that have obtained monopoly status and work in inefficient, 
antidemocratic ways. 9) Social platforms must be used. 10) Cooperation must 
be established between denominations, especially between Christians and Jews, 
and between the two rivals for the past four hundred years, the Roman 
Catholic and Calvinist churches. 11) Churches must participate in education 
and socialization by presenting something valuable and different. 
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Keeping tradition alive and working for radical reform are equally important. 
Adapting ourselves to something new is not enough in itself since, as a 
sociologist put it, "The devil's hoof of a self-repetition peeps out from under 
the cloak of change". It would be wonderful to believe that Hungarian 
Christians, doomed to sudden liberty, will find a way that combines sticking to 
the score and improvising skills. 
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RELIGIONS, CHURCHES IN MODERN HUNGARY 
AND METEM RESEARCH 
TIBOR HORVÁTH S. J. 
Regis College, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada 
Crises in identity are a common phenomenon in the life of individuals, 
societies, institutions and churches of our days. For the Roman Catholic 
Church the Second Vatican Council had the task of offering guidelines on how 
the church should see itself in the modern world. And similar efforts can be 
detected in religions and churches everywhere. For obvious reasons in Hun-
gary all this was and is still moving very slowly. Churches and religions are 
just starting to take account of themselves, to find their identity by rediscover-
ing their history, and to catch up with the rapidly changing world around 
them. 
For this reason we all should welcome the present symposium organized by 
the Hungarian Studies Program of Indiana University. It gives us an oppor-
tunity to reflect, and take account of what are the functions of the churches 
and religions in our modern age. I commend this initiative because an analysis 
of the impact linguistics makes on religion and religion on linguistics is long 
overdue. For example, studies on the Finnish Language and its impact on 
Finnish Lutheranism, the Hungarian Language on Hungarian Roman Ca-
tholicism and Hungarian Judaism, the Uzbek Language on Uzbek Islam, etc., 
and conversely, could be the topic of a challenging Uralic and Altaic Studies 
Conference to be held in Bloomington or in Budapest. But I commend this 
initiative especially because it highlights the objective of METEM research, 
making the Hungarian Church self-conscious in the light of its history. The 
research began in 1985 and now it is part of the churches and religions in 
modern Hungary. 
METEM is an acronym for the Hungarian name Magyar isgyházíörténeti 
.Enciklopédia A/unkakÖzössége, "Society for an Encyclopedia of Hungarian 
Church History." Its objective is to prepare and publish an Encyclopedia of 
Church History in Hungary, which would list in alphabetical order places, 
persons, councils, documents, monuments, and writings relevant to the one 
thousand year history of religious faith in Hungary. It is expected that the 
project will give perspective and purpose to the manifold ongoing research, 
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facilitate the retrieval of the results of past investigations, and point to various 
areas overlooked thus far (METEM Vázlatok, Essays in Hungarian Church 
History 1989, 1:6-7, 279-324; 3:245-258). 
Membership is open to individuals of all beliefs, cultures, religions, coun-
tries who support the purpose of the Society and who are dedicated to 
maintaining high scholarly standards, and able to make a contribution to the 
realization of METEM objectives. 
Research into the history of parishes has preeminence in the project. They are 
the founding communities of the people of God which in the light of Lumen 
gentium of Vatican II (13-16) include not only Catholics but non-Catholics, 
Jews, Muslims, theists, and atheists who "moved by grace, strive by their deeds 
to do His will as it is known to them through the dictates of conscience" (no. 16). 
Such a history of parishes is something new; it needs, therefore, a preliminary 
reflection, a search for methods in the light of modern historiography. 
For the preparation of this project a periodical entitled Vázlatok, Essays in 
Church History in Hungary was launched in 1989 for the discussion and critical 
assessment of studies in preparation for their final incorporation in an 
encyclopedia. The aim of the periodical is to provide a forum for experts to 
discuss and express their views on the various topics. By doing this it is 
expected that articles, prior to their incorporation in the encyclopedia, will be 
scholarly and of high academic standards. Manuscripts are welcome in 
Hungarian, English, French, German, Spanish, Rumanian, Croatian, Slovak 
and other Slavic languages. They must be scholarly, well-documented, self-
critical and attentive to the hermeneutical influence of one's own tradition. 
Each essay is followed by an English resume. 
Essays are published under 20 main headings, which concretely illustrate 
what we understand under church and religion. 
Here are the 20 headings: 
1. Parishes, local communities 
2. Persons 
3. Buildings 
4. Prayers 
5. Worship and Liturgy 
6. Organizations, social structure 
7. Associations, religious orders, etc. 
8. Spirituality 
9. Persecutions 
10. Activites: 
1. Pastoral 
2. Teaching 
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3. Political and diplomatic 
4. Scientific 
5. Charities 
6. Economic 
7. Artistic creations, painting, works of art 
8. Music 
9. Entertainment 
10. Literature, poetry 
All these entities and activites mal^e up a church. To study a church is to 
study at least all these things. Looking at the program of our symposium we 
can see that a great number of the presentations is focused on the political and 
diplomatic activites of the churches, and other topics are not mentioned at all. 
In the remaining part of my presentation I would like to mention some 
examples symptomatic of the modern age in religions and churches in 
Hungary. Being a Roman Catholic I am more familiar with the movements in 
my own church. Thus the examples I present are taken from the Roman 
Catholic Church. Yet the tendencies and initiatives mentioned here, in various 
degrees, were and are active in all the religions and churches in Hungary. I 
limit myself to three movements with examples taken from the times between 
the two world wars, when modern initiatives started to take shape in Hungary. 
L Local communities 
In modern Hungary as in the modern world in general there is a greater 
emphasis on smaller geographic units, on basic communities, the local par­
ishes. It might be true that the parish is just a part of greater units like the 
diocese or the global church, yet it is also true that the parish is the visible 
image, the symbol of any larger units, the global church included. It is the 
realization, the Verwirklichung as one of the great theologians of this century, 
Karl Rahner, said: "Die Pfarrei ist die primäre Verwirklichung der Kirche als 
Ereignis" "Plébánia az Egyháznak mint eseménynek elsődleges megvalósu­
lása" (K. Rahner, 1956, 34). The history of the churches is really not so much 
the history of kings and bishops, and of their political intrigues, as the history 
of the people, the history of the common people, an idea that "plébánia," the 
Hungarian name for parish, expresses so well. 
The German word "Pfarrei" comes from the old Gothic word parra which 
means a "umgrenzter Bezirk," a fenced off region with its head, the "Pfarrer," 
the "Pfarr-Herr," the lord of the parish territory (Melzer, 1965, 214). The 
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English "Parish", like the Latin "parochia" and the Greek paroikia, means 
neighborhood, or more exactly, a place (oikia), where people live side by side 
"ahol nép egymás mellett (para) él." Whereas, the Hungarian "plébánia," 
"plébános" comes from the Latin word plebs, plebeius, which means people, 
common people, "közönséges nép," everyone, the "plebs." The parish priest, 
the "plébános," therefore, is not a "Herr," but a man of the people, an idea 
which is very close to the Second Vatican Council's concept of the church, the 
people of God, to which, every human being, in various degrees, is related, and 
belongs (Lumen Gentium, 13-16). 
It is in the parish where one can see, not in theory or in the abstract but in 
reality, what a church as a people of God is. The parish is the church incarnate, 
embodied in a specific time and place with its eucharistic celebration, the 
foundation and center of the parish (Riepe, 1967, 1018). 
Such a conception of the Church had motivated the Kalot (Katolikus Agrár 
Legények Országos Tanácsa), the Council of Catholic Agrarian Young Men. The 
Jesuit Jenő Kerkai founded it in 1935 and within 10 years it had about half a 
million members. The aim was to save the agrarian youth of the Hungarian 
countryside. "Műveltebb falut!" a "More Educated Rural Country" was one of its 
guiding principles which mobilized Hungary's most numerous social class, living 
without hope in a self-defeating lethargy. They were simple people. Thus they were 
the appropriate symbol of a Church which dared to boast of the title "the people" 
of God. Reflecting on them the Hungarian church could begin to discover itself as 
the people of God, with the vocation of becoming a more Christian, human, and 
vigorous people. Since neither was the concern of the communist ideology, the 
beginning of the communist regime had to be the end of Kalot. 
2. Economy 
METEM has listed economic function with economic responsibility as one 
of the ten functions of the churches. And I propose this as the second example 
of the symptoms of the modern age in religions and churches. 
Economics is concerned not only with distribution and consumption of 
goods but with production of goods and creating jobs. Labor is one of the 
most important economic factors. A study of the history of the Church is not 
complete unless it pays attention to the Church's economic functions, its 
production and distribution of goods, its job creating function and so on. Not 
withstanding its supernatural vocation the church can be considered as one of 
the most significant and lasting economic institutions of the world. Through 
centuries it has invested its accumulated wealth in constructions, building 
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churches, cathedrals, schools, hospitals, rectories with decorations and special 
furnishings. It has promoted artefacts and artistic creations. Especially 
through its religious orders it has cultivated land and taught people to work 
and produce food. In doing this the church produced goods and created 
opportunities for work. And as a result it shared both the benefits and the 
problems of any economic enterprise with its inherent temptations, failures and 
injustices yet without giving up its will to correct faults by means of trial and 
error. The economic concerns expressed in the Vatican II document, entitled 
Gaudium et Spes, suggest a self-corrective "economic system" of this kind, 
practiced throughout two millennia. 
Whereas in its Dogmatic Constitution, Lumen Gentium, the Church reflec-
ted on itself, its identity, and its function, in its Pastoral Constitution, Gaudium 
et Spes, Chapter 3, Part 2 the church addressed the economy, and now we can 
ask whether the church follows in its own economy the guiding principles laid 
down in its own document. 
Reading the document one has the impression that the economy practiced 
by the Church is characterized by a concern aiming at equilibrium and equity 
among the people in the world and, specially more recently, at involving as 
many people as possible in the decision-making process in financial matters. 
The difficulty and intriguing problem for the Church is how to give 
unconditional priority to the Church's spiritual vision and mission in a world 
where profit is a fundamental prerequisite for any institution that plans to 
function for more than a year or two. The difficulty of such a problem, however, 
may be just the incentive for an inventive mind. The challenge of great polarities 
is one of the resources that in economics is called the entrepreneurial spirit. 
Reassured by faith in the providence of God there are some real entrepreneurs 
in the Church. Ferenc Bíró in 1921 gathered a group of Hungarian women for 
bringing the Church into the world of economics. And he called them simply 
"Népleányok", the Daughters of the People, the People of God. Though the 
name was later changed to Society of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, the mission 
remains unchanged: an effort to give unconditional priority to the Church's 
spiritual vision and mission and compete, at the same time, with a world of 
economics where profit seems to be the only rule for survival (Bíró, 1920,1935, 
1943). 
3. Alienation 
In addition to the two rather positive symptoms of the modern age I would 
like to mention one more symptom, a negative one: alienation, alienation from 
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oneself and alienation from everyone else. One of the modern age's most 
ostentatious displays of alienation was Marxist-Stalinist communism. Its 
dazzling effect was the alienation of parents from their children, and children 
from their parents, wives from their husbands and husbands from their wives, 
friends from their friends. 
There are some who believe that the damage the communist dictatorship 
inflicted on the Hungarian people and particularly on the Hungarian church 
was heavier than the damage done by the previous three national disasters, The 
Devastation of the Tartars, "Tatárjárás", Turkish Menace, "Török vesze­
delem," and the Austrian Oppression, "Osztrák elnyomás." The Communist 
dictatorship, "a kommunista egyeduralom" is a strong fourth contender. It 
was communism which systematically tried to bury all the churches forcing 
them to march on the road to Calvary. The life of Cardinal Mindszenty is the 
best documented symbol of that. 
Coming back from the road to Calvary the revenge cannot be the church's 
answer. Religions and churches have to forgive. But forgiving is not forgetting. 
Forgetting might be dangerous because it may enhance the possibility of 
repeating the past and failing the future. História est mater studiorum. And this 
should be METEM's modest contribution to the post-Calvary life of the 
Hungarian religions and churches: placing great tragedies within the panora­
ma of a remarkable past and offering hope for a better future guaranteed by 
an impressive past. 
Hungarian religions and Hungarian churches share a common past. And this 
past includes also the pre-Christian Hungarian religion that in the light of Vatican 
II can be considered also as a vehicle of grace. The life of a nation and the life of its 
religions and churches are one, because no religion or church can exist without 
people and no people can live without hope, without ideals and convictions 
transcending the "here and now" of a material world. The road to Calvary was a 
common journey for the church as well as for the people of Hungary. We hope and 
pray that the road to recovery will be also a common journey for both the 
Hungarian people and the religions and churches in a modern Hungary. 
References 
Bíró, X. F. 1920. A Magyar Nemzeti Ipar és Kereskedelem. Budapest: Hornyánszky Viktor 
Könyvnyomda. 
- . 1935, A Kereskedelem és Üzletvilág Reformja. Budapest: Korda. 
- . 1943. Jézus Szíve Országa Szövetségében Létező Jézus Szíve Népleányai Társasága Alkotmánya, 
Szabályai. Budapest: Korda. 
RELIGIONS, CHURCHES IN MODERN HUNGARY 137 
Galbraith, J. K. 1987. Economics in Perspective. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Hetényi Varga, K. 1922. Papi sorsok a Horogkereszt és a Vörös Csillag árnyékában. I. Abaliget: 
Lámpás Kiadó. 
Meizler, F. 1965. Das Wort in den Wörtern. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr. 
Rahner, K. 1956. "Zur Theologie der Pfarre." H. Rahner, Die Pfarre, Von der Theologie zur 
Praxis. Freiburg: Lambertus Verlag, 27-39. 
Riepe, C. 1967. "Parish." New Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: McGraw-Hill, vol. 10, 
1017-1019. 
Vázlatok, Essays in Church History in Hungary. 1989-. Szeged, Dugonics tér 12. H-6720 Hungary. 

POST-COMMUNIST DILEMMAS 
OF HUNGARIAN CHURCHES 
IVAN VARGA 
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The independence of the churches achieved after the collapse of the 
communist system brought about the possibility of the assumption of their just 
place in society. The unshackling of the churches, and their freeing from 
superimposed state control, however, was not, and still is not, a smooth 
process. Both the churches and the state have to accommodate themselves to 
the changed conditions and have to learn to function in a society which wants 
to become a modern, pluralistic, democratic one, but which still carries the 
burden of its recent and remote past. 
Neither the institutions of the state nor the churches themselves function 
under the conditions of modern democracies. 
This is a sweeping statement which requires clarification and qualification. 
The historical development of Hungary, its late and incomplete arrival to 
capitalism and modern democracy, the trauma suffered by the Trianon peace 
treaties and the subsequent loss of two-thirds of the country's territory, the 
aborted bourgeois transformation, the archconservative regime of Regent 
Horthy, the totalitarian communist system's forty-odd year long rule did not 
allow the emergence of democratic state institutions. Nor did it foster the 
development of a strong civil society or civic consciousness. The members of 
the state did not become citizens, but by and large remained subjects. 
When the social earthquake - the collapse of communism - did happen, 
neither society as a whole, nor the churches were prepared to assume their 
functions in new ways, under the given conditions, to accomplish rapidly the 
requirements of modernity. This statement does not seek to lay the blame on 
either party, although both the state and the churches could have done more, 
and more rapidly, to avail themselves of the opportunities opened up by the 
post-communist society. 
In principle, the churches have a most favourable situation to revitalise 
themselves and their functions. Obviously, they suffered under communism, 
their institutions having been largely destroyed, their scope of activity severely 
restrained. Already in the last phase of communist rule, the reform-commu-
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nists acknowledged that there cannot be a free society without freedom of 
conscience and that churches do have a place in the spiritual and cultural life 
of the society. The majority of citizens agreed with this, although only a 
minority amongst them approved of the political role of the churches. 
There were no parties in the newly elected Parliament which would air 
antireligious or anticlericalist views. Indeed even the Hungarian Socialist Party 
has a Christian faction. Moreover, the parties of the governing coalition ever 
more frequently made references to the Christian traditions of the country 
(occasionally even with exclusionist overtones). Influential politicians often 
mention the Christian-national values as the beacons which ought to guide the 
nation and permeate its culture. 
And still, in practice, the great revival of the churches did not follow. They 
still struggle to rebuild themselves and search for their place in the web of 
contemporary Hungarian society. 
The reasons for this are complex and manifold. Obviously the persecution 
of churches under communism did not, could not, remain without lasting 
consequences. The leaders of the large Christian churches (cardinals Mind-
szenty and Grősz, bishops Ravasz and Ordass) were coerced out of their 
positions, sentenced on constructed charges and spent long years in jail.1 The 
smaller Christian communities, with a few exceptions, were outlawed and 
persecuted. In sum, one can say the churches were decapitated and placed 
under state control. This was accomplished by among others, forcing on the 
churches leaders who were ready to collaborate with the state. 
It would be easy to blame the collaborating church leaders for cowardice 
and unnecessary compromise, but it would also be somewhat unfair. Often one 
hears voices which compare the behaviour of Hungarian church leaders to that 
of Polish ones. True, there were occasions when, even with the benefit of 
hindsight, one could reproach certain church dignitaries for making needless 
compromises (e.g. the Catholic church's acquiescent stand on conscientious 
objectors or their complicity with the state in the case of small church 
communities - the case of Father Bulányi). None the less, the specificities of 
the Hungarian situation should make such hesitations and compromises easier 
to understand. What, however, was harmful for the churches, was some of 
their leaders' involvement in the party-state's political actions or even accept­
ance of political positions (e.g. Ernő Mihályfi, János Péter, Albert Bereczky). 
This was especially harmful when it was rationalised by theological consider­
ations, e.g. the theology of the diakone advocated by bishop Zoltán Káldy of 
the Lutheran Church. Also, the involvement of parts of the clergy in the state 
sponsored "peace priests" movement or some bishops' participation in the 
state sponsored "Peace Council" reduced the authority of the church and gave 
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rise to voices that wanted to take to task those who were members of this 
movement or otherwise compromised themselves with the communist authori-
ties. 
Whatever the case, the churches did not emerge unscathed from the 
communist era. The post-communist churches had to renew their activities 
under conditions where their members were divided in judging the correctness 
of the leadership's past behaviour. 
The social structure of the country, with the concomitant institutional and 
cultural changes, has been altered irrevocably. It is not an exaggeration to 
claim that the arrival of the post-communist era found a deeply different 
Hungary from the one of 1945 or even 1948. The class structure, the 
occupational structure, the level of industrialisation and urbanisation, of 
scholarisation, the type of culture-including the culture of everyday life—have 
been irreversibly changed. 
True, all these processes were carried out under communist rule and in 
correspondence with the communist ideal of a future, "perfect" society. The 
result was that no real modernisation took place and despite urbanisation and 
industrialisation, the ingrained habits, behavioral patterns and cultural norms 
of the past remained firmly entrenched. 
Nevertheless, a measurable secularisation process alsp took place, which 
changed the scope and type of religiosity. Part of the secularisation process was 
enforced: the restrictions placed on religious instruction, the abolition of 
religious instruction in the public schools (and after the nationalisation of 
ecclesiastic schools in 1948 there remained only a handful of church-run 
schools in Hungary2), and the officially endorsed anti-religious attitude in 
public life resulted in an observable diminishment of religious activity. 
Whether this was a genuine abandonment of religious belief and practices or 
simply a survival tactic is subject to discussion. One cannot exclude the 
possibility that there emerged a "bedroom religiosity", that is a survival of 
religious beliefs and some practice (e.g. prayer) which, however, did not find 
public expression. 
But the other possibility, namely that a real secularisation took place, is 
substantiated by sociological research. Miklós Tomka in his book Magyar 
katolicizmus 1991 (Hungarian Catholicism 1991) publishes some revealing data 
which indicate a rather large-scale secularisation.3 He mentions, for example, 
that on any given Sunday only about 8-10% of Catholics participate in the 
holy mass (p. 16). 
In many respects the decline in religiosity is quite understandable. In spite 
of the aforementioned distortions and inadequacies of the modernisation 
process, the massive urbanisation loosened the rather strict social control 
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mechanisms which existed in rural areas or small towns. This, coupled with the 
officially sponsored secular culture, contributed to the slackening of religious 
beliefs and practices. 
At least two more features of Soviet type societies ought to be mentioned 
here. The first is the enforced and artificial community-building. The authori-
ties realised that spontaneously formed communities endanger the working of 
the system because these would not lend themselves to strict party-state 
control. While religious communities did exist, they were marginal and/or 
illegal. The communist sponsored quasi-communities were for the most part 
substitutions and often attended because of the lack of any other solution. The 
second is that for a long time the churches were the only tolerated seats of civil 
society - if we understand civil society as that sphere of human life and activity 
where people come together spontaneously and pursue their own interests 
(material or spiritual) - without state intervention. 
However, as far as the second feature is concerned, the gradual reforms 
introduced by the party-state from the late seventies on - and especially in the 
eighties allowed the individual to pursue his economic interests in a much less 
restricted way. This expanded the sphere of civil society but also carried negative 
consequences for society and the individual. People engaged in the so-called 
"second economy" exploited themselves by working double shifts, giving up their 
annual vacations and this resulted in a dramatic increase in heart disease, deaths 
caused by cardio-vascular disease, suicide and alcoholism. It is understandable 
that this life-style did not leave (much) time to be engaged in church activities or 
satisfy spiritual needs. Paradoxically, communism, which espoused a collectivist 
ideology, opened up the way to a rampant individualism and materialism.4 
Broadly speaking, this was the condition in which the churches found 
themselves at the beginning of the system-change. Already before the declared 
collapse of the Soviet type systems, in the period of the latent, and later not 
so latent, decomposition of the communist regime, they ceased to function as 
the sole field of civil society, even in the political sphere. The emerging 
oppositional movements and their growth in the late 1980s made it possible, 
for those who wished and dared to engage themselves in political activity, to 
find organisational forms for their activity. Meanwhile the largest Catholic 
"oppositional" movement refrained from direct political engagement and 
aimed rather at a spiritual renascence. 
In different periods the individual churches had been allowed different 
access to international communication (attendance of the meetings of the 
World Council of Churches, communication with the Vatican, etc.). These 
were under strict state control exercised through the State Office for Church 
Affairs. (The existence, and especially the mode of functioning of this Office 
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was, strictly speaking, unconstitutional because the communist constitution of 
the country declared the separation of church and state.) The Roman Catholic 
church was in a particularly difficult situation because the Kádár regime 
preferred to ignore the Hungarian hierarchy and conducted direct negotiations 
with the Vatican in trying to solve the Mindszenty problem. And in many 
instances the treatment of the Hungarian church depended on the progress of 
those negotiations.5 
As a result of the restrictions placed on international contacts the Catholic 
church had few chances to adapt itself to the spirit and resolutions of the 
second Vatican council. As Tamás Nyíri, the renowned professor of the 
Catholic Theological Academy stated, the Catholic churches in the region, i.e. 
the Hungarian, the Croatian, the Slovak, the Czech, and the Polish, lagged 
40-45 years behind the development of the Western churches.6 The aggior-
namento (adaptation to the modern and rapidly changing world) propounded 
by Pope John XXIII is, of course, a controversial project. On the one hand, it 
was necessary to draw the church nearer to the realities of the contemporary 
world and thus enable the Catholic church to carry out its mission under 
radically changed conditions. Vatican II introduced a certain degree of 
democracy in the working of the hierarchy, gave greater power of decision to 
the national bishops' conferences, opened up the way to the greater involve-
ment of laypeople in the work of the church and introduced important 
theological changes. Also, the second Vatican council introduced a more 
ecumenical attitude towards other Christian churches, a greater understanding 
with Jews, with non-Christian believers, and even with humanist non-believers. 
On the other hand, the project of aggiornamento made the church more 
enmeshed in the social, political and economic problems of the contemporary 
world. (This inevitably forces the church to take stands on social and economic 
problems. Thus, even if its position is largely couched in moral considerations, 
it has to voice its position in temporary, this-worldly matters.) 
True, in the modern world, since 1891 when Pope Leo XIII issued his 
encyclical Rerum Novarum, the church has issued papal statements concerning 
the theological and moral assessment of the institutions of market-based 
capitalist society. Especially Pope John Paul II in his social encyclicals: 
Laborem Exercens, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis and Centesimus Annus criticised 
unfettered liberal capitalism and emphasised the need for developing "an 
ethically guided, mixed economy, solidary welfare capitalism - a capitalism 
with a human face."7 The challenge, and the dilemma, of the Hungarian 
Catholic church is how to adapt these teachings to the practice of present-day 
Hungary, where the emerging capitalism gives rise to extreme individualism 
and, leads to the economic polarisation of society. 
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So far the Hungarian churches have not addressed this problem. They are 
mainly preoccupied with their own reconstruction, with the resumption of their 
normal pastoral, caritative and educational activities, as well as with the 
reconstruction of their institutions: schools, monasteries, hospitals, and old 
people's homes. There is, understandably, an inward looking tendency in the 
present activities of the churches. After more than four decades of communist 
rule the "housecleaning" and "housekeeping'* tasks took priority. 
The past situation of the churches makes these tasks rather difficult. While 
the government emphasises historical continuity and wishes to bracket out a 
half century-long history of trying to (re)build institutions in a way that would 
(re)establish them on past patterns, the churches cannot follow that road. The 
renewal of the churches rests upon their ability to overcome the crippling 
effects of the decades of oppression; they have to overcome the discord, the 
lack of understanding, mistrust, insinuations, etc., and build a consensus 
within themselves. There are encouraging signs that this is slowly happening. 
Nevertheless the churches still have to accomplish reconciliation, as well as a 
critical confrontation with their past. A crucial question is whether, without 
changes in the church leadership, this could be accomplished. Short of this, the 
churches cannot gain widespread credibility and face up to modernity.8 
Modernity, among many other things, means pluralism. Pluralism is often 
viewed in a superficial way as political pluralism alone, i.e. the presence of 
several political parties that vie for power and compete with their political 
programmes. However, pluralism in modernity also means the competition of 
world-views. Moreover, in post-modernity it is generally acknowledged that 
there is no more possibility for a discourse considered universally valid. There 
is no validity attributed to a world-view which claims to explain the substance 
and all substantive phenomena of nature, society and human beings. In 
modern times it was religion and Marxism which claimed this universality. 
Religion's greatest adversary, Marxism, has suffered a setback, not only 
because of the collapse of the Soviet type systems but rather because of its 
failure to prove the validity of its universal discourse. Religion, however, still 
maintains its claim to universal validity, to the representation of a transcendent 
truth. 
The dilemma is how to make plausible this claim under the condition of 
pluralism as interpreted above, i.e. pluralism in culture and world-views. 
"Pluralism [...] impinges on human consciousness, on what takes place within 
our minds. [...] Cultural plurality is experienced by the individual, not just as 
something external [...] but as an internal reality, a set of options present in 
his mind."9 In that sense, pluralism means for the individual a permanent 
uncertainty insofar as he or she has constantly to face and make choices, the 
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consequences of which are unknown or at least uncertain. Nevertheless, this 
feature of modern society is deeply entrenched and is also expressed by the 
institutional separation of different spheres of life (economy, politics, religion, 
etc.) whereby each of these spheres operates under different rules, which the 
individual has to learn in order to function successfully. 
Under these conditions the churches have to compete with other world-
views and have to make plausible their own ideas. The dilemma which emerges 
from this situation is that on the one hand religion claims to represent eternal 
truths, but on the other hand the church as a community of believers has to 
make these acceptable and obvious for the believers. The question is, among 
others, whether the churches are capable of reaching large segments of the 
population with ideas and methods that are not obviously attractive, especially 
for the young. (I am not thinking of superficial techniques like the introduction 
of rock music in service.) 
Peter Berger, in his book, A Far Glory,10 mentions the following survival 
strategies for the church under the conditions of pluralism: "cognitive bargain-
ing", "cognitive surrender" and "cognitive retrenchment" - the latter in a 
defensive or offensive form. In other words, religion, as interpreted by the 
different churches, in order to maintain its plausibility and dynamism ought to 
develop a discourse and a strategy that would allow it to compete successfully 
with other world views. A "cognitive surrender", however, would mean for the 
church to accommodate itself to the prevailing secular discourses. It seems to 
me that the Christian churches in Hungary in the present phase of the 
country's and their own development are closest to the defensive "cognitive 
retrenchment" mixed with a dose of "cognitive surrender". 
The reason for this is that, in my view, the churches in their theology and 
pastoral methods experience serious difficulties in adapting to the actual social 
and cultural conditions in Hungary. In spite of the favourable political 
conditions (the government's definitely positive attitude toward the churches 
has been manifested in legislating the return of nationalised church property, 
the already mentioned inclination of the governing coalition toward Christian-
ity as the leading value system, etc.) the churches have to present themselves 
in a credible way as institutions capable of winning over the minds and souls 
of people, especially of the young. 
A rather symptomatic indication of the Hungarian churches' reluctance, or 
inability, to adapt themselves to even an ecclesiastic pluralism is their overt or 
covert support of the bill presented to Parliament which would change the 
hitherto existing mode of financing of churches or religious organisations. 
Until now the churches or religious organisations received financial support 
from the state according to the size of their membership. The amendment 
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to restrict state support to churches which have existed for more than 200 years 
or have at least 10,000 registered members. This would reinstate the old 
distinction between "accepted" and "recognised" denominations, thus intro-
ducing a division between "first class" and "second class" churches or 
denominations. The sympathy of the established churches to this proposed 
amendment (the constitutionality of which is questionable) demonstrates their 
rejection of denominational pluralism and competition amongst religious 
organisations, which, however, is a feature of modernity. 
The churches also have to accommodate themselves to the political aspects 
of pluralism. It is true that in Hungary, unlike in Poland, they cannot claim 
exclusivity in defining the morality and behaviour of the whole society.11 
Nevertheless, they face the dilemma, which is shared by the whole of the 
Western world, that they ought to accommodate themselves to a largely 
secularised society, representing their social and moral agenda and yet main-
taining their reference to a reality that is held superior to the transient. 
Thus, the greatest and most encompassing dilemma the churches face in 
present-day Hungary is whether they wish, and are able, to contribute to the 
modernisation of society while still upholding their fundamental doctrines as 
well as their moral authority in a credible, plausible and attractive manner. 
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T is a Woman's whole existence; Man may range 
The Court, Camp, Church, the Vessel, and the Mars; 
Sword, Gown, Gain, Glory, offer in exchange 
Pride, Fame, Ambition, to fill up his heart, 
And few there are whom these can not estrange; 
Men have all these resources, we but one, 
To love again, and be again undone. 
(Lord Byron, Don Juan) 
Feminist criticism 
Most recent Western literary theories, such as structuralism, close reading, 
semiotics, etc. are also well known in Eastern Europe. They were accepted and 
explored at the time when the dominance of the Marxist approach was still 
very strong. The only theory that did not become popular in countries like 
Poland and Hungary was feminist literary theory. The East European societies 
do not have to fight for things, such as employment of women, longer 
maternity leave, or day care. Since 1945, all these changes have been imple-
mented by the state and have had a significant impact on people's mentality. 
Whether this has had a fully positive effect on the position of woman is a moot 
question. It was accepted that a woman might be working outside the home 
for financial reasons; if her work was interesting, or if she was well-educated, 
she gained a certain social position and her family, including her husband, 
were proud of her. In the East European societies, a new kind of mentality has 
developed since the war: a woman's career became as, or more, important than 
the care of the family and children. 
This situation explains, to a certain extent, why neither Hungarian nor 
Polish literature has any explicitly feminist writers. This also explains the lack 
of interest in feminism and feminist fiction as political writing, i.e. as the means 
of changing social reality and people's mentality. Besides, this mentality was 
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changed to such an extent that, due to a very low birth rate in Hungary, the 
state decided to encourage women to bear children and take care of them by 
giving the mothers a three-year-leave for each child and the right to return to 
their job after the period of absence. 
However, since the beginning of the 1990s, feminist theory has been noticed 
in some way in both countries. Courses on the feminist perspective are now 
being given at the university of Budapest by American and English scholars 
(see Sükösd 1992). In Poland, an article about feminists, a kind of ironic 
dictionary of feminist terms was written by a famous Polish critic and 
published in one of the best literary periodicals (see K. Mtrak's article in 
Literatur a 1992). Despite this, there are no books written from the feminist 
perspective, no translations of such books from other languages, no depart-
ments or chairs of Women's Studies and no advertisements encouraging 
women to apply for a job by suggesting that if they have the same qualifica-
tions as the male applicants they will be selected for the job in question.1 
In the West, feminist studies are very advanced and the feminist point of 
view is adopted to historical, sociological and literary research. Some Western 
feminist criticism argues that the whole history of literature has been written 
from a masculine viewpoint and that it has had a very important impact on 
the appreciation of some masculine values. 
Consequently, literary work by women has been considered less interesting 
and marginal.2 This is the reason why feminist criticism tries to focus on 
women's works and, specifically, on women's values. One example of this kind 
of research is Alison Light's book Forever England: Femininity, Literature and 
Conservatism Between the Wars. The author focusses exclusively on women 
novelists and this is the most feminist aspect of her study. In my opinion, her 
book, as well as the greater part of feminist studies, can be considered a 
mixture of sociology of literature and reception-theory, both well-known in 
Eastern Europe. I would like to mention two examples of interest in feminine 
behaviour which do not adopt the feminist perspective. The first is a study by 
Éva Bálint and András Veres (1974), entitled A sikertelenség környezetrajza 
[The Topography of Failure], in which three novels by three male writers have 
been selected from a sociological perspective, documenting the impossibility of 
a happy life in a concrete Hungarian situation. One of them is a novel by Ákos 
Kertész, which depicts the relationship between a young girl, Vali Szombathy, 
and a worker, Ferenc Makra. She is ambitious, unconventional and she knows 
what she wants: to become an artist. He has perhaps enough talent to become 
a sculptor, but he has no artistic ambition and, as a result of his environment 
and the lack of education, he is only interested in a very traditional way of life 
(marriage, children, and a good housewife). When Vali gets pregnant, she 
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decides to have an abortion, despite the fact that she really is in love, and 
loved, and that the young man wants to marry her. She feels, understandably, 
considering the very difficult economic circumstances in Hungary in the 1950s 
that the acceptance of marriage and family life would make her own personal 
development and that of her lover impossible. The critics were very negative 
about such an outcome and accused the writer of lacking the ability to create 
a positive and hopeful end to the story. They also found Vali, as a character, 
to be unconvincing, exaggerated, monstrous and very problematic from the 
ideological point of view. Of course, this study, published in the 1970s, was 
influenced by Lukács' theory. I mention this example, because of the system 
of values which I will analyze later in my article. It is also interesting because 
it shows an unusual picture of a woman drawn by a male author. It is also 
interesting to know that the writer shows the unhappiness of the male 
character who has abandoned the young girl after the abortion and has chosen 
a traditional way of life: a marriage with a simple girl. In the end, Ferenc 
Makra commits suicide while, as the text suggests,Vali is happy, leading her 
unconventional life, somewhere outside Hungary, which she has left after the 
Revolution of 1956. 
In this context, the concept of "negative images of women" in male writing 
seems to me a very ambiguous one. Following the stages in the development 
of feminist literary theory enumerated by Julia Kristeva (quoted by Mills 1989: 
4), I would like to argue that it is possible and sensible to discuss negative 
judgments about women and female writers only in male critical writings and 
not in literary texts. 
Another example of interest in the position of Hungarian women was a 
sociological study by Pál Lőcsei (1985) A női munkavállalás és a hagyományos 
magyar család [Female Employment and the Traditional Hungarian Family]. 
From the modern (or feminist) point of view this very serious and interesting 
study is somewhat paternalistic. Considering the fact that an average Hungar­
ian family is economically based on two bread-winners, Lőcsei pleads for the 
possibility of part-time jobs for women working outside the home: 
'What has prevented, and still prevents, the establishment of work places with 4-6 
working hours for women who wished and wish to reconcile the dual tasks assumed by 
them?' (Lőcsei 1985: 90) 
The author is obviously convinced that there are some typically female 
activities, apart from the biologically determined ones, related to the house­
hold and motherhood, which can be done only by women. He cannot imagine 
that the option of a part-time job can be also taken up by men. 
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I would like to suggest that there are two main reasons for the lack of 
interest in feminist criticism in Eastern Europe: a social one and a purely 
theoretical one. Having explained the totally different position of women in 
Eastern Europe and its consequences for people's mentality, I would like to 
focus briefly on the theoretical aspect of feminist criticism. 
An important group of feminist writers examines or criticizes the position 
of women in society, now or in the past. This kind of writing can be seen as 
'documents of the time', and such texts are generally written in a realistic 
prose, which is a fairly direct representation of the real world. This kind of 
writing, feminist or not, was selected, evaluated and interpreted by the method 
called sociology of literature, which was the favourite theory of the Marxists: 
all problems were examined as illustrations of the struggle between people of 
different social classes, but no distinction was made between the situation of 
women and the position of farmers. In fact, feminist criticism, especially 
so-called Marxist-Feminism, is doing the same: it focusses attention on a 
group of human beings who are oppressed, this time because of their gender. 
It is interesting to see that Western feminist critics have a link with Marxism 
or with its point of view. Some feminist critics use Marxist terminology. For 
example, A. Light argues that even that feminism which allied itself with a 
socialist tradition seemed to have little to say about a sense of class difference 
in women's lives. The term 'consciousness-raising' in a feminist context3 
reminds one of the term 'class consciousness' that was to be developed by the 
communist party. This kind of Marxist sociolect would be very irritating in the 
East European countries, especially after the change in 1989, when Marxist 
ideology became rejected. The problem is that feminism is closely connected 
with the socialist tradition, the Women's Movement, politics and, as such, 
seems to be more of an ideology than a scientific method (see Mills 1989: 3-4, 
186-225). 
However, one ideological task of feminist criticism that certainly makes 
sense is the revision of literary history. It is a feminist point of view that makes 
it clear to me that, according to one of feminism's arguments, Hungarian 
literary history needs some supplementing and should perhaps be rewritten. 
The absence of woman writers in Hungarian history of literature is obvious 
and, in some way, suspect, but the general opinion is that this fact is due to 
the low aesthetic level of their novels and poetry. It does not seem important 
to know who these female writers are and what kind of books they have 
written. For Hungarian literary history, the first step should be a registration 
of woman writers in the form of an annotated bibliography, which can be 
followed later by an analysis of the characteristics of Hungarian women's 
writing. The Hungarian female literary tradition, as far as it is known, is so 
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important that it can be argued that male authors such as, for example, 
Zsigmond Móricz and László Németh, were influenced by it.4 The problem is 
that most of the books written by women that are not considered part of the 
Hungarian literary canon are unavailable. However, book publishing in 
Hungary is now more free and, consequently, there are some re-publications of 
the female writers who were very popular before the second world war.5 As 
long as the criterion of gender is considered to be scientifically irrelevant, there 
is no hope for a change. It is significant that, at the moment, only Hungarian 
scholars living in the West pay attention to feminist criticism and female 
writers. One example of this interest is the 10th number of Arkánum (Decem-
ber 1992), a literary periodical edited by Hungarian (male) scholars and writers 
living in the USA and Canada, which published Hungarian translation 
excerpts from the works of Luce Irigaray (1992) and Constance Penley (1992). 
This is also the first attempt to appropriate the terms of feminist criticism into 
the Hungarian language.0 
The second theoretical problem with feminist criticism is its inability to 
characterise women's writing: neither the poetical approach, nor the thematic 
point of view is able to define it. There are some attempts and statements, such 
as 'the symbolism of fluidity and female sexuality' in confrontation with 'the 
phallogocentrism of Western philosophical writings' (quoted by Mills 1989: 7), 
or the conviction that 'a link between fiction and life can be considered as the 
essence of feminist thought' (quoted by Mills 1989: 171). At the same time, 
there are those who argue that a text must be seen 'as discursive construct 
rather than reflections of an individual authors's experience' (quoted by Mills 
1989: 8). But the fact that there is no agreed opinion amongst feminist critics 
can also be seen as a challenge to analysis of the male and female writing from 
this point of view. 
The reconstruction of values 
The analysis I will present here is a reading of Esterházy's novels, influenced 
by feminist theory and executed in semiotic terms. It is not my intention to 
show the positive or negative image of women in Esterházy's fiction, but only 
to show the fine interaction between the female and male characters and the 
system of values that underlines it. 
At any times, every society has a number of values which are connected to 
its norms and rules. By norms I understand the rules which are fixed by law 
(Greimas' domain of competence and performance)', by values I understand a 
much more subjective combination of meanings, ethical beliefs and ideas that 
change in time and are characteristic of a social group. Because they are not 
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defined by law, they can be discerned by empirical sociological research or by 
a survey of (literary) texts. The values belong to the domain of manipulation 
and sanction. 
It is possible to reconstruct the feminist system of values, if we examine 
carefully their publications (Brouwer et al. 1990: 12) and interviews. From a 
feminist point of view, knowledge and technology, as well as some cultural, 
political and economic developments in our society, have had a positive 
impact on the women's lives. They enabled them to realize the following 
values: 
- the opportunity to postpone and choose motherhood, 
- smaller dependency on men, 
- greater control over one's own destiny, 
- engagement in public life. 
The most committed feminists would formulate those values more strongly: 
- independence, 
- total control over one's own destiny, 
- a career. 
It is absolutely clear that these values are also masculine values, and the 
paradoxical situation is that what feminists wanted was to replace masculine 
values by some feminine values. It is significant that some successful women 
declare proudly that they have strength, vision and dominant behaviour while, 
at the same time, admitting that these qualifications are seen in our society as 
masculine (see interview with Madonna, BBC 1992). Another statement from 
the same interview made it clear that intelligent, independent women are not 
interested in marriage and children. 
I would like to illustrate, using the Greimasian model, the system of values 
held by Vali Szombathy, the character from Ákos Kertész novel's: 
Manipulation Competence Performance Sanction 
personal 
development 
a strong will 
and possibility 
to do that 
abortion independence; 
impossibility to 
realize'one aspect 
of femininity: 
motherhood 
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The more extreme form of behavior was manifested by Renate Dorrestein, a 
Dutch feminist, who was sterilized when she was twenty-two. According to 
Greimas* semiotic model, her life can be represented as follows: 
Manipulation Competence Performance Sanction 
independence a strong will sterilization successful career; 
and possibility impossibility to 
to do that7 realize one 
aspect 
of femininity: 
motherhood 
The question is whether intelligence, independence and career exclude 
motherhood and a (happy) family life. I would like to show that this 
opposition (independence and career on the one hand and the motherhood and 
the family on the other) is typical of some militant Western feminists and those 
Hungarian writers who elevate family life. However, this fact, is only apparent-
ly paradoxical. 
The idyllic family life in the work of Péter Esterházy 
I am now going to provide a semiotic analysis of the image of family life in 
Esterházy's first novel Termelési-regény [Production-novel]8 (1979) and in 
Hrabal könyve [A book of Hrabal], published in 1990. 
Termelési-regény is a novel about a young writer, Esterházy Péter,9 his wife 
and their two children, and his family (his parents, his brother, his aunts, 
uncles and cousins). The novel has two narrators: an impersonal, third person 
narrator and a very involved one who, like Goethe's chronicle writer, Ecker-
man, whose name he has adopted, writes a kind of a first person chronicle 
about an admired novelist. This impersonation results in an ironically exag-
gerated attention to the young novelist to the detriment of everybody else, 
including his wife. Furthermore, the narration of the whole novel is ironic and 
intertextual, with commonplace and conventional images coherently presented 
with meta-linguistic commentaries. This novel paints a perfect and harmonious 
family life and the image of an 'ideal woman'. 
Esterházy's Hrabal könyve is also about a writer's family, his wife Anna and 
their three children. This novel is to some extent autobiographical. There is 
some tension between the husband and his wife, who is pregnant with her 
fourth child and, this time, sees motherhood as a burden. The novel has a third 
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person narrator, but several times the narration is taken by Anna (apparent 
Direct Speech) who talks about her family in general and about her 
feeling and fascination for the older novelist, Bohumil Hrabal. In this 
novel, which also has a happy-ending, the idyllic atmosphere is mixed 
with some reality. 
The Termelési-regény 
Adopting Greimas' terminology, it can be said that the discursive configur-
ation of family life occupies an important place in some of Esterházy's novels. 
This configuration can be described as: 
the life of a family in its customary way of doing it; the family is a group of people 
that consists of parents and their children, in a large sense aunts, uncles, cousins, and 
grandparents. 
There are, of course, more configurations in the novel such as politics, social 
life, literature etc. A short enumeration of the thematic roles of both actors 
shows the configurations to which they belong: 
The roles of the masculine character, Péter Esterházy: 
politics: a person of aristocratic origin: an Esterházy, a Hungarian 
citizen, a novelist; 
social life'. a person of aristocratic origin, a Catholic, a novelist, a 
footballer; 
literature: a (famous) novelist, a friend of famous writers, a literary 
critic; 
family life: a husband, (to some extent) a lover, a father, a child (of 
his parents), a brother. 
The roles of the feminine character, Mrs Esterházy: 
family life: a wife, (to some extent) a mistress, a housewife, a mother 
In semiotic terms, this distribution of roles means that the female actor is 
connected to the configuration of family life only and that inside it she has 
fewer roles than her husband. 
In some way, Esterházy's text confirms the statements of feminist criticism: 
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Traditionally women's lives have been imagined in relation to men's lives, as the 
daughters, mothers, mistresses, wives of men. They have, in consequence, been imagined 
either in terms of a single role, psychologically important to men (virgin, temptress, 
bitch, goddess) or in terms of their single social and biological function in male society 
(preparing for marriage, or married).' (quoted by Ruthven 1990: 73) 
The author of Feminist Literary Studies, K. K. Ruthven argues that a good 
deal of this would be equally true if the terms were simply reversed: 
'Traditionally men's lives have been imagined in relation to women's lives, as the 
sons, fathers, lovers or husbands of women.' (Ibid.) 
Sadly, he does not mention the most important part of men's images, 
namely their social roles and their career, which mean their attachment to 
other configurations such as, for example, social life. 
Their thematic roles determine the space in which the characters move: it is 
clear that Mrs Esterházy never ventures outside her home, she has no friends 
of her own, we know nothing about her family or her education prior to her 
marriage. This is quite strange considering that the setting of the novel is 
Hungary in the 1970s and that the text relates to political and social reality by, 
for example, ironically using Marxist sociolect. In the 1970s, most Hungarian 
women were working outside the home. In contrast, the only place where Mrs 
Esterházy plays her roles is in her home. Consequently, with one exception, 
her family name is not given: 
'I can, for example, look at a million faces, and yet I hold Gitta Reén the fairest 
one of all.' (Esterházy 1979: 303) 
This is the only time when Gitta's family name is mentioned. It is also 
noticeable that it is the very name of the author's wife. It is significant that 
Mrs Esterházy has several names given to her by the narrators. All these names 
are connected with her husband's point of view:10 the wife of Esterházy, a 
Lady, the marvellous lady Gitti, Frau Gitti, my little Gittus, sweet Gittis etc. 
Most of these names express adoration and love and, as a whole, the text 
expresses the love for a woman who has accepted the traditional distribution of 
tasks within the family and has undertaken to do the cleaning, the cooking, 
the sewing, the caring for the children, and the entertaining. The distribution 
of roles between the female and masculine characters is clear cut, but Mrs 
Esterházy is allowed to be irritated about the way things have turned out. 
Some situations are presented ironically and the irony touches the male 
character, in particular, but he will never change. The passage introducing Mrs 
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Esterházy into the novel illustrates this well: the chronical part of the novel 
starts with the conventional image of a man looking for his sports gear and 
indirectly accusing his wife of having put it away. Mrs Esterházy's first 
utterance in the novel is the question: 'Are you blind?' (Ibid., 133); her 
irritation is emphasised by the narrator's comment who qualifies her question 
as an utterance 'without any rhetorical quality'. Mrs Esterházy's second 
utterance is given by the narrator in indirect speech without a comment: it is 
a question about whether her husband's visitors want some coffee. 
All the traits of the characters and their roles are static and strongly 
opposed to one another: there is an opposition between the euphoric (connect-
ed to the female character) and the dysphoric (connected to the male 
character). 
euphoric vs dysphoric 
she is a beautiful woman he is not a really handsome man 
'Frau Gitti looked up with sleepy while he, the Master, always wakes 
eyes. The Master again observed up wrinkled like a bulldog.' (Ibid., 
with admiration the morning 336) 
smoothness of her face, the vivid red 
of her mouth, the blinding darkness 
(not exactly like that!) of her eyes, 
the soft arch of the eyebrows, the 
intimate neutrality of the base of her 
nose ("exxcelent!") and the tired pu-
rity of her forehead; 
The above example shows that most of the descriptions are finely ironic, 
mainly because of the stereotypes which are embedded in the language. Such 
use of language is typical of the whole text of the novel and emphasises the 
stereotypical situations in which all things and characters are presented. I shall 
return to this problem later on. 
When there is no intention to compare the woman's beauty, then it is shown 
from her husband's viewpoint: 
'Frau Gitti's thighs axe first class; coming at the women from the psyche: she fulfills 
the most extreme adolescent dreams of the Master!' (Ibid., 176) 
'Lady Gitti was as pretty as a picture. Her olive skin and her freckles positively 
radiated outwards, fragrant, colorful bubbles of air floated towards the city. The Master 
closed his eyes, people stopped in their tracks everywhere, and just stared and stared. 
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«You know, my friend, I saw my wife, I personally, with my very eyes!»' (Ibid., 
342-243) 
Returning to my earlier discussion, we fmd more examples of the opposition 
between the euphoric and the dysphoric in the text: 
she is practical 
Frau Gitti helps both of them 
Gitti has to list the things that are 
missing, like spoons and small plates 
she advises him to open the door 
and to look 
she is a very good cook 
she is always busy and helpful 
The plates were changed (thanks to 
Lady Gitti's presence in the back-
ground, [...].' (Ibid., 185) 'Fragrant 
black coffee beckoned invitingly, the 
result of Lady Gitti's blessed hands.' 
(Ibid., 208) 
she is a very good and caring mother 
when their daughter is bleeding be-
cause of her fall from the bicycle, 
she is the first to run to help 
he is very clumsy 
once, when he once tries to console 
a crying baby, he falls into the bed 
once he serves breakfast in bed, but 
forgets to bring half of the things 
when he asks who is ringing at the 
door 
he never cooks 
but he can make some tea 
at home, he is mostly sitting 
in his favourite arm-chair, reading 
newspaper and receiving visitors; 
Gitti's illness is a disaster, it makes 
clear what takes up most of her days: 
there are so many dirty dishes in the 
sink, that he cannot fill the kettle to 
boil some water for a cup of tea. 
he tries to be a good father 
he makes first an literary associ-
ation: 'Blut muss fliessen knüppel-
dick, vivat, hoch, die Republik!' 
(371) Then, he also helps the child. 
In the light of the above examples, it is absolutely clear that the narration 
of Termelési-regény is not realistic. Firstly, the accumulation of stereotypical 
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situations, behaviours and statements is obvious. Secondly, the use of language 
is such that it does refer not only to reality, but also to the literary and 
everyday language. It is a feature of Esterházy's style that he makes use of 
literary and linguistic stereotypes. In this context, it is important to realize 
which stereotypical situations are not shown and which descriptions are not 
ironically stereotyped. All things which have to do with family ties, religion 
and fidelity are presented without irony; they are the unquestioned values. 
(The fact that some characters show quite an immature behaviour at the 
table or in the church is relevant only to them, and not to the values 
themselves.) 
Let me give an example/ The young husband is absolutely faithful to his 
wife. Of course, he notices other women and he likes some of them, but they 
never attract him physically. The structure of the text could make it possible 
that, in the stereotypical situation of a famous writer touring Europe, he 
should flirt with some attractive girls or have an affair, but this is not the case. 
Not even an (imaginary) meeting with Gina Lollobrigida and her proposition 
to visit her in the evening can breach his fidelity. On the contrary, at night he 
passionately desires his wife. 
In this very intertextual and meta-literary text, there are some very brief 
statements, spoken and repeated by both actors, which are conspicious by their 
simplicity: 
'You darling.' (Ibid., 201, 202, 303) 
'It's great living with you.' (Ibid., 303, 345) 
There are also statements without irony or poetry: 
'Big Boss, I love you,' he said to the sleeping woman.' I love you because you're 
gorgeous, you have a fine mind, and because your ass is aabsolutely purrffect.' (Ibid., 
443) 
There are also erotic descriptions in the text such as, for example, those of 
Gitta in the bath (349) which in addition to being simple and lacking irony, 
express her husband's great admiration for her beauty. 
In Esterházy's novels, a happy family life is a very important value, but it 
seems to be in conflict with a woman's independence. This means that a value 
such as one's independence is absent, because dependence is seen as an intrinsic 
part of love. 
Using the Greimasian model, the system of values held by Frau Gitti can 
be illustrated as follows: 
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Manipulation Competence Performance Sanction 
happiness marriage love and happy family life 
dependency 
In this context, I would like to suggest that the values in the discursive 
configuration of Esterházy's family life are based on Christian virtues, for 
example, on selfless love. 
Hrabal könyve 
The Novel Hrabal könyve is a tale about a family, with the character Anna 
as the central actor. This is almost a realistic story, but there are two actors in 
it who do not belong to the Veal world': they are angels send by God to 
protect the family happiness. Once upon the time, God needed to send one 
angel only, the archangel Gabriel, to announce the pregnancy, but in modern 
times, when the protection of pregnancy is the main problem, God needs two 
helpers. One of them was earlier called Gabriel, but nobody uses his name 
now. In times that have changed, God and the two angels will not intervene, 
they can only watch the events: the angels, installed in a Lada car communi-
cate with God by modern technological equipment and in a very modern 
language. The installation of the two observers makes it possible to present 
Anna from a point of view other than that of her husband's, but the result is 
the same: the angels are delighted with her beauty and they express this in a 
very sexist language, talking about her 'pretty ass'. Of course, they are not 
really 'dangerous' as men. Besides, Anna sees them as spies. 
There are many thematic and poetical11 similarities between the two novels: 
Anna's husband is a writer,12 the family ties are very important and Anna who is 
presented as a pretty and desirable woman, is consciously and extremely devoted 
to her family. However, Anna has a much more independent personality than 
Frau Gitti. This is apparent from the enumeration of her roles which are, 
nevertheless, still only connected to the discursive configuration of family life: 
a wife, (to some extent) a mistress, a housewife, a mother, a daughter-in-law, a 
daughter, a niece. 
Anna sees herself as having more roles and tasks. Let me illustrate this by 
citing one of her statements: 
'I can see and understand that I'm needed around here. Only sometimes I think that 
someone is needed here and not me, a kind of anonymous jack-of-all-trades, lover, wife, 
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family, secretary, mother, mother in lieu of mother, interior decorator, cook, kitchen 
help, spiritual solace, corrector, gardener, receptionist, nurse, charwoman, friend, [...].' 
(Esterházy 1990: 151-152) 
It is clear that all these words have, as a common characteristic, the notion 
of servitude. 
As the above quotation shows, Anna has a voice in the text: the third person 
narrator "allows" her to take over the narration about herself and to present her 
interior monologues. Her husband and her family constitute a big part of it. Most 
of her inner thoughts are addressed to the Czech writer, Bohumil Hrabal, in whom 
Anna's husband is interested, since he is writing a book about him. Through her 
husband, Hrabal becomes present in the family and becomes her friend. This is a 
really grotesque situation: only thanks to her husband can Anna have somebody 
to whom she can tell her problems, but it is a very logical solution, because, like 
Frau Gitti, Anna is mostly enclosed in her home and surrounded by her children, 
husband, and her family. She only goes for a short walk early in the evening and 
then she thinks about the life that she has accepted and loves. However, there is 
some tension in this novel and, this time, this tension is inside Anna herself. 
euphoric vs dysphoric 
it is fine to have always somebody 
around 
after nearly twenty years, she still 
adores, loves and desires her hus-
band 
she adores her parents-in-law 
she likes cooking 
it is tiring to be never alone 
she dreams about Hrabal and she 
speaks to him in her mind 
she never had a really good relation-
ship with her own parents 
she is not patient enough to make a 
good soup (like her mother-in-law 
did) she is not able to get up early 
every morning to prepare breakfast 
for her family (like her mother and 
mother-in-law did) 
she loves her children she is frightened by her fourth preg-
nancy 
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It is not the desire for personal development or career that forces Anna to 
think about the abortion, it is only the tiredness. 
'I don't want to have any more children,... No, no, no I don't want them anymore. 
I don't want to carry my big belly, my big bloody belly any more, I don't want to wear 
the same dress for half a year, no more iron for me, no more throwing up, no more 
pain, no more hospital [...].' (Ibid., 114) 
Anna speaks about the abortion to Hrabal, and she revolts against her 
husband. Finally he persuades her to keep the baby, sitting in the kitchen and 
caressing her hand, by the following arguments: 
'[...] he was clearly struggling with words,' if... if you want... if you want it... then 
... then I will give birth...'. (Ibid., 144) 
The novel ends with the happy-end, Anna shall bear her child. As she 
herself says, a miracle has happened, so the angels were not sent in vain. Using 
Greimas' framework, her life can be depicted as follows: 
Manipulation Competence Performance Sanction 
happiness marriage and acceptance of happy family life 
motherhood the fourth 
pregnancy 
Happiness is, of course, a very relative notion. In this novel, happiness 
means living in the family and working for it. The wife and the husband have 
totally different tasks, but the same goals. He brings bags of cement, when the 
family house is being built and spends whole days in his study writing books. 
She cooks and the attention that the text pays to the preparation of meals is 
significant: eating together in a family, eating with friends, offering food to a 
stranger (to console him) become the sharing of food, creating a community in 
the Biblical sense. Happiness means, thus, living closely together and serving 
each other. This is, of course, a very traditional model of life. It can be called 
paternalistic from feminist viewpoint, but it is simply based on other values: 
dependence, solidarity, happiness through other people, sense of being useful. 
In the light of some interviews with Esterházy, the family (and the church) 
appears to be the very place for a lonely human being (Keresztury 1991: 24). 
The acceptance of all the tasks connected with the family life is explicitly 
expressed by Anna: 
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Tm a wife, with a stress on all three words.' (Ibid., 147) 
I t was my choice. I'm free and I'm confined, that's my condition.' (Ibid., 152) 
These words, spoken by a female character in a book by a male writer will 
not sound convincing to everyone. The whole thing looks more like an idyllic 
and, in some way, romantic, male fantasy. 
This novel creates a fairy land, where good heroes always get their just 
rewards. 
Notes 
1. This kind of'positive discrimination' is current in the Netherlands. 
2. Feminist studies give us examples of 'discriminating' behaviour against women writers: I t may 
be respectable to write about Conan Doyle or even Raymond Chandler but Christie remains 
beyond the pale, [...]. It is an extraordinary fact, given the centrality of her work to British 
cultural life, that no self-respecting British critic has ever written at decent length about her, 
[...].' (Light 1991: 64) 
The Hungarian critics and scholars show a similar attitude. 
3.'[...] 'consciousness-raising' came to signify a variety of related activities which are spelled out 
in Juliet Mitchell's definition: the process of transforming the hidden, individual fears of 
women into a shared awareness of the meaning of them as social problems, the release of anger, 
anxiety, the struggle of proclaming the painful and transforming it into the political? [my 
emphasis] (quoted by Ruthven 1990: 71.) 
4. The connection between Kata Bethlen and Margit Kaffka on the one hand, and Margit Kaffka 
and the two above-mentioned male writers on the other is certainly worth considering. 
5. As an example, I would like to mention the reprint of two novels by Renée Erdős (1879-1956), 
a Hungarian female author. The Hungarian critics were unanimously negative about it (Illés 
1972, Iszlai 1990). It is also significant that only a scholar outside Hungary is interested in 
analysis of books considered to be trivial literature. I allude to the paper presented by L. 
Kemenes Géfin at the Modern Languages Association Convention (Toronto 1993), entitled 
Female Identity in the Novels of Renée Erdős. I would like to thank the author for allowing 
me to read his manuscript. 
6. Another example of research from feminist viewpoint into Hungarian literature, written in 
Hungarian is the article by a Dutch scholar (Molemkamp 1994). 
7. Sterilization is not allowed in Eastern Europe. 
8. This novel is translated into the French: Esterházy Péter: Trois anges me surveillent. Les aveux 
d'un roman. Traduit du hongrois par Agnés Járfás et Sophie Képes. Paris 1989: Gallimard. 
9. This novel is to some extent autobiographical. This is the reason why the name of the author 
and that of the most important character are the same. 
10. In Hungarian: Esterházy felesége (113), az asszony (ibid.), a mester felesége, a csudás Gitti 
asszony (138), Frau Gitti (139), Gittuskám (ibid.), Gittus (173), Édes Gittis (176), etc. All the 
quotations from Esterházy 1979. 
11. We can also recognise the typical Esterhazy's style which I have just described in connection 
with the Termelési-regény. 
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12. This time it is the husband who has no name. The third person narrator calls him simply 'the 
writer'. When Anna takes over the narration she speaks about 'my husband', using often a 
somewhat archaic form, or she expresses her feelings for him by calling him 'my happiness', 
'my darling', etc. 
Bibliography 
Arkánum. (eds.) András, Sándor - Baránszky, László - Kemenes Géfin, László - Vitéz, György. 
Bálint, Éva - Veres, András 1974: A sikertelenség környezetrajza. Valóság 8, 58-74. 
Brouwer, L., Broomans, P. Paasman, R. (eds.) 1990: Beyond Limits: Boundaries in Feminist 
Semiotics and Literary Theory. Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. 
Esterházy, Péter 1990: Hrabal könyve. Budapest: Magvető. 
Esterházy, Péter 1979: Termelési-regény (kisssregény). Budapest: Magvető. 
Illés, Endre 1972: Gyóntatószék-erotika. In: Illés, E. 1972: Árnyékrajzok. Budapest: Magvető, 
434^139. 
Irigaray, Luce 1992: A másik nő mely nem egynem(iszerv)ű. Arkánum, 10. sz., 48-60. 
Iszlai, Zoltán 1990: Santerra bíboros-ról. Magyar Napló, 6. sz. 2. 
Keresztury, Tibor 1991: Félterpeszben. Arcképek az újabb magyar irodalomból. JAK füzetek 54. 
Budapest: Magvető Kiadó. 
Kristeva, Julia 1986: Women's Time. In: Toni Moi (ed.): Kristeva Reader. Blackwell: Oxford. 
Light, Alison 1991: Forever England: Femininity, Literature and Conservatism Between the Wars. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
Lőcsei, Pál 1985: A női munkavállalás és a hagyományos magyar család. Kortárs XXIX: 10, 
78-90. 
Mtrak, Krzysztof 1992: Stownik feminizmu. Literatura 7 (118), 11, 56. 
Mills, Sara - Pearce, Lynne - Spaull, Sue - Millard, Elaine (eds.) 1989: Feminist Readings/Fem­
inists Reading. New York/London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Molenkamp-Wiltink, In eke 1994: A női perspektíva szerepe Weöres Sándor Psyché és Esterházy 
Péter Tizenhét hattyúk című művében. Jelenkor 6. sz., 533-543. 
Penley, Constance 1992: «Egy bizonyos különbség elutasítása»: feminizmus és filmelmélet. 
Arkánum, 10. sz., 24-32. 
Ruthven, K. K. 1990: Feminist Literary Studies. An Introduction. Canto. 
Sükösd, Miklós 1992: Feminizmus az egyetemen. Ki mossa ki a zoknit? Magyar Narancs 1992. 
VI. évf. 29. IV. 1992., 8. 

Die Ungarn, ihre Geschichte und 
Kultur 
Edited by L. Kosa 
Ein hervorragendes Autorenkollektiv unternimmt hier erstmals den 
Versuch, den Leser über alles, was zur Hungarologie gehört, zu 
informieren. In diesem Werk sind sämtliche das Ungarntum und 
Ungarn betreffenden Kenntnisse kurz und knapp zusammengefaßt. 
Nach einer Einführung in die Hungarologie, ihrer Begriffsbestimmung, 
der Anzahl und territorialen Verbreitung der Ungarn in der Welt folgt 
ein Überblick über die ungarische Sprache, deren Verwandtschaft 
und Perioden. Das Kapitel über die Geschichte Ungarns beginnt bei 
der ungarischen Urgeschichte und erstreckt sich bis hin in die neueste 
Zeit. Die Literatur und Künste werden ausgehend von der ältesten 
ungarischen Dichtung nach Perioden und Themenkreisen bis in die 
jüngste Vergangenheit hinein behandelt. Die Ethnographie, die 
ungarische Volkskultur, deren historischen Schichten und Stellung 
in Europa bilden den Schluß dieses umfassenden Werkes. Die 
Bibliographie enthält in den Weltsprachen erschienenen Studien und 
Bücher, die zur weiteren eingehenden Orientierung verhelfen. 
Das Buch wendet sich an alle, die sich mit der ungarischen Sprache 
befassen und die Vergangenheit sowie Kultur der Ungarn 
kennenlernen möchten, es richtet sich an jene, die zwar ungarischer 
Abstammung sind, aber nicht in diesem Kulturkreis aufgewachsen 
sind oder leben, und es ist für all die von Interesse, die mehr über 
Ungarn wissen möchten, als ein Reiseführer vermittelt. Gleichzeitig 
bietet es das erforderliche Grundwissen für ein ausführliches 
Ungarnstudium. 
Readership: historians, undergraduate students, general public 
In German, 1994,508 pages, 17 x 25 cm. 
Hardbound, $ 65 
ISBN 963 05 6702 4 
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest m 
Nous, les Hongrois 
by I. Nemeskürty 
Cet ouvrage n'est pas un traité d'historiographie, mais comme les 
autres livres d'István Nemeskürty, une lecture captivante qui facilite 
la comprehension du present de la Hongrie par la presentation de son 
passé. 
L'auteur traite l'histoire de Hongrie dans l'ordre chronologique, de la 
conquéte du pays ä 1947, date du traité de Paris. Nous lirons avec 
intérét les événements qui marquérent le régne du roi saint Etienne, 
fondateur de l'Etat, et celui des autres Arpadiens, l'époque de la 
maison d'Anjou, la gloire des Hunyadi, l'occupation turque et les 
malheurs du pays divisé en trois parties. L'auteur nous fait connaitre 
le monde des kouroutz, puis nous présente l'empire Habsbourg, le 
mouvement des jacobins hongrois, les guerres napoléoniennes, la 
Reforme, ainsi que la revolution bourgeoise, la guerre d'indépendance 
de 1848,- puis le Compromis. II consacre tout un chapitre ä la 
tragédie de la premiere guerre mondiale, ainsi qu'á la période qui va 
du traité de Trianon ä celui de Paris. 
Le volume est complete dune Petite encyclopedic, qui contient des 
données de base vuígarisatrices sur les personnalités hongroises ou 
les personnalités étrangéres en rapport étroit avec l'histoire de Hongrie. 
Cet appendice enrichit la matiére du livre, le rend plus systématique 
et plus facile ä utiliser. 
Readership: historians, undergraduate students, general public 
In French,1994,383 pages, 17 x 25 cm, 
Hardbound, $ 62 
ISBN 963 05 6688 5 
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
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